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Why Misdemeanors Matter: 
Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts 
Jenny Roberts* 
Most individuals accused in our nation’s criminal courts are not charged 
with murder, rape, drug sales, or even less serious felonies. The vast 
majority of charges are in the lower courts, for misdemeanors such as 
marijuana possession, driving with a license suspension for failure to pay 
tickets, assault, disorderly conduct, or public intoxication. Misdemeanor 
adjudications have exploded in recent years, with one recent study 
estimating that the volume of misdemeanor cases nationwide has risen 
from five to more than ten million between 1972 and 2006. At the same 
time, violent crime and the number of felony cases across the country have 
decreased markedly. 
A common misperception is that misdemeanor charges might lead to a 
night in jail and the punishment of going through the process — often 
requiring a number of court appearances — culminating in dismissal, 
deferred adjudication, or a quick guilty plea with community service, a 
fine, or perhaps some small amount of jail time. Yet the consequences of 
even the most “minor” misdemeanor conviction can be far reaching, and 
include deportation, sex offender registration, and loss of public housing 
and student loans. In addition, criminal records are now widely available 
electronically and employers, landlords, and others log on to check them. 
These “collateral consequences” of a misdemeanor conviction are often 
more dire than any direct criminal penalty. 
What often stands between an individual and an avoidable misdemeanor 
conviction, with its harsh effects, is a good lawyer. Yet a profound crisis 
exists in the lower courts, brought about by a widespread lack of zealous 
representation for indigent people charged with misdemeanors. Many 
individuals charged with low-level crimes receive representation from 
defense attorneys with overwhelming caseloads, in a criminal justice 
system singularly focused on rapid finality in the large numbers of 
docketed cases. Despite this urgent situation, the body of scholarship on 
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the right to effective representation and the indigent defense crisis has 
largely ignored misdemeanors. This Article describes how ineffective 
assistance jurisprudence is undeveloped for misdemeanors and how 
published professional standards for defense advocacy have failed to 
address misdemeanors. There is almost no guidance about proper norms 
for this distinct category of cases. This Article calls for responses to the 
misdemeanor representation crisis from the three groups situated to make 
a difference in this area based on their particular institutional 
competencies: the judiciary, the defender community, and professional 
organizations that draft standards for practice. Without proper 
administration, including effective defense representation, the current 
approach to mass misdemeanor processing and prosecution significantly 
impedes substantive justice for the individual, public perception of justice, 
and public safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is time to end the wasteful and harmful practices that have 
turned our misdemeanor courts into mindless conviction mills. 
— Former Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice Gerald Kogan1 
 
In Detroit, Michigan, the Misdemeanor Defender Professional 
Corporation has a flat-fee contract with the City of Detroit to handle 
between 12,000 and 14,000 cases each year.2 The five part-time 
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 1 ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THREE-
MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 8 (2011) 
[hereinafter THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE].  
 2 NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, “A RACE TO THE BOTTOM,” EVALUATION OF 
THE TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN MICHIGAN 23 (2008) [hereinafter RACE 
TO THE BOTTOM].  
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Corporation attorneys must carry between 2,400 and 2,800 
misdemeanors a year, which is more than 500 percent greater than the 
nationally recognized caseload recommendation of 300–400 
misdemeanors per year for full-time defenders.3 This means that 
Corporation attorneys will spend an average of thirty-two minutes, or 
about $51 of legal services, on each client’s case.4 Thirty minutes 
south, in Woodhaven, Michigan, a similar situation occurs. There, a 
person charged with a misdemeanor who is entitled to court-
appointed counsel will be represented at a pretrial conference by 
“house counsel” who represents every indigent defendant in court that 
day.5 Those facing misdemeanor charges cannot meet their attorney 
until the day of court, “which could be anywhere from one to three 
weeks after arraignment.”6 The court administrator in Woodhaven 
“estimated that, in an average year, there would be one motion filed by 
house counsel and maybe two jury trials involving an indigent 
defendant.”7 
These stories of assembly-line representation in the lower criminal 
courts have received little attention. Instead, scholars, practitioners, 
and the press have highlighted inadequate representation cases such as 
one where a court deemed “effective” the performance of a sleeping 
lawyer in a death penalty case.8 A series of DNA exonerations of 
innocent men and women in high-profile cases have also “reveal[ed] a 
trail of sleeping, drunk, incompetent and overburdened defense 
attorneys.”9 These shocking examples and others deserve continuing 
criticism; the stakes were high, and the representation was egregious. 
Contrary to popular belief, however, the vast majority of criminal 
cases in the United States are not felonies. They are misdemeanors: 
“minor” dramas played out in much higher numbers every day in 
 
 3 Id.; see also infra note 77 and accompanying text (describing nationally 
recommended caseload standards). 
 4 RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 23. 
 5 Id. at 27.  
 6 Id. (noting that “the court does not give out house counsel phone numbers 
until the day of court”). 
 7 Id.  
 8 See McFarland v. Texas, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Jeffrey 
L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 
460-63 (1996); Bob Herbert, In America; The Death Factory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, 
at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/02/opinion/in-america-the-
death-factory.html?scp=2&sq=sleeping%20lawyer%20death%20penalty&st=cse. 
 9 Bad Lawyering, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/Bad-Lawyering.php (last visited July 11, 2011). 
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lower courts across the country.10 A 2008 analysis of eleven state 
courts revealed that misdemeanors comprised 79% of the total 
caseload in those courts.11 In addition to comprising the majority of 
criminal cases, misdemeanors are also on the rise. One recent study 
estimated that the volume of misdemeanor cases nationwide has risen 
from five to more than ten million between 1972 and 2006.12 This 
change has taken place across diverse jurisdictions. In New York State, 
misdemeanor arrests rose from 363,634 in 2001 to 423,947 in 2010.13 
The public defender in Lancaster County, Nebraska experienced a 
56% increase in the number of new misdemeanor cases between 2003 
and 2007.14 In Florida, almost “a half million people, or approximately 
 
 10 See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., ADULT ARRESTS: 2001–2010, 
available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/NewYorkState.pdf 
[hereinafter NEW YORK STATE ADULT ARRESTS: 2001–2010] (listing statistics for “adult 
arrests” for New York States in 2010 as 584,558 total, of which 423,947 were 
misdemeanors and 160,611 were felonies).  
 11 ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 (2010), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/ 
d_research/csp/2008_files/EWSC-2008-Online%20Version%20v2.pdf; see also NEW YORK 
STATE ADULT ARRESTS: 2001-2010, supra note 10 (noting almost 600,000 arrests in 2010, 
with felonies comprising just over 160,000 of that total); Steve W. Perry, Prosecutors in 
State Courts, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL., at 6 (Ser. No. NCJ 
213799, 2006) (“In 2005 State court prosecutors reported closing over 2.4 million felony 
cases and nearly 7.5 million misdemeanor cases.”), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf. The actual difference between 
prosecuted misdemeanors and felonies is even greater, as only 95% of all state 
prosecutors’ offices reported handling misdemeanor cases. Id. at 4 tbl.5. County 
attorneys or perhaps police officers presumably prosecuted misdemeanors in the 
remaining five percent of jurisdictions, or the court handled the disposition without any 
prosecutorial involvement.  
 12 See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, MALIA N. BRINK & MAUREEN DIMINO, NAT’L ASSOC. 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF 
AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009) [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES, 
MASSIVE WASTE] (citing National Center for State Courts, 2007 Criminal Caseloads 
Report finding that in data gathered in 12 states in 2006, there was a “median 
misdemeanor rate of 3,544 per 100,000” people).  
 13 See NEW YORK STATE ADULT ARRESTS: 2001–2010, supra note 10 (listing numbers 
demonstrating that misdemeanor arrests climbed substantially each year from 2000 to 
2009, with the exception of 2004); see also JUSTIN BARRY & LISA LINDSAY, OFFICE 
DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT 26-27 (2010), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/criminal/ 
AnnualReport2009.pdf. 
 14 ELIZABETH NEELEY, LANCASTER COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER WORKLOAD ASSESSMENT 
JULY 2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://ppc.unl.edu/userfiles/file/Documents/ 
projects/Public%20Defender/Public%20Defender%20Workload%20Assessment.pdf. 
The corresponding felony picture is quite different. Between 2000 and 2009, the 
violent crime rate in the United States fell by 39%. Both violent and property crime 
rates in 2009 were at their lowest recorded levels since 1973. Jennifer L. Truman & 
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3% of the state’s adults, pass through [the] misdemeanor courts each 
year.”15 These numbers reflect a recent explosion of misdemeanor 
adjudications flooding trial courts around the country. Although full 
exploration of the causes of rising misdemeanor volume are beyond 
the scope of this Article, the adoption of zero-tolerance policing and 
broken windows theory — which claim that policing minor quality-of-
life offenses helps control violent crime — are largely responsible for 
the trend in many jurisdictions.16 
The high-volume misdemeanor system is clearly in crisis. 
Misdemeanor defenders handle caseloads far above nationally 
recommended standards,17 yet have few resources to investigate and 
perform the core tasks for their clients’ cases.18 They practice in 
overcrowded courts where defendants are pressured to enter quick 
guilty pleas without adequate time to consult with the attorney they 
may have just met.19 Their potential clients often face pressure to 
waive the right to counsel in order to enter a guilty plea.20 
 
Michael R. Rand, Criminal Victimization, 2009, in U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATS. BULL. at 2-3, (Ser. No. NCJ 231327, 2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv09.pdf; cf. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005: PERCENT CHANGE IN VOLUME AND 
RATE PER 100,000 INHABITANTS FOR 2 YEARS, 5 YEARS, 10 YEARS (2009), available at 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_01a.html (showing how, between 2000 
and 2009, the violent crime rate fell 15.2% per 100,000 inhabitants). Except for 
burglary, violent crime fell in every category, including murder, rape, and aggravated 
assault. It also fell 31.5% for motor vehicle theft during that ten-year period. Id. In 
New York, for example, violent felony arrests dropped from more than 51,000 in 2001 
to 44,000 in 2010. NEW YORK STATE ADULT ARRESTS: 2001-2010, supra note 10 (listing 
overall felony total as dropping from 169,942 in 2001 to 160,611 in 2010). 
 15 See THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 9 app. C. 
 16 See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Mar. 1982, at 29 (introducing the “broken windows” theory); see also Peter A. Barta, 
Note, Giuliani, Broken Windows, and the Right to Beg, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
165, 168–69 (1999) (summarizing Mayor Giuliani’s “zero-tolerance policing” 
approach and its effects on New York City’s homeless population); cf. BERNARD E. 
HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 6-7 
(2001) (scrutinizing the evidence and policy behind the “broken windows” theory). 
 17 See infra Part I.A. 
 18 See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 10-11, 19 (2004), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/ 
fullreport.pdf [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE]; MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, 
supra note 12, at 38. 
 19 See infra Part I.D (discussing coercive aspects of plea bargaining in the lower 
courts). 
 20 See infra Part III.D.2 (discussing waiver of the right to counsel). 
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The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies 
to many misdemeanor cases and implicates many of these issues of 
high workloads, resource deprivation, and substantive and procedural 
justice.21 There are also ethical rules, state laws, and professional 
guidelines relevant to criminal defense representation. Yet, the crisis in 
effective misdemeanor representation confronts a blank slate of 
standards specific to misdemeanor practice. The Supreme Court has 
never applied Strickland v. Washington’s two-pronged ineffective 
assistance of counsel test in the misdemeanor context.22 Although 
some lower court decisions have done so, these cases do not tackle the 
difficult question of what differences there are, if any, between 
effective representation in felony and misdemeanor cases.23 
Professional standards, an important source for norms of effective 
assistance both as a constitutional and practical matter, also do not 
consider the specific issues and problems relating to misdemeanor 
advocacy.24 In short, there are no standards against which to judge the 
critical failures of representation in the lower criminal courts.25 
Careful analysis of the current state of misdemeanor representation 
in the United States is inadequately developed, and the subject merits 
much more than the scant attention it now receives both in criminal 
justice literature and in practice.26 Thus, at a time when some 
 
 21 See infra Part II.A (explaining how the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
applies in any case where the defendant is sentenced to actual or suspended 
incarceration, and how many states offer more generous levels of misdemeanor 
representation, including states that confer the right to counsel for all misdemeanors 
regardless of the sentence). The vast majority of individuals charged with 
misdemeanors, and who have a right to counsel, qualify for state-appointed counsel. 
See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A 
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006) (“Poor people account for more 
than eighty percent of individuals prosecuted.”). 
 22 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (noting that defendant, 
to win claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, must demonstrate (1) that defense 
counsel’s representation was deficient as judged by prevailing professional norms, and 
(2) that this deficiency was prejudicial to the defendant). For an insightful and 
comprehensive examination of the Court’s jurisprudential journey towards the two-
prong ineffective assistance test, see Donald A. Dripps, Effective Assistance of Counsel: 
The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 269-78 
(1997); see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing lack of Supreme Court cases on 
misdemeanor ineffective assistance). 
 23 See also infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 25 See infra Part I. 
 26 Although the literature has largely failed to examine misdemeanors and other 
minor adjudications separately, there are some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Erica J. 
Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 461 
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commentators have called for a greater focus on the felony 
representation crisis at the expense of misdemeanor representation,27 
this Article recognizes a utilitarian argument for more attention to 
low-level cases, which affect so many individuals and communities 
and have serious hidden consequences.28 As one report noted, 
“[E]xperts have observed innumerable times that public defender 
offices across the country are underfunded. What is essentially 
unreported is how this underfunding disparately impacts those 
accused of misdemeanors.”29 
The crisis in misdemeanor representation and the lack of specific 
standards for this large category of cases raises important questions for 
courts, professional organizations, and defender offices. Should there 
be separate standards for misdemeanor representation? If felony 
ineffective assistance jurisprudence and existing professional 
 
(2007); John Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1222 
(1994) (focusing on a “practical definition of the Sixth Amendment in the lower 
courts”). With respect to the realities of the lower criminal courts, see Michael Pinard, 
Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry Into 
Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067, 1069-70 & n.9 (2004); Ian 
Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1157, 1160-62 (2004); Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Court and 
the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 316 (2005) (discussing New York City). 
Recent commentary on broken windows theory, although focused on the policing 
aspects of minor charges, is also relevant here. See, e.g., HARCOURT, supra note 16, at 6-
7 (questioning whether broken windows is an effective strategy). With respect to 
misdemeanors more generally, “there is a startling dearth of data on misdemeanor 
case processing.” Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 89 
(2007) (noting how New York City is “something of an exception” to this general 
observation).  
 27 See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument From 
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 801 (2004) (suggesting default rules by 
which indigent defense providers should ration scarce resources, including “a harm-
reduction principle that gives a qualified preference to suspects facing greater 
potential punishments”); Hashimoto, supra note 26, at 461 (arguing that states should 
free up limited defender resources by “significantly curtailing the appointment of 
counsel in low-level misdemeanor cases,” but ignoring the collateral consequences of 
misdemeanor convictions). For a robust debate over the need for triage in criminal 
defense work, compare Mitchell, supra note 26, at 1222 (1994) (focusing on a 
“practical definition of the Sixth Amendment in the lower courts” and urging 
recognition of the need for triage in decision-making process about how to distribute 
defender resources), with Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public 
Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911(2005) (rejecting Mitchell’s call for triage and re-
definition of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). See also John B. Mitchell, In 
(Slightly Uncomfortable) Defense of “Triage” by Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 925 
(2005) (responding to Freedman).  
 28 See infra Part I.B. 
 29 MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 26.  
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standards apply to misdemeanors, where should misdemeanor lawyers 
look for guidance about misdemeanor-specific issues such as higher 
caseloads, fewer resources, and plea offers and guilty pleas at the first 
court appearance? Given the many structural obstacles to 
development of a jurisprudence of ineffective misdemeanor 
lawyering,30 how might courts shape ineffective assistance law to 
address misdemeanor-specific situations? Should professional 
organizations rely on commentary or rather black-letter misdemeanor-
specific standards in order to guide misdemeanor representation? 
What often stands between an individual and an unnecessary 
misdemeanor conviction is a good lawyer. The quality of 
representation that an individual gets in a misdemeanor case is 
significant on many levels, including substantive justice for that 
individual, public perception of justice, and public safety. First, people 
sometimes go to jail for misdemeanor convictions. Sentences may be 
short compared to those for serious felony charges, but six months in 
jail or several years of probation, often with monthly fees,31 is 
substantial for the individual and his family.32 An effective lawyer will 
advance sentencing arguments that help avoid unnecessary 
incarceration in appropriate cases, whereas the absence of such 
advocacy can lead to unjust sentences. In addition, the potential for 
wrongful convictions and the troubling phenomenon of innocent 
people pleading guilty is great in low-level cases.33 Exonerations in 
high-profile and high-stakes cases are well documented and 
publicized,34 and inadequate representation is one of the core causes of 
wrongful convictions.35 Although there is no empirical study of such 
 
 30 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 31 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-225 (West 2011) (“Any person under state 
probation or parole supervision shall be required to contribute not more than seventy-
five dollars ($75) per month as determined by the board of correction.”). 
 32 See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (describing statutes in which 
misdemeanors in various jurisdictions can carry up to two, four, or even ten years in 
jail). This observation is also based on my experience in Syracuse, New York, where 
failure to complete drug treatment court for misdemeanor possession regularly 
resulted in nine- to twelve-month sentences.  
 33 See infra Part I.D (discussing coercion and plea bargaining in the misdemeanor 
context). 
 34 See, e.g., Innocence Project Case Profiles, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2011) (“There have been 
280 post-conviction DNA exonerations in United States history. These stories are 
becoming more familiar as more innocent people gain their freedom through 
postconviction testing.”). 
 35 See EMILY M. WEST, COURT FINDINGS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AMONG THE FIRST 255 DNA EXONERATION CASES 1 
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wrongful convictions in the lower courts, the conviction of the 
innocent through trial or guilty plea is surely not limited to capital 
cases and serious felonies.36 Unfortunately, as one report noted, 
“There is no national Innocence Project for the hundreds of thousands 
of misdemeanor cases that lack DNA evidence.”37 
Second, the relationship between a person charged with a 
misdemeanor and defense counsel is a meaningful part of the overall 
experience that person has with the criminal justice system.38 
Procedural justice matters. Inadequate assistance of counsel in 
criminal cases affects both the individual’s and the public’s perception 
of the criminal justice system’s legitimacy, which may undermine 
future willingness to obey the law.39 Third, recent research has 
revealed that saddling large numbers of individuals with permanent 
criminal records significantly impedes access to employment. This 
 
(2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Innocence_Project_IAC_ 
Report.pdf. 
 36 See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1559 (“It is fair 
to say that the proven cases of actual innocence are just the tip of the innocence 
iceberg, so to speak.”). 
 37 RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 15. 
 38 See Am. Council of Chief Defenders, Statement on Caseloads and Workloads at 2-
3, available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1189179200.71/ 
EDITEDFINALVERSIONACCDCASELOADSTATEMENTsept6.pdf [hereinafter 
Statement on Caseloads and Workloads] (“Excessive public defender caseloads and 
workloads [that] threaten the ability of even the most dedicated lawyers to provide 
effective representation to their clients . . . can . . . lead to the public’s loss of 
confidence in the ability of our courts to provide equal justice.”); see also JUSTICE 
POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 23 
(2011) [hereinafter SYSTEM OVERLOAD].  
 39 See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 175 (2002) (“We find that 
people are responsive to two social aspects of their experience with legal authorities 
— their feelings about the procedural justice of their experience and their trust in the 
motives of those authorities.”); see also E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 1-2 (1988). As Roscoe Pound noted more than 80 
years ago:  
 It is in [the handling of petty prosecutions] that the administration of 
criminal justice touches immediately the greatest number of people. . . . The 
bad physical surroundings, the confusion, the want of decorum, the 
undignified offhand disposition of cases at high speed, the frequent 
suggestion of something working behind the scenes, which characterize the 
petty criminal court in almost all of our cities, create in the minds of 
observers a general suspicion of the whole process of law enforcement 
which, no matter how unfounded, gravely prejudices the law.  
MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER 
CRIMINAL COURT 6 (1979) (quoting ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 190-
191 (1930)).  
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leads to more crime among those individuals, thus undermining 
public safety.40 Some understanding of this link has even begun to 
filter into the public dialogue about crime and public safety.41 
Two ways in which the quality of misdemeanor representation 
matters more today than ever before merit particular attention: the 
proliferation of criminal records and the related phenomenon of an 
explosion in collateral consequences for minor criminal convictions. 
Recent technological advances allow easy access to individuals’ 
criminal records.42 In some states, even cases that end in a dismissal 
remain publicly available and may require the individual to 
affirmatively file, and sometimes pay, for expungement.43 This is an 
enormous change from only several years ago, when researching a 
person’s criminal record often required a trip to the local courthouse 
or multiple courthouses.44 The result is that employers and landlords 
can now quickly search criminal records, so that even when there is 
no legal barrier to housing or employment for the individual, there is 
an effective bar.45 One commentator has aptly described “the stigma of 
 
 40 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, RE-ENTRY AND REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO 
PUBLIC SAFETY 56 (May 2006), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/ 
Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID
=11415 (“[T]he safety of our communities and citizens is jeopardized when 
[convicted persons] . . . revert to a life of crime” because their permanent criminal 
records make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to acquire employment, housing, 
and other necessities.”); Megan C. Kurlychek & Robert Brame, Scarlet Letters and 
Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 483, 486, 490 (2006) (concluding that individuals with permanent criminal 
records are relatively more likely to commit future crimes). 
 41 See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, When ‘Help Wanted’ Comes With a Catch, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 17, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/17/jobs/17convicts.html?_r=2&scp= 
1&sq=conviction&st=nyt (describing hiring hurdles that those with criminal records 
must overcome, and noting several proposals to address these obstacles). Certainly 
much of the public and political concern is driven by fiscal reality. See Adam Liptak, 
Right and Left Join Forces on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, at A1.  
 42 See generally James B. Jacobs, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of 
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177 (2007–2008) (“This Article 
documents how criminal history records are expanding in scope and how their 
dissemination is proliferating.”). 
 43 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105(a) (West 2011) (requiring that 
person petition for expungement of a nolle prosequi); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. §7-202 (West 2011) (noting “a $30 filing fee for docketing a petition for 
expungement of records in a criminal case, unless all records to be expunged relate to 
a charge of which the petitioner has been acquitted.”). 
 44 James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 401 (2006). 
 45 See, e.g., Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC., 937, 958 
(2003) (describing study where testers applied for real jobs with identical credentials 
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[a] criminal record as a ‘negative curriculum vitae.’ ”46 The effect of 
widely available criminal records cannot be underestimated at a time 
when, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, “[o]ver 92 million 
individual offenders were in the criminal history files of the State 
criminal history repositories on December 31, 2008.”47 
Increased access to criminal records coincides with a recent, and 
exponential, growth in the collateral consequences of criminal 
convictions.48 The rise in misdemeanor prosecutions and convictions 
has negative effects that reach far beyond the confines of the criminal 
courthouse. Individuals with misdemeanor convictions may be 
automatically deportable, regardless of their work ties, time spent, and 
family connections in the United States.49 They may lose or be unable 
 
other than race and criminal record: white non-offender tester received callbacks 34% 
of the time he applied; white offender received callbacks for 17% of applications; and 
black offender tester callback ratio plummeted to 5%); see also Devah Pager, Bruce 
Western, & Bart Bonikowski, Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field 
Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2009) (rerunning earlier Pager study in New York 
City, with similar results); Smart on Crime: Recommendations for the Next 
Administration and Congress, THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION, 131-
34 (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_ 
transition2009.pdf (recommending various executive and legislative changes to deal 
with bars to employment for individuals with criminal records). 
Collateral — or hidden — consequences fall into two general categories. First are 
those enforced through civil statutes or regulations, such as immigration laws or 
professional licensing schemes, that apply to individuals convicted of qualifying 
crimes. The second category involves the more diffuse, but equally powerful and more 
far-reaching, effects on families and communities when a person is involved in the 
criminal system even on a relatively minor charge. These effects include a family 
struggling to survive financially, where one member must pay fines and court costs, or 
lose work days to numerous court appearances. See generally FEELEY, supra note 39; K. 
Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive 
Misdemeanor Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 296 (2009) (describing 
how policing misdemeanors through criminal system imposes significant financial and 
legitimacy costs).  
 46 Jacobs, supra note 44, at 420. 
 47 Survey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2008, at 4, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (Oct. 2009) (noting how “[a]n individual offender may have records 
in more than one State”), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/ 
228661.pdf.  
 48 Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, 
and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 770-74 
(2011) (describing expanded scope and severity of collateral penalties in federal and 
state law in past two decades).  
 49 See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; ‘This Has Got Me in Some Kind of 
Whirlwind,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, at A13 (describing deportation order against 
Mary Anne Gehris, who was adopted and brought to United States as an infant, based 
on misdemeanor conviction from her young adulthood). 
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to get public housing and benefits, their driver’s license, or access to 
student loans.50 If convicted of certain misdemeanor sexual offenses, 
they will be required to register as a sex offender, with severe 
restrictions on where they can live and work.51 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of indigent individuals charged 
with low-level crimes receive representation characterized by 
overwhelming caseloads and by courts singularly committed to rapid 
finality and churning the large numbers of docketed cases through the 
system.52 Fortunately, there are a number of institutional actors that 
can respond to the misdemeanor representation crisis. Legislators can 
relieve the numerical and fiscal pressure on the lower courts through 
selective misdemeanor decriminalization. Professional organizations 
can draft specific misdemeanor representation standards or explain 
why standards should be the same for felonies and misdemeanors. The 
defender community can articulate misdemeanor standards and 
institute practices leading to more effective representation. In 
particular, the defense community could argue for resources to 
provide counsel at the first appearance, to ameliorate the problem of 
defendants waiving the right to counsel and guilty pleas at 
arraignment. Finally, the judiciary has a central role in articulating 
standards that recognize the realities of misdemeanor practice. The 
judiciary must provoke state legislatures to adequately fund the 
criminal justice system that the legislatures — and the executive, 
through the police power — have chosen to populate with a wide 
variety of broadly enforced misdemeanor crimes. 
Part I of this Article provides the definition of a misdemeanor and 
then sets out important differences and similarities between 
misdemeanor and felony representation. Part II describes the lack of 
constitutional and other norms, such as professional standards, that 
speak specifically to the effective assistance of misdemeanor counsel. 
Part III explores the institutional competencies of legislators, the 
courts, organizations that draft professional standards, and the 
defender community, noting ways in which each can take part in the 
 
 50 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2003) (listing varying ineligibility periods for 
federal student loans, based on number of drug-related convictions); 21 U.S.C. § 862a 
(2003) (bars to public benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2003) (bars to public housing). 
 51 See, e.g., KAREN J. TERRY & JOHN S. FURLONG, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION: A “MEGAN’S LAW” SOURCEBOOK (2d ed. 2006) (describing 
registration and community notification processes with which sex offenders must 
comply).  
 52 See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 2. But see Ronald F. Wright, 
Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1515, 1531-33 
(2011) (describing more salutary practices in some large public defender offices). 
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critical dialogue about the representation necessary for fair 
administration of misdemeanors. 
I. THE DIFFERENCES, AND CERTAIN SIMILARITIES, BETWEEN 
MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY LAWYERING 
Just what is a misdemeanor? As a general matter, jurisdictions 
divide crimes “into two categories — felonies and misdemeanors. 
Misdemeanors are the less serious offenses, for which punishment is 
generally limited to one year in jail.”53 Despite this general method of 
defining misdemeanors by the penalty imposed for the offense, 
legislatures deviate in different ways, resulting in a broad range of 
crimes that qualify as misdemeanors depending on the particular 
jurisdiction. The result is that a misdemeanor is any crime the relevant 
legislature labels a “misdemeanor.”54 For example, second-degree 
assault in Maryland, which encompasses common-law battery as well 
 
 53 MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 11. In some jurisdictions, there 
are also “infractions” or “violations,” which are generally offenses that are categorized 
as non-criminal even though they may result in a jail sentence. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2008) (making marijuana possession a violation); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 10.00(3) (McKinney 2009) (“ ‘Violation’ means an offense, other than a 
‘traffic infraction,’ for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen 
days cannot be imposed.”). The federal criminal code has three categories of 
misdemeanors, all for crimes with a maximum sentence of less than one year. See 18 
U.S.C.A. § 3559(a) (West 2011) (listing Class A, B, and C misdemeanors with 
sentences, respectively, of six months to one year, thirty days to six months, and five 
to thirty days). All crimes with maximum sentences under five days, or where the 
statute does not authorize imprisonment, are classified as “infractions.” 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 3559(a)(9) (West 2011). Federal criminal law also recognizes the category of “petty” 
offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §19 (2003) (including Class B and C misdemeanors as well as 
infractions in definition of “petty offense”). However, this distinction has been 
relevant only in connection with defining the right to a jury trial. See Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) (“So-called petty offenses were tried without 
juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt 
from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial 
provisions.”); see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[N]o offense can 
be deemed ‘petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for 
more than six months is authorized.”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) 
(holding that six-person jury satisfies Sixth Amendment’s jury trial requirement). In 
Baldwin, the Court rejected New York State’s request that it “draw the line between 
‘petty’ and ‘serious’ to coincide with the line between misdemeanor and felony.” 
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69.  
 54 As the Minnesota Supreme Court has noted, “Absent any constitutional 
definition or classification, it is competent for the legislature, in creating or defining 
an offense, to name it, classify it, and prescribe the punishment for it, subject only to 
the limitation that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual 
punishments inflicted.” State v. Kelly, 15 N.W.2d 554, 564 (Minn. 1944).  
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as the mere intent to frighten by threat of battery, with no requirement 
of physical injury,55 is a misdemeanor “subject to imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 years.”56 By contrast, misdemeanor assault in New York 
State has a maximum punishment of one year in jail and a 
requirement of physical injury;57 if there is no physical injury, the 
charge would be harassment — a class of non-criminal “violation” that 
carries a maximum sentence of fifteen days in jail.58 In California, 
certain crimes are called “wobblers,” meaning that they can be charged 
as either a felony or a misdemeanor.59 Iowa has “simple,” “serious,” 
and “aggravated” misdemeanors;60 an aggravated misdemeanor 
conviction can result in up to two years of incarceration.61 
Misdemeanors can be found throughout most sections of any 
jurisdiction’s criminal code, including misdemeanor charges for theft, 
assault, drug offenses, sex crimes, hate crimes, and fraud.62 Many 
 
 55 See Cruz v. State, 407 Md. 202, 209 n.3 (2009) (explaining various common 
law crimes encompassed in Maryland’s misdemeanor assault statute). 
 56 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §3-203 (LexisNexis 2011). Many other 
misdemeanors carry lengthy potential sentences. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW 
§5-601 (LexisNexis 2011) (setting out maximum penalty of four years for person 
convicted of misdemeanor possession of controlled substance); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW §7-116 (LexisNexis 2011) (setting out maximum penalty of 10 years for person 
convicted of misdemeanor failure to deliver documents for merchandise). 
 57 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 2009). 
 58 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (McKinney 2008); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(3) 
(McKinney 2009).  
 59 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 1999) (the same type of offense may be 
prosecuted as felony or misdemeanor); People v. Statum, 50 P.3d 355, 357 (Cal. 2002) 
(describing example of “wobbler” crime); see also Erin R. Yoshino, California’s 
Criminal Gang Enhancements: Lessons from Interviews with Practitioners, 18 S. CAL. REV. 
L. & SOC. JUST. 117, 139 (2008) (discussing “wobbler” crimes).  
 60 IOWA CODE § 701.8 (2003) (“All public offenses which are not felonies are 
misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are aggravated misdemeanors, serious misdemeanors, 
or simple misdemeanors. Where an act is declared to be a public offense, crime or 
misdemeanor, but no other delegation is given, such act shall be a simple 
misdemeanor.”).  
 61 Id. § 903.1(2) (2003) (“When a person is convicted of an aggravated 
misdemeanor, and a specific penalty is not provided for, the maximum penalty shall 
be imprisonment not to exceed two years.”). 
 62 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11 § 1304(b)(1) (West 2011) (“Hate crimes shall 
be punished as follows . . . . If the underlying offense is a violation or unclassified 
misdemeanor, the hate crime shall be a class A misdemeanor.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
43-6-12(a)(1) (West 2011) (listing the elements of Class B misdemeanor home 
improvement fraud); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1422(2) (West 2011) (“Possession of 
marijuana is a Class B misdemeanor, except that, KRS Chapter 532 to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the maximum term of incarceration shall be no greater than forty-
five (45) days.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.25 (McKinney 2010) (“Petit larceny is a class 
A misdemeanor.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-33(a) (West 1993) (“Any person who 
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public order offenses are misdemeanors.63 There are also numerous 
misdemeanors in local ordinances, enacted by the town or city council 
or legislature. For example, the Broward County, Florida Board of 
County Commissioners made it a misdemeanor to “throw or deposit 
litter on any occupied private property within the county, whether 
owned by such person or not.”64 Under the New York City 
Administrative Code General Vendor Law, it is a misdemeanor for 
individuals to sell goods or services in the streets, sidewalks, and 
public spaces of New York City without a license from the Department 
of Consumer Affairs.65 Both of these local ordinances authorize jail 
sentences.66 
Advocacy in misdemeanor cases is similar in many respects to 
advocacy in felony cases. This is demonstrated by the fact that, in 
some jurisdictions, there are high potential penalties for 
misdemeanors, and certain offenses move between misdemeanor and 
felony categories. Additionally, however a particular crime is labeled, 
the collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions render less 
significant the line between felonies — at least low-level ones — and 
misdemeanors.67 For example, all felonies and a good number of 
misdemeanors lead to one or more collateral consequences located in 
federal, state, or local law.68 Finally, whatever level of case they 
 
commits a simple assault or a simple assault and battery or participates in a simple 
affray is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.415(2) (West 
2003) (“Sexual abuse in the third degree is a Class A misdemeanor.”). 
 63 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.00-240.70 (McKinney 2008) (establishing 
twelve public order offenses as misdemeanors).  
 64 BROWARD, FLA., CODE ch. 21, art. V, § 21-76 (2001). 
 65 See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-453 (2004) (making unlawful unlicensed general 
vending).  
 66 Id. § 20-472 (2004) (stating that unlicensed vending is “misdemeanor 
punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred fifty dollars nor more than one 
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than three months or by both such 
fine and imprisonment”); BROWARD, FLA., CODE ch. 21, art. V § 21-80 (2001) 
(authorizing sentence of up to five hundred dollars, imprisonment in county jail not 
to exceed sixty days, or both for littering misdemeanor). 
 67 See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PLEAS OF GUILTY, at xi (3d ed. 1999) 
[hereinafter PLEAS OF GUILTY] (“[T]he collateral consequences of convictions . . . have 
increased dramatically . . . . This has also diminished the significance of the 
distinction between pleading guilty to a felony or a misdemeanor, as the latter may 
also carry significant future consequences for the defendant.”).  
 68 See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucsada/2010final_amends.htm (“This Act 
deals with several aspects of the creation and imposition of collateral consequences. 
The provisions are largely procedural, and designed to rationalize and clarify policies 
and provisions that are already widely accepted in many states.”). 
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handle, all criminal defense lawyers must have skills in areas including 
interviewing, fact investigation, counseling, negotiation, and trial and 
sentencing advocacy. 
Despite these similarities, several significant differences between 
felony and misdemeanor lawyering highlight the need for specific 
attention to standards for misdemeanor representation. This Part 
explores three differences: the higher caseloads misdemeanor lawyers 
are expected to, and indeed do, carry; the potential for using collateral 
consequences of misdemeanor convictions in creative plea bargaining 
and sentencing advocacy; and the greater prevalence of complex 
constitutional issues in some misdemeanor cases, particularly public 
order offenses.69 
 
 69 Another significant area with both differences and similarities between 
misdemeanors and felonies is that of the well-documented racial and economic 
disparities of individuals in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, 
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) 
(discussing racial and economic disparities in criminal justice system); see also Marc 
Mauer, Justice for All? Challenging Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, 37 
HUM. RTS. 14 (2010). Although the causes of these disparities cut across both types of 
cases, see id. at 14 (describing causes of racial disparity in criminal justice system as 
“complicated,” but listing four key factors: disproportionate crime rates, disparities in 
criminal justice processing, overlap of race and class effects, and impact of “race 
neutral” policies), the effect of racial and economic disparity is particularly significant 
in the misdemeanor realm. This is in part due to the sheer volume of misdemeanor 
prosecutions, see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text, and thus the large 
number of non-white individuals charged in the lower courts and leaving those courts 
with a permanent criminal record. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
CONVICTION ACT, supra note 68 (“Minorities are far more likely than whites to have a 
criminal record: Almost 17% of adult black males have been incarcerated, compared to 
2.6% of white males.”); see also Pager, supra note 45. Another factor contributing to 
racial disparities is that, unlike violent crime, many misdemeanor arrests flow from 
deliberate policing choices linked to particular neighborhoods, which are often non-
white neighborhoods. See Howell, supra note 45, at 292-93. Finally, the “war on 
drugs” has a well-documented disparate effect on blacks and Latinos, and drug 
offenses make up a healthy part of lower court dockets. See Paul Butler, One Hundred 
Years of Race & Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043, 1048 (2010) (“Three-
fourths of those imprisoned for drug offenses are black or Latino. In seven states, 80% 
to 90% of imprisoned drug offenders are black. Such disparities cannot be explained 
by disproportionate use of drugs by African Americans; blacks don’t use drugs more 
than any other group, and some studies have even found that they use them less.”); 
ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, DIVERTING AND 
RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS COULD SAVE $1 BILLION PER YEAR: REDUCING THE NEED 
FOR AND COST OF APPOINTED COUNSEL 2-3 (2010) [hereinafter DIVERTING AND 
RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS] (citing Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United 
States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-
in-the-u.s/2009) (noting 2009 FBI estimates that 45.6% of the 1,663,582 drug arrests 
in United States were for possession of marijuana). Full exploration of the race and 
class dynamics of the lower courts is beyond the scope of this Article.  
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A. Higher Caseloads and Workloads for Misdemeanor Attorneys 
The Department of Justice, courts, and advocacy organizations have 
recently focused their attention on the role of excessive defender 
workloads in the indigent defense crisis.70 In 2009, caseload concerns 
led New York State to pass legislation directing its court 
administration to “promulgate rules relating to caseloads for attorneys 
representing indigent clients in criminal matters in cities of one 
million or more” and to formulate a phase-in plan for the court’s 
response to the caseload problem.71 Although excessive workloads are 
cause for concern in both the felony and misdemeanor context, 
individuals facing misdemeanor charges are more likely to suffer the 
consequences of the workload strain. As one report noted, “Although 
national crime rates have decreased and fewer major crimes are being 
committed, indigent defense providers remain burdened with 
excessive caseloads consisting of all kinds of cases . . . including 
countless minor, petty offense cases.”72 Thus, in Chicago, Atlanta, and 
Miami, defenders handle more than 2,000 misdemeanors a year,73 far 
above recommended maximum numbers.74 According to a 2007 
Department of Justice study, 
73 percent of county based public defender offices lacked 
enough attorneys to meet these national caseload standards, 
 
 70 See, e.g., State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 298 S.W.3d 870, 879-80 (Mo. 
2009) (“The excessive number of cases to which the public defender’s offices 
currently are being assigned calls into question whether any public defender is 
meeting his or her ethical duties of competent and diligent representation in all cases 
assigned.”); Donald J. Farole, Jr. & Lynn Langton, A National Assessment of Public 
Defender Office Caseloads, 94 JUDICATURE 87, 90 (2010) (concluding that lack of 
personnel and resources across country prevents effective representation of indigent 
defendants); David Carroll, Gideon Alert: DOJ Data Confirms Existence of Right to 
Counsel Workload Crisis in the United States, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N (Sept. 
17, 2010, 10:56 AM), http://www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/gideon-alert-doj-data-confirms-
existence-right-counsel-workload-crisis-united-states (noting how recently published 
data by Bureau of Justice Statistics confirm that public defenders are carrying 
excessive workloads). 
 71 Steven Zeidman, Indigent Defense: Caseload Standards, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 24, 2010, 
at 6, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202446663975& 
_Indigent_Defense_Caseload_Standards&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; see also A.B. 156, 
2009 Assemb., 232d Sess. (N.Y. 2009).  
 72 Justice Denied America’s Continuing Neglect of our Constitutional Right to Counsel, 
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, 72 (2009), [hereinafter “JUSTICE DENIED”], 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf (citing FBI crime statistics). 
 73 See MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 21. 
 74 See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing national caseload 
recommendations). 
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while 23 percent of offices had less than half of the necessary 
attorneys to meet caseload standards. Only 12 percent of 
county public defender offices with more than 5,000 cases per 
year had enough lawyers to meet caseload standards.75 
In our high-volume criminal justice system, the lure of assembly-line 
justice — where defenders fail to deliver even the most rudimentary 
services, such as investigation and appropriate client counseling — is 
an unfortunate fixture in day-to-day representation in the lower 
courts.76 
Still, there is general acceptance that attorneys can handle more 
misdemeanors than felonies, and there is thus widespread support for 
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals’ recommendations of 400 non-traffic misdemeanors per year, 
with the number dropping to 150 for felonies.77 These differing 
recommendations are likely due in part to the reality of high numbers 
of misdemeanors in the criminal justice system, combined with the 
reality of a limited pool of resources.78 The differing numbers are also 
 
 75 SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 10. 
 76 See id. at 13; MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 12, 21-22. 
 77 See Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, supra note 38, at 3 (referencing 
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 
recommendations of 150 felonies, 400 non-traffic misdemeanors, 200 juvenile court 
cases, 200 Mental Health Act cases, or 25 non-capital appeals per attorney per year); 
see also ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIM. JUST. IN A FREE SOC’Y, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: 
A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN BAR ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1988), available at http://www.druglibrary.org/special/king/cjic.htm 
(stating that ABA endorses National Advisory Commission (“NAC”) caseload 
numbers, although list following endorsement notes 300 misdemeanor cap rather than 
400 as NAC recommends); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. PREPARED BY THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, 
Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable, in BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SERIES 7-8 (Ser. No. NCJ 185632, 2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf (referencing National Advisory Council numbers, but also 
noting the need to differentiate between caseloads and workloads). The Washington 
State Bar Association has taken a more nuanced approach with its 2007 standards. On 
the issue of caseloads, the organization notes a difference between “simple” and 
“complex” misdemeanors. Although the standards recommend a caseload of no more 
than 300 misdemeanors, they recognize certain exceptions where caseloads might be 
adjusted to 400 misdemeanors. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 3 (adopted Sept. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/wsbastandards408.doc. 
 78 One study noted that “[i]n 2005 State court prosecutors reported closing over 
2.4 million felony cases and nearly 7.5 million misdemeanor cases.” Steve W. Perry, 
Prosecutors in State Courts, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL. 6 (Ser. 
No. NCJ 213799, 2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/psc05.pdf. The actual difference between prosecuted misdemeanors and 
felonies is even greater, as only 95% of all state prosecutors’ offices reported handling 
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undoubtedly due to the fact that there can be little disagreement that 
an attorney handling a complex multi-count felony indictment that 
exposes her client to decades in prison will require more time to 
prepare than an attorney handling a misdemeanor assault with two 
witnesses and no medical records. It is not troubling that attorneys 
assigned to both kinds of cases will devote more attention to clients 
charged with the complex felony. What is troubling is that there are 
no constitutional, ethical, or professional standards to guide attorneys 
in deciding how to divide that attention, and to ensure that attorneys 
provide misdemeanor clients with effective representation. 
As Professor Steve Zeidman noted in his commentary on caseload 
caps for public defenders, “Numbers should not be the only, nor 
primary, way to assess defense attorney effectiveness.”79 Thus, even if 
there is agreement that attorneys can handle more misdemeanors than 
felonies as a general matter, “[t]here are many variables to consider in 
evaluating attorney workloads, including the seriousness and 
complexity of assigned cases and the skill and experience of individual 
attorneys.”80 For example, although it makes sense for new attorneys 
to begin with misdemeanors before moving up to a felony practice, the 
skewed caseload recommendations mean that attorneys new to 
criminal defense practice (and often right out of law school) will 
almost immediately handle large numbers of cases. At the same time, 
these new attorneys must learn basic pretrial and trial skills and 
familiarize themselves with the local lower criminal court culture. In 
some jurisdictions, misdemeanor lawyers might find themselves 
moving between several courtrooms, or even between different towns, 
in order to handle their assigned cases.81 These factors thus exacerbate 
the workload differences between misdemeanors and felonies. 
While some felonies require more attorney time and attention than 
misdemeanors, this is not always the case. As described below in 
Section C, misdemeanor defenders handle a wide variety of charges, 
some of which raise complex constitutional or statutory issues not 
often seen with felony charges. Further, as described below in Section 
B, collateral consequences loom larger in misdemeanor cases, because 
 
misdemeanor cases. Id. at 4 tbl.5. County attorneys or perhaps police officers 
presumably prosecuted misdemeanors in the remaining five percent of jurisdictions, 
or the court may have handled the disposition without any prosecutorial involvement.  
 79 Zeidman, supra note 71, at 6 (applauding New York State law calling for rules 
on public defender caseloads, but cautioning that “[w]e must do more than zero in on 
caseloads”). 
 80 Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, supra note 38, at 2-3. 
 81 See id. at 4 (“Local court calendar management practices . . . can . . . play havoc 
with attorney workloads as can legislative changes and new judicial decisions.”). 
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they often overshadow any potential direct criminal sentence. Thus, 
there is greater need to counsel clients about the cost of such 
consequences compared to the benefits of entering a guilty plea, and 
more room for creative plea bargaining in order to avoid unintended 
collateral consequences. This requires a working familiarity with a 
wide variety of potential collateral consequences, and may require 
coordination with one or more experts in the area of any relevant 
consequences in order to fully inform the misdemeanor client.82 
Given the ways in which misdemeanor representation requires a 
particular type of attention, national recognition that misdemeanor 
defenders can handle far greater caseloads than felony defenders, and 
the realities of assembly-line case processing in the lower courts, the 
need for further guidance on the meaning of effective misdemeanor 
representation is clear. These differences between felony and 
misdemeanor practice highlight the need for standards that are unique 
to the misdemeanor context. 
B. Minor Criminal Convictions Lead to Major Collateral Consequences 
Mary Anne Gehris was adopted by an American couple when she 
was two weeks old.83 Her parents did not make her a U.S. citizen, but 
Gehris herself later filed the necessary paperwork, correctly noting a 
past criminal conviction. By that time, she was married to a U.S. 
citizen and had a young son with cerebral palsy.84 Her effort to seek 
naturalization resulted in a deportation order. The basis for her 
deportation was her ten-year-old misdemeanor battery conviction 
based on allegations of fighting another woman over a man. On the 
advice of her attorney, she had pled guilty to the charge and received a 
suspended sentence with probation.85 After extensive publicity about 
her deportation order, the Georgia Board of Pardon and Parole granted 
her a pardon, and immigration officials halted her deportation.86 
Gehris was one of the lucky few.87 Miguel Angel Hernandez, a lawful 
 
 82 See Wright, supra note 52, at 1530-34.  
 83 See Stephen Davis, Deported from America, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 22, 2004, at 
14-15, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/200411220005.  
 84 Id.  
 85 See Lewis, supra note 49, at A13.  
 86 Davis, supra note 83, at 17. Gehris later became a U.S. citizen. See Anthony 
Lewis, Op-Ed., Abroad at Home: Rays of Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/10/opinion/abroad-at-home-rays-of-hope.html.  
 87 MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 5 (William S. Hein & Co. 
ed., 2006), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/detail/publication.cfm? 
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permanent resident, also had a misdemeanor battery conviction in 
Georgia. He did not get a pardon, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals denied his petition for review of his final order of 
deportation.88 
Misdemeanor assault is not the only minor crime with such drastic 
consequences. Numerous misdemeanor drug convictions can lead to 
automatic deportation for non-citizens. This is because “[a]ny alien 
who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of 
(or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, 
the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled 
substance . . . other than a single offense involving possession for one’s 
own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”89 Deportation 
is only one of many serious collateral consequences of misdemeanor 
convictions.90 In many states, a number of misdemeanor sex crime 
 
publication_id=115 (“In at least a dozen states where a governor’s pardon is the 
exclusive means of avoiding or mitigating collateral disabilities, the governor has not 
exercised the power with any regularity for many years. The federal pardoning process 
has also withered in the past twenty years, producing only a handful of grants despite 
a steady stream of applications from people who may long since have completed their 
court-imposed sentences.”). 
 88 Hernandez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding 
that Georgia misdemeanor battery statute met definition of “crime of violence” under 
federal immigration law so that Hernandez’s conviction under statute, combined with 
his suspended one-year sentence, rendered his conviction automatically deportable 
“aggravated felony” under federal immigration law).  
 89 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2011); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on 
Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 253, 261 (2002).  
 90 These consequences are generally referred to as “collateral consequences” of a 
criminal conviction because they are not imposed directly by the court as part of the 
sentence, but rather flow as a consequence of the conviction. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 n.8 (2010) (recognizing that courts are split over distinguishing 
and applying distinction between direct and collateral consequences); see also Jenny 
Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 
670, 689-92 (2008) (noting inconsistency in how courts categorize direct versus 
collateral consequences, and how consequently there is confusing jurisprudence in 
this area). This Article uses the term “collateral” because it is still commonly used by 
courts and commentators. See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences after 
Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1883809 (“The term ‘collateral consequences’ has 
become a commonplace way of describing the legal penalties and disabilities to which 
people are exposed when they plead guilty to a crime, though the term ‘status-
generated penalties’ might be more apt if not legally precise.”); see also Brown v. 
United States, No. 10 Civ. 3012, 2010 WL 5313546, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Margaret 
C. Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to Counsel and the Collateral 
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convictions can lead to mandatory, long-term sex offender 
registration, and in some cases community notification via a publicly 
available electronic database.91 A marijuana possession conviction will 
lead to the loss of federal student loan assistance for at least a year.92 
Low-level drug crime convictions can lead to eviction from public 
housing for the individual and his entire family, even if he is not the 
leaseholder or even living in the housing.93 
The most pervasive collateral effect of a misdemeanor conviction is 
the ability to find and keep work. There are a multitude of statutory 
and regulatory bars to employment at the local, state, and federal 
levels for convicted persons. For example, in New York State a person 
with certain misdemeanor convictions cannot work as a home health 
aide,94 and in Texas a number of convictions block employment in any 
capacity at facilities serving the elderly, terminally ill, or people with 
disabilities.95 In addition to formal restrictions, many employers take 
 
Consequences of Conviction, 34 CHAMPION 18, 18 (2010). But see McGregor Smyth, 
From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and its 
Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 802 (2011) (noting how, in 
wake of Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), already-problematic distinction 
between so-called collateral and direct consequences is even weaker, and how term 
“enmeshed penalty” would better reflect fact that “these penalties are intimately 
related to criminal charges (not just convictions), and are serious, often draconian, 
and lifelong”); see also McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal 
Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 479, 479-80 (2005) [hereinafter Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word] (using 
term “invisible” consequences).  
 91 See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168(a) (2011) (defining sex offender to include 
individuals convicted of certain misdemeanors); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §168(f) (2011) 
(requiring sex offenders to register); see also Adam Walsh Child Protection & Safety 
Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2). See generally TERRY & FURLONG, supra note 51 
(discussing SORA and community notification).  
 92 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2003) (suspending student loan eligibility for varying 
time periods for any “student who is convicted of any offense under any Federal or 
State law involving the possession or sale of a controlled substance for conduct that 
occurred during a period of enrollment for which the student was receiving any grant, 
loan, or work assistance”). But see id. § 1091(r)(2) (allowing for resumption of loan 
assistance upon showing of “rehabilitation”). 
 93 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2011) (allowing for eviction of tenant in federal 
housing where tenant, member of tenant’s household, or guest of tenant is convicted 
of, or involved with, drug-related activity, even if tenant lacks knowledge of that 
activity); Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 128 (2002) (upholding 
eviction of grandparent tenants under 42 U.S.C. § 1437 based on drug activity on 
public housing grounds, including tenants’ grandsons smoking marijuana in 
apartment complex parking lot). 
 94 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 845-b(5)(b) (McKinney 2011).  
 95 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 250.006 (West 2007) (listing numerous 
criminal convictions that are permanent or five-year bar to employment in facilities 
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advantage of easy electronic access to criminal records and use the 
information to avoid hiring anyone with any type of record, even if 
there is no connection between that conviction and the type of work.96 
“I’ve come to expect being turned down,” is how Justin Gannon 
described his ongoing search for a job.97 He had several job offers, all 
later rescinded. Despite his eight years of Army National Guard 
service, leading to a drawer full of medals for meritorious service and a 
2009 honorable discharge certification, he is among the 16% of 
Ohioans — 1.9 million people — with a criminal conviction. He was 
convicted of misdemeanor assault in 2003 after a bar fight, and says 
that he pled guilty because he was scared of going to jail and because 
he was “told the misdemeanor wouldn’t be that big of a deal on my 
record.” Mr. Gannon is not alone, as there were 258,000 new 
misdemeanor convictions in 2008 in Ohio.98 
The large number and harsh nature of collateral consequences 
illustrate how even a low-level conviction that seems to begin with 
arrest and end in front of the judge can actually have an impact not 
only on that person’s life, but also on the lives of family members and 
the person’s community. For example, an NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
survey of thirty women incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, designed 
to document “social costs” of Mississippi’s poor quality public defense 
system, “found that nearly half of the women lost a home or 
apartment, while 12 lost vehicles. More than half of the women had 
children living with them when they were arrested and had to move in 
with relatives. Eight women had elderly parents who were affected 
financially.”99 These examples demonstrate how misdemeanor 
convictions can negatively affect a person’s ability to be a productive 
 
serving elderly, terminally ill, or people with disabilities). 
 96 Many states have human rights or other state laws prohibiting employers from 
discriminating against individuals with criminal records unless there is a legitimate 
connection to the type of work. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2011) 
(banning unfair licensure or employment discrimination against persons convicted of 
one or more crimes); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15)-(16) (McKinney 2011) (making it 
unlawful to inquire about, or deny license or employment to any person with past 
convictions). However, the efficacy of such laws is open to question and their 
enforcement mechanisms — many largely rely on private enforcement through 
individual complaints — leaves something to be desired.  
 97 Mary McCarty, Criminal Records Keeping Millions of Ohioans Jobless, DAYTON 
DAILY NEWS (June 25, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/crime/ 
criminal-records-keeping-millions-of-ohioans-jobless-1193628.html. 
 98 Id. (noting numbers provided by Ed Rhine, deputy director for Ohio’s office of 
offender re-entry, who also noted how marking box on job application that asks about 
convictions is “[i]n most cases . . . sufficient to get that application tossed out”). 
 99 See SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 18. 
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member of society and, therefore, should be cause for serious 
concern.100 This is especially true where large percentages of 
individuals in a particular community have criminal convictions. The 
public safety effect on a community when many members are 
incarcerated or unable to find work because of a minor conviction 
cannot be underestimated in a cost-benefit analysis of low-level 
prosecutions.101 
The re-entry movement has brought attention to “[o]ne of the most 
profound challenges facing American society”102 — the re-integration 
of the more than 700,000 adults exiting state and federal prisons each 
year into their communities.103 The movement’s focus has largely been 
on this prison-to-community transition, recognizing the critical link 
between recidivism, public safety, and the ability to work past 
significant obstacles in order to successfully function after leaving 
prison.104 Re-entry from incarceration also affects large numbers of 
individuals, their families, and their communities.105 Similarly, some of 
the sociological literature argues that the social costs of incarceration 
 
 100 Indeed, it is hard to justify the effects of many misdemeanor convictions under 
traditional theories of punishment if the collateral consequences are factored into the 
equation. An important, related front in this area is to incorporate the consideration of 
third party interests into general criminal law theories of punishment. See Daryl K. 
Brown, Third Party Interests, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1408-20 (2002). Taking the 
collateral consequences that criminal prosecutions cause to innocent third parties 
(families, communities) into account in our theoretical construct for the criminal 
justice system means moving beyond strict retributivist or deterrence theories — or 
even theories that combine these two dominant strains — to include a consideration 
of third party interests. See generally DIEDRE GOLASH, THE CASE AGAINST PUNISHMENT: 
RETRIBUTION, CRIME PREVENTION, AND THE LAW 23 (2005) (pointing out that cost-
benefit analyses of punishment theories usually ignore cost of harm to person 
punished).  
 101 See SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 2 (“Families are torn apart when a loved 
one is sent to prison or can no longer work due to the collateral consequences of a 
conviction. Communities suffer both in terms of public safety and through 
unnecessarily losing friends, neighbors and co-workers who are locked up.”).  
 102 JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 3 (2003); see also Jeremy Travis, 
But They All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry, 5(3) CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 23 
(2001). 
 103 Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting 
Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2010). As a general matter, 
misdemeanor sentences involving incarceration are served in jails and longer felony 
sentences in prisons. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2189 (2010) (“Broadly speaking, 
felonies are punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary or state prison, and 
misdemeanors by imprisonment in a county jail or the like.”). 
 104 See generally PETERSILIA, supra note 102 (noting ineffectiveness of current re-
entry programs and proposing solutions to improve it). 
 105 Id. at 223-28. 
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actually work against crime prevention.106 To be sure, this is important 
work in an area that was largely previously ignored. 
However, the collateral effects of minor convictions are to some 
extent lost in this analysis. The very fact of a conviction — even 
without any jail time — can lead to many of the same social effects 
described in these studies.107 Yet there has not been sufficient focus on 
the effects of the massive number of newly minted “misdemeanants” 
coming from a trip to the courthouse each year. An individual who is 
fully informed about such things as deportation, bars to employment, 
or getting kicked out of public housing because of a misdemeanor 
conviction will be focused on avoiding any conviction that would lead 
to collateral consequences most relevant to that particular individual. 
Thus, a primary focus of misdemeanor defenders, and the institutions 
that set standards for effective representation, should also be the high 
collateral costs of lower court convictions. In this light, standards for 
the type and quality of misdemeanor defense counsel assistance is 
critical and may be different from standards in serious felony cases. 
A variety of potential reforms might ameliorate counterproductive 
and unjustly severe collateral consequences. These include 
decriminalization of certain low-level offenses,108 prosecutorial 
discretion in charging and plea bargaining to avoid unintended 
collateral consequences, additional resources for the reintegration of 
those with convictions,109 and public education campaigns so that 
employers, landlords, and others are willing to give individuals with 
 
 106 See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Inequality and Republican Criminology, in CRIME AND 
INEQUALITY 277, 283-84 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (arguing that 
family and social networks work better for crime control than criminal sanctions); 
Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The 
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173 (2008) 
(explaining how imprisonment may have criminogenic rather than deterrent effects); 
John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, in 28 CRIME 
& JUST. 1, 44-45 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001) (arguing that “life-course account” can 
explain desistance of criminal offenders, that changes in criminality are caused by 
variations in information social control and bonds, and that salient life events such as 
work and marriage affect these bonds). 
 107 See Pager, supra note 45, at 960-62; see also MARK MAUER, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 6-7, 13 (2d ed. 2006) (arguing that our criminal justice 
system is stuck in punitive response mode even though neighborhoods are perceived 
“safe” when clean, well-lit, and have open businesses, not when heavily policed or 
have the death penalty). 
 108 See infra Part III.A; see also David Abel, Voters Approve Marijuana Law Change, 
THE BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2008, at B6, available at http://www.boston.com/news/ 
local/massachusetts/articles/2008/11/05/voters_approve_marijuana_law_change/. 
 109 For an example of some such resources, see generally REENTRY.NET, 
http://www.reentry.net (last visited Oct. 19, 2011).  
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convictions a chance.110 These are important ideas, all worthy of 
further attention. To the extent that they focus on remediation at the 
front end of a potential criminal case, such as decriminalization or the 
exercise of charging discretion, they confront the problem of 
overloaded defender systems as well as the effect of minor convictions 
on individuals, families, and communities. Still, they do not directly 
address the problem of defining appropriate standards for delivery of 
the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases that go forward. Such 
standards are critical to ensuring that justice inheres in the process 
itself, so that the many individuals in the misdemeanor system do not 
receive unwarranted convictions or overly harsh sentences. 
C. Complexities of Misdemeanor Practice 
Although misdemeanors are the usual training ground for new 
attorneys, they can also be just as complicated as typical felony cases. 
Like felonies, misdemeanor cases raise issues of suppression in drug 
and weapons cases,111 expert testimony in drug, assault, and drunk 
driving cases,112 and Crawford/Confrontation Clause issues in 
domestic violence and other types of cases.113 Therefore, attorneys 
handling misdemeanor cases grapple with many of the same legal 
issues as felony attorneys. Proper representation on these issues 
requires the same skills in interviewing and counseling the client, 
negotiating with the prosecution, and conducting factual investigation 
and legal research. 
 
 110 See Sample Letters to Employers, REENTRY.NET, http://www.reentry.net/ny/ 
library/folder.83212-Sample_Letters_to_Employers (last visited Oct. 19, 2011) 
(offering sample letters educating employers about employment rights of people with 
criminal records).  
 111 See, e.g., State v. Remy, No. 02CA2664, 2003 WL 21152881, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 25, 2003) (denying motion to suppress crack pipe in misdemeanor 
possession of drug paraphernalia case); Russell v. State, 74 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2002) (denying motion to suppress evidence in misdemeanor marijuana possession 
case on grounds that reasonable suspicion is not required for school search).  
 112 See, e.g., State v. McClain, 301 S.W.3d 97, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that 
expert testified to weight of marijuana in grams because weight determines whether 
person is guilty of misdemeanor or felony under Missouri state law).  
 113 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 814, 828 (2006) (finding victim’s 
statements that identified her assailant during 911 call were not “testimonial” for 
purposes of Confrontation Clause because they were made to get help for immediate 
physical threat); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (holding that out-
of-court “testimonial” statements are inadmissible under Confrontation Clause unless 
declarant is unavailable to testify and accused has had prior opportunity to cross-
examine). 
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Beyond these commonalities, misdemeanor lawyers sometimes 
encounter complex constitutional issues that are not found as 
frequently in the felony arena. For example, public order offenses such 
as disorderly conduct or unlawful assembly often implicate free 
speech, overbreadth, and vagueness issues.114 As the Supreme Court 
noted: 
We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional 
questions involved in a case that actually leads to 
imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex 
than when a person can be sent off for six months or more. 
The trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only brief 
sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the cases often 
bristle with thorny constitutional questions.115 
Misdemeanor lawyers would raise such constitutional issues in pretrial 
motion practice, such as in a motion to dismiss a charging document 
as facially unconstitutional based on the vague and overbroad nature 
of the underlying criminal charge.116 Defense counsel might also 
engage in pretrial litigation about the sufficiency of a charging 
document because misdemeanors normally proceed upon an 
accusatory instrument — which is essentially an affidavit noting the 
crimes charged and basic factual allegations, signed by a police officer, 
prosecutor, or complaining witness — rather than a grand jury 
indictment or a preliminary hearing.117 Attorneys with overwhelming 
workloads will lack the time necessary to litigate these important 
issues. This is particularly troubling in an era of sharply rising 
misdemeanor and steeply declining felony prosecutions, and 
enormous growth in the numbers of collateral consequences of 
misdemeanor convictions.118 Challenges to problematic public order 
 
 114 See, e.g., People v. Biltsted, 574 N.Y.S.2d 272, 278 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) 
(finding criminal law banning unlawful assembly is not vague, overbroad, or 
unconstitutional where actions of individual charged “constitute an incitement which 
is both directed towards and likely to produce imminent violent and tumultuous 
conduct”). 
 115 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (internal citations omitted).  
 116 See Bilsted, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74. 
 117 See, e.g., People v. Casey, 740 N.E.2d 233 (N.Y. 2000) (affirming denial of 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, and setting forth sufficiency requirements of charging 
document in misdemeanor cases); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20 (McKinney 
2011) (defining “accusatory instrument”). 
 118 See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (describing rising misdemeanor 
prosecutions and falling felonies); supra Part I.B. (describing collateral consequences 
of minor criminal convictions). 
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offenses, or to a prosecution office practice of insufficient notice to 
defendants in charging documents, are critical where elected officials’ 
or legislators’ beliefs about the need to be “tough on crime” can eclipse 
other considerations relevant to public safety and fairness in the 
administration of criminal justice.119 
In addition to the potential for complex pretrial motions, 
misdemeanor attorneys often handle a large variety of crimes, codified 
in a variety of sources. A misdemeanor attorney might simultaneously 
handle cases from the state penal law, such as drug possession, theft, 
assault, or domestic violence;120 from the traffic code, such as driving 
with a suspended license; and from the local administrative code, such 
as unlicensed general vending or sale of a weapon without a safety-
locking device.121 By contrast, felony counsel may have a more limited 
variety of cases, particularly when the jurisdiction has a heavy number 
of felony drug prosecutions.122 When counsel handles one type of case 
in great volume — for example drug sales, where the main witnesses 
are undercover or other police officers who may refuse to speak with 
defense counsel, thus limiting the potential for investigation on the 
case — that defender will have fewer pretrial tasks than in some 
misdemeanor cases. 
The many facets of misdemeanor advocacy provide excellent 
training for new attorneys, but it would demonstrate ignorance of the 
 
 119 See infra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 120 See, e.g., M.D. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 5-601 (West 2011); see also Table 30: 
County Court Misdemeanor Filings by Type, FY 2008, COLO. STATE JUD. BRANCH, 
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Administration/Planning_and_Analysis/ 
Annual_Statistical_Reports/2008/Table30.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2011) (indicating 
that domestic violence crimes accounted for 18% of Colorado misdemeanor filings in 
2008).  
 121 See, e.g., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-472 (McKinney 2004) (making unlicensed 
general vending “a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than two hundred 
fifty dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment for not more 
than three months or by both such fine and imprisonment”); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 10-
311 (2010) (making it a misdemeanor, punishable by up to 90 days in jail, $500 fine, 
or both, “for any person or business enterprise to dispose of any weapon which does 
not contain a safety locking device”).  
 122 For example, felony drug arrests accounted for 39,435 out of 124,111 total 
felonies in Los Angeles County in 2008. Adult Felony Arrests, 2008, Offense by 
Jurisdiction and Gender, CAL. STATE DEP’T JUST., http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/ 
prof08/19/15.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). Between 1994 and 2006, drug charges 
comprised the largest group of felony cases in the 75 largest counties, ranging from 
34% to 37% of total felony cases. Thomas Cohen & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Felony 
Defendants in Large Urban Counties, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL. 
2 (Ser. No. NCJ 228944, 2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf.  
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true nature of misdemeanor practice to say that it is always easier, less 
complex work.123 The consequences — at least the direct, penal 
consequences — may be lower, but the work can be just as 
challenging as the majority of felony prosecutions in a typical 
jurisdiction. 
D. Coercion and Plea Bargaining in the Misdemeanor Context 
Judges, practitioners, and scholars have all long acknowledged the 
potential for, and existence of, coercion in the plea bargain process.124 
These concerns focus on the disparity between the offered sentence 
and the higher sentence that a defendant will receive should he lose at 
trial.125 Although the limited amount of possible jail time narrows this 
disparity in the misdemeanor context, there are structural features of 
the lower courts that raise troubling — and often overlooked — issues 
of coercion in minor cases. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the 
volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number than felony 
prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, 
regardless of the fairness of the result.”126 
With such a high volume of misdemeanors and other minor cases, 
judges, defense counsel, and prosecutors all have enormous incentive 
 
 123 Clearly there are felony cases that are far more complex than any misdemeanor. 
Death penalty cases are one example, as are homicide or other cases involving forensic 
issues. However, these cases do not comprise the majority of the caseload of a typical 
felony attorney. See Cohen & Kyckelhahn, supra note 122, at 2 (noting how drug 
charges were largest group of felony cases in the 75 largest counties between 1994 and 
2006).  
 124 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. 
REV 652, 687-89 (1981) (describing potential coercive effects of plea bargaining); 
Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Cooperation in the Plea Bargaining Process, 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349 (2004) (describing coercive powers that judges may exert on 
defendants during plea bargaining process); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining 
Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1060-62 (1984) (listing possible inducement to 
plead guilty when no significant concessions were granted). The potential for coercion 
actually applies to the guilty plea process more broadly, bargain or no bargain, since 
in most instances the judge gives the defendant a significant sentence discount if he 
pleads guilty to all charges prior to trial.  
 125 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 
1975 (1992) (explaining how defendants balance benefits against drawbacks of 
accepting proposed plea); Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial 
Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 87-88 (2005) (arguing that there 
is significant difference between sentences imposed after guilty plea and those 
imposed after trial); cf. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470-96 (2004) (noting institutional features of criminal 
justice system that lead to atmosphere that can coerce guilty pleas). 
 126 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1972).  
  
2011] Why Misdemeanors Matter 307 
to pursue early guilty pleas — as early as the initial arraignment in 
some jurisdictions.127 There is serious institutional pressure from all 
quarters to quickly “dispose of” misdemeanor cases, often before 
defense counsel can undertake any investigation or adequately review 
any discovery material.128 A study for New York State’s then-high court 
Chief Judge revealed that by the year 2000 in New York City, private 
attorneys representing indigent defendants through an assigned-
counsel plan “were disposing of 69 percent of all misdemeanor cases 
at arraignment.”129 The same study described how the Legal Aid 
Society, New York City’s largest provider of indigent defense services, 
had “permanent arraignment lawyers who . . . only take misdemeanor 
arraignments and . . . ‘know the going rate of a case’ on misdemeanors 
and violations and therefore try to take only those cases that can be 
disposed of at arraignment.”130 
One might argue that this early plea system is often beneficial to the 
defendant, who gets a good bargain without returning to court many 
times in exchange for his prompt decision to plead guilty.131 Although 
it is certainly true that some defendants (particularly those with 
lengthy criminal records) benefit from this type of system, many 
defendants do not gain much from such a process. They may feel 
enormous pressure from all sides to enter a quick guilty plea. In 
addition, although quick and early guilty pleas are encouraged in part 
to free up scarce resources in order to focus on more “serious” cases, 
the fact remains that pleas in this environment are often taken without 
much assistance of counsel at all. For example, counsel focused on 
moving misdemeanors along quickly, with a goal of clients taking 
pleas at the first appearance, would be hard-pressed to fulfill her 
ethical and constitutional duties to counsel clients about collateral 
 
 127 See SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 13 (“In many jurisdictions across the 
country defenders meet with their clients minutes before their court appearance in 
courthouse hallways, often just presenting an offer for a plea bargain from the 
prosecution without ever conducting an investigation into the facts of the case or the 
individual circumstances of the client.”). 
 128 See Zeidman, supra note 26, at 331 n.86 (stating that there should be no pleas at 
arraignment).  
 129 Status of Indigent Defense in New York: A Study for Chief Judge Kaye’s Commission on 
the Future of Indigent Defense Services, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, 142 (2006), 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf 
[hereinafter “Spangenberg Study”]. 
 130 Id. at 144. 
 131 See generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) (praising autonomy and efficiency aspects of plea 
bargaining).  
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consequences of any guilty plea.132 In one particularly egregious case 
of pressure to plead guilty early (and to waive counsel), defendants in 
a Broward County, Florida courtroom were handed a form explaining 
how the fee for court-appointed attorneys was $50 for a plea entered at 
arraignment, and $350 for a plea after arraignment.133 The same study 
that detailed the Broward County form, a study that involved 1,649 
misdemeanor adjudications in twenty-one Florida counties, showed 
that “[a]lmost 70% of defendants observed entered a guilty or no 
contest plea at arraignment.”134 
Perhaps the most coercive aspect of plea-bargaining in the lower 
criminal courts is pretrial detention for individuals held on bail that 
they cannot pay.135 In such cases, defendants must generally choose 
between remaining in jail to fight the case or taking an early plea with 
a sentence of time served or probation. In the Florida study, the “most 
significant predictor of defendants entering a plea of guilty or no 
contest at arraignment was their custody status. In-custody defendants 
were more likely to enter a guilty plea than released defendants.”136 
Incarcerated individuals will find it difficult to ignore the call of 
immediate freedom, particularly if the person is unaware of the myriad 
collateral consequences of the guilty plea and thus does not factor 
these consequences into the cost-benefit analysis of an immediate 
guilty plea.137 
With misdemeanors, the problem of coercion resulting from the 
system’s structure, including one’s own defense counsel, is thus 
paramount. There is little guidance for defense counsel, or any other 
institutional actor, on where the line between coercion and advice lies 
in the lower courts.138 The incentive structure that encourages 
 
 132 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (articulating counsel’s 
duty to warn about deportation); see also ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 19-
2.3 (3d ed. 2004). 
 133 See THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 18 app. C.  
 134 Id. at 14-15. A “no contest,” or nolo contendere, plea is when “a defendant does 
not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes 
the court for purposes of the case to treat him as if he were guilty.” North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 (1970). 
 135 See Bibas, supra note 125, at 2491-93.  
 136 THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 15. 
 137 See Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 725-28 
(2011) (noting how full information about serious collateral consequences of criminal 
conviction will factor into defendant’s decision-making process about whether to 
plead guilty or go to trial).  
 138 See generally Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and 
Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 888 (1998) (discussing continuum of 
approaches when counseling client about guilty plea, ranging from neutrality to 
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coercion, and the real presence of such coercion in some instances, 
demonstrates why guidance on effective assistance in misdemeanor 
cases is so important. 
II. LACK OF GUIDANCE ON THE MEANING OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL FOR MISDEMEANORS 
If misdemeanor cases are important enough to prosecute, then they 
are important enough to analyze in terms of the appropriate level of 
representation. The message to society in prosecuting individuals in 
these cases is that they matter and that it is important to hold people 
accountable for such conduct. Whether or not one agrees with that 
message, a concomitant message should be that those charged with 
such offenses deserve a lawyer who does an effective job. In addition 
to upholding the constitutional right to such representation, there are 
a number of reasons to ensure effective misdemeanor representation. 
For a number of cases, an overburdened or incompetent 
misdemeanor lawyer could get the same result as a committed, well-
resourced public defender or high-quality private counsel. For 
example, a prosecutor may routinely offer some type of deferred 
dismissal in all first-arrest shoplifting cases, and anyone with an 
attorney will get this same offer.139 The experienced defender might 
knock a few hours of community service off of the requirements for 
the dismissal, but the results are basically the same for that defender 
and the lawyer who simply conveys the prosecution’s offer to her 
client without any negotiation over terms. However, many low-level 
cases are not so simple, and do not result in dismissal for the asking. 
In addition, in a significant number of cases with quality public or 
private representation, counsel might uncover something during the 
investigation or client interviewing and counseling process that will 
make a difference. 
From a procedural justice perspective, recent research has 
demonstrated the importance of fair treatment if we want defendants, 
their families, and communities to have more faith in and respect for 
the criminal justice system.140 Surely the quality of one’s counsel must 
 
urging). 
 139 Based on my own experience in the lower courts of several different 
jurisdictions, prosecutors do not make the same “standard” offers to defendants 
proceeding pro se. Prosecutors will often first – and sometimes only – present pro se 
defendants with the option to plead guilty to the crime or crimes charged (in 
situations where a defendant represented by counsel would receive a more generous 
offer). 
 140 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 161 (2006) (noting how 
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play a large role in these perceptions of legitimacy — or lack 
thereof.141 
What, then, is the current state of the law on effective assistance of 
counsel, and what professional standards govern, in the misdemeanor 
context? The short answer is that these guideposts do not seem to 
exist. There is no developed body of case law or professional standards 
that address the meaning of the right to effective assistance of counsel 
in the specific context of misdemeanors and other low-level 
adjudications. 
A. The Threshold Issue of the Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases 
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not apply to all misdemeanors. 
Generally, the Sixth Amendment confers the right to state-funded 
counsel for indigent defendants.142 Before 1972, the Court’s right-to-
counsel jurisprudence derived exclusively from felony cases, and some 
lower courts explicitly placed “petty offenses” outside the scope of the 
Sixth Amendment.143 Since that time, the Argersinger-Scott-Shelton 
 
legitimacy--defined as “the belief that one ought to obey the law”--has an effect “on 
people’s everyday behavior toward the law” and thus “plays an important role in 
promoting compliance” with the law).  
 141 See, e.g., NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE 
COLLABORATIONS, at ix (Feb. 1999), www.sado.org/fees/icjs.pdf (“Ultimately, as 
Attorney General Janet Reno states, the lack of competent, vigorous legal 
representation for indigent defendants calls into question the legitimacy of criminal 
convictions and the integrity of the criminal justice system as a whole.”).  
 142 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963) (under Sixth Amendment, applicable to states 
through Fourteenth Amendment, state courts must appoint counsel to individuals 
who cannot afford to hire private counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) 
(“[i]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel . . . it is the 
duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary 
requisite of due process of law”). 
 143 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §11.2(a) (5th. ed. 2009). This 
is in stark contrast to the British common law history of the right to counsel. 
“Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of 
counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest. 
At the same time parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were 
entitled to the full assistance of counsel.” Powell, 287 U.S. at 61. This rule was 
“constantly, vigorously, and sometimes passionately assailed by English statesmen and 
lawyers,” and ultimately “rejected by the colonies.” Id. at 60-61; see also Scott v. 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 372 (1979) (noting how pre–Sixth Amendment common law 
“perversely gave less in the way of right to counsel to accused felons than to those 
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troika of Supreme Court decisions has set forth the contours for non-
felony cases, finding that any imposed or suspended sentence of 
incarceration triggers the right to counsel.144 Under these 
constitutional standards governing the scope of the Sixth Amendment, 
some individuals charged with misdemeanor offenses enjoy the right 
to appointed counsel, and others do not. 
The right to misdemeanor counsel is a restraint on a judge’s ability 
to impose any sentence of incarceration when a defendant is convicted 
without counsel, unless that defendant entered a valid waiver of the 
right to counsel.145 This ex post approach does not consider the 
possible sentences listed in the statute under which an individual is 
charged. Nor is it an affirmative directive to judges determining when 
they should appoint counsel in a particular case. Rather, the state can 
forgo appointing counsel in a misdemeanor case only if the judge is 
willing to forgo any potential for a sentence involving actual or 
suspended incarceration.146 
Many states extend the guarantee of counsel beyond the federal 
floor, with some states making it available any time the relevant 
 
accused of misdemeanors”). 
 144 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (finding that Sixth Amendment 
bars imposition of suspended sentence when underlying sentence followed 
“uncounseled conviction”); Scott, 440 U.S. at 371-73 (1979) (no right to counsel for 
sentence of fine); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972) (“We hold, therefore, 
that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was 
represented by counsel at his trial.”).  
 145 See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 662 (“Where the State provides no counsel to an 
indigent defendant, does the Sixth Amendment permit activation of a suspended 
sentence upon the defendant’s violation of the terms of probation? We conclude that it 
does not.”); see also id. at 664 (restating Argersinger’s command that “no person may 
be imprisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented by counsel at his trial”). 
 146 Thus, in Shelton the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Alabama 
Supreme Court, which had affirmed Shelton’s underlying misdemeanor assault 
conviction as well as that part of the sentence imposing a fine, but had vacated that 
part of his sentence imposing probation attached to a suspended jail sentence. Id. at 
659, 674; see also id. at 671 (noting how “[a]lthough they may not attach probation to 
an imposed and suspended prison sentence, States unable or unwilling routinely to 
provide appointed counsel to misdemeanants in Shelton’s situation are not without 
recourse to another option capable of yielding a similar result,” and describing pretrial 
probation option for uncounseled misdemeanors). Similarly, the Court in Scott upheld 
the underlying conviction because, even though incarceration was a potential penalty 
for the misdemeanor theft charge in that case, the trial court imposed only a fine. 
Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74 (“We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal 
defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him 
the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.”).  
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criminal statute in a case authorizes the judge to impose a sentence of 
imprisonment, regardless of the actual sentence imposed.147 
Unfortunately, recent studies describe how some jurisdictions fail — 
or even purposely refuse — to comply with either the Argersinger line 
of cases or their own more rigorous state rule. For example, a Bureau 
of Justice report found that 28% of jail inmates charged with 
misdemeanors stated, when interviewed, that they had no counsel.148 
Such judicial disrespect for the rules governing the right to counsel is 
starkly illustrated by the South Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice’s 
statement at that state’s public bar association meeting: 
Alabama v. Shelton is one of the more misguided decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court, I must say. If we adhered to 
it in South Carolina we would have the right to counsel 
probably . . . by dragooning lawyers out of their law offices to 
take these cases in every magistrate’s court in South Carolina, 
and I have simply told my magistrates that we just don’t have 
the resources to do that. So I will tell you straight up that we 
[are] not adhering to Alabama v. Shelton in every situation.”149 
As the overwhelming majority of all prosecutions are misdemeanors, 
both rules and practice in this area play a large role in the experience 
 
 147 See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 668 (“Most jurisdictions already provide a state-law 
right to appointed counsel more generous than that afforded by the Federal 
Constitution.”). There are two ways a state can expand upon the federal standard for 
the right to counsel: the state high court can declare a more stringent standard as a 
matter of state constitutional law, or the state legislature can pass a statute granting 
the greater right. See, e.g., B. Mitchell Simpson, A Fair Trial: Are Indigents Charged 
With Misdemeanors Entitled to Court Appointed Counsel?, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
417, 426 (2000) (surveying varying state laws on appointment of misdemeanor 
counsel and noting that 36 states expand upon Argersinger right in various iterations). 
As of 2001, “All but 16 States . . . would provide counsel to a defendant . . . either 
because he received a substantial fine or because state law authorized incarceration for 
the charged offense or provided for a maximum prison term of one year.” Shelton, 535 
U.S. at 668-69 (citing relevant examples from cases and statutes in various states). 
 148 See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 14 (citing Caroline 
Wolf Harlow, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases, in U.S. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (Ser. No. NCJ 179023, 2000), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ascii/dccc.txt). But see id. at 15 (noting that 
NACDL’s own site visits for its misdemeanor report suggest that the correct 
percentage is even higher). The ABA has also documented the widespread failure to 
provide counsel in misdemeanor cases. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 
22-23; see also Spangenberg Study, supra note 129, at 86-88 (describing how 
misdemeanor guilty pleas are taken in New York State’s town and village courts 
without presence of counsel).  
 149 MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 14.  
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of individuals in the criminal justice system.150 Indeed, they determine 
who is and who is not entitled to counsel, as well as whether those 
entitled actually get counsel. It is clear that, at least in some 
jurisdictions, even those entitled to counsel in misdemeanor cases do 
not always get to exercise that right. Obviously, the appointment of 
counsel for all individuals qualifying for misdemeanor representation 
is a necessary predicate to any examination of the meaning of effective 
counsel in those cases. Studies have explored some potential remedies 
for the serious problem of such outright denial of the right to 
counsel.151 This Article moves beyond this baseline issue to explore 
the type of misdemeanor assistance the Constitution guarantees. 
B. The Failure to Define Effective Misdemeanor Lawyering 
There are a number of sources that could provide guidance on the 
particular meaning of effective misdemeanor representation. These 
sources include Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 
jurisprudence and professional organizations’ standards for defense 
practice.152 This section briefly describes how each of these sources 
currently fails to provide norms for misdemeanor representation. 
1. Lack of Misdemeanor Representation Guidance in Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Jurisprudence 
In Powell v. Alabama and Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court 
established the right to counsel in federal and state felony 
prosecutions.153 The Court then moved forward to explore the more 
 
 150 See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (citing statistics on misdemeanors 
from several jurisdictions).  
 151 See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 45; Spangenberg 
Study, supra note 129, at 155-64 (noting need for increased funding, and stricter 
requirements and recertification for attorneys). Professor Paul Marcus has made a 
convincing argument that, in part because of the potentially severe collateral 
consequences of any criminal conviction, the right to counsel should extend to all 
prosecutions, not only those with an imposed or suspended sentence of incarceration. 
See Paul Marcus, Why the United States Supreme Court Got Some (But Not a Lot) of the 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Analysis Right, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 142, 187-88 
(2009).  
 152 See infra Part III.C (considering defense community as another potential 
source). 
 153 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-42 (1963) (holding right to counsel 
to apply to state felony prosecutions through Sixth Amendment); Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 50 (1932) (noting right to counsel located in Fourteen Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (holding 
right to counsel applies to any “critical stage” of prosecution).  
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nuanced questions of the quality of guaranteed counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment, building on its statement that “[i]t has long been 
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.”154 In the 1984 case Strickland v. Washington, the 
Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test for determining ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. Under this test, a defendant must 
demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s representation was incompetent as 
judged by prevailing professional norms; and (2) this incompetency 
prejudiced the defendant.155 The following year, the Court held this 
same test applicable in the guilty plea context.156 
Despite the variety of structural impediments to judicial review of 
ineffective assistance claims in misdemeanor cases explored below in 
Part III.A.1, the limited number of lower federal and state courts that 
have reviewed such claims applied Strickland’s two-prong analysis.157 
As the Supreme Court noted with respect to its right-to-counsel 
jurisprudence more generally, “[b]oth Powell and Gideon involved 
felonies. But their rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where 
an accused is deprived of his liberty. Powell and Gideon suggest that 
there are certain fundamental rights applicable to all such criminal 
prosecutions . . . .”158 Because the right to counsel is the right to 
effective assistance of that counsel, it is clear that the well-established 
Strickland test is the appropriate standard for ineffective assistance 
claims in misdemeanor as well as felony cases.159 
 
 154 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 155 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Dripps, supra note 22. 
 156 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Although this landmark case 
established the test for ineffective assistance claims following guilty pleas, neither Hill 
nor any later Supreme Court case examined the meaning of the first (attorney 
competence) prong for guilty pleas. Instead, Hill made quick work of applying this 
newly declared framework to reject Hill’s claim. The decision devoted only two short 
paragraphs to its finding that Hill failed to demonstrate prejudice, thus rendering 
unnecessary any exploration of Hill’s claim that he pled guilty only after his attorney’s 
misadvice about parole eligibility. Id. at 60.  
 157 See, e.g., Smith v. Mun. Court of Franklin Cnty., 802 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(noting how district court properly applied Strickland standard in federal habeas 
corpus petition claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with state 
court misdemeanor); United States v. Somerset, No. 3:03-po-002, 2009 WL 3763058, 
at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (noting, in allegation of ineffective assistance in misdemeanor 
case, how “[e]ach area of asserted deficient performance is analyzed in terms of the 
Strickland standard: deficient performance and prejudice”); United States v. Busse, 814 
F. Supp. 760, 764-65 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (stating, in review of misdemeanor conviction, 
that “upon the facts presented, the defendant has satisfied both prongs of the 
Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance of counsel”).  
 158 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972). 
 159 There are a limited number of cases in which the standard in Stickland’s 
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However, the Strickland test offers little concrete guidance to lower 
courts analyzing actual claims of ineffective assistance and to defense 
attorneys regulated by its Sixth Amendment holding. The Strickland 
decision emphasized how courts examining ineffective assistance 
claims must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial 
strategy.’ ”160 The Court’s reliance on such a presumption was a sound 
rejection of any type of checklist approach for ineffective assistance.161 
The “wide range” of possible acceptable behavior, as one commentator 
noted, “make[s] clear that one searching for the content of the 
reasonably effective assistance standard must look primarily to judicial 
decisions applying that standard.”162 
In felony cases, particularly in the death penalty area, this content 
exists; the same cannot be said in the misdemeanor context. There is 
no well-developed body of lower court decisions on issues specific to 
ineffective assistance in misdemeanor cases, and the Supreme Court 
has never had the occasion to apply the Strickland test in a case 
challenging a misdemeanor conviction. After giving some examples of 
ineffective assistance norms in the felony context, the remainder of 
this section explores the lack of such content for misdemeanor 
practice. 
 
companion case, United States v. Cronic, applies. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 
(1984). In the Cronic line of cases, a defendant who can demonstrate suffering from 
the actual or constructive denial of any counsel is relieved of Strickland’s prejudice 
requirement. Id. at 658; see also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004) (“If 
counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial 
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the 
adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”). However, courts rarely employ a 
presumed prejudice standard based on denial of counsel; rather, Strickland governs 
the vast majority of ineffective assistance claims. See Keith Cuningham-Parmeter, 
Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic’s Call to Presume Prejudice 
from Representational Absence, 76 TEMPLE L. REV. 827, 881 (2003) (“The application of 
Cronic outlined here will affect only a subset of cases involving ineffective assistance 
of counsel . . . . Most defendants with valid claims will be unable to establish that their 
lawyer’s impairment rose to the level of “absence” required by Cronic.”). 
 160 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 161 See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà vu All Over Again”: 
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to 
the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 
140 (2007). 
 162 LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 664 (referring to Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 
(1986), and Strickland). 
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The most fully developed area of ineffective assistance jurisprudence 
in felony cases is defense counsel’s failure to investigate. For example, 
there are a number of Supreme Court decisions — beginning with 
Strickland and continuing with decisions in the past two terms163 — 
setting out defense counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence 
for the penalty phase of bifurcated death penalty trials.164 The result is 
robust guidance to defense attorneys, defender offices, and judges in 
capital cases, mandating thorough investigation into the defendant’s 
mental capacity, social background, and other potentially mitigating 
circumstances.165 Indeed, the criminal defense community responded 
to these decisions with a spate of trainings designed to implement the 
Court’s directives about more rigorous mitigation investigation.166 The 
Court’s application of the Strickland test to a particular context thus 
led to changes in defender practices. 
The duty to investigate facts and law is not limited to the capital 
mitigation context. For example, in a non-capital felony case, the 
 
 163 Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3264 (2010); Porter v. McCullough, 130 S. Ct. 
447, 453-54(2009); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  
 164 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s statute 
requiring bifurcated trials where there are separate guilt and sentencing phases); Gary 
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 317 (1983) (stating that bifurcated trials “are essential to a 
constitutional death sentence”). 
 165 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 391 (2005) (noting how defense 
counsel failed to examine file that “disclose[d] test results that the defense’s mental 
health experts would have viewed as pointing to schizophrenia and other disorders, 
and test scores showing a third grade level of cognition after nine years of schooling”); 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (“Counsel failed to introduce available 
evidence that Williams was ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did not advance beyond 
sixth grade in school.”). 
 166 See Seminar Program, Tenn. Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Annual Death 
Penalty Training: The Fight for Life (Apr. 8-9, 2005), http://www.jenner.com/files/ 
tbl_s23Events%5CLinktoAgenda1243%5C1238%5CTACDL_Death_Penalty_Seminar.
pdf (including attorney and mitigation specialist from the Wiggins case, with panel on 
Tracking Down the Witnesses & Documents You Need to Discover Your Client’s Life 
Story.”); see also Seminar Program, Washburn Univ. Sch. of Law, 2003 National 
Capital Defense and Mitigation Skills Training Conference (Nov. 6-8, 2003), 
http://washburnlaw.edu/cle/programs/200311deathpenalty.php; Seminar Program, 
Nat’l Alliance of Sentencing Advocates & Mitigation Specialists, Death Penalty 
Mitigation Institute, 3 (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/ 
1151007501.75/NLADA_NASAMS_2006%20Conference.pdf (“The NASAMS Death 
Penalty Mitigation Institute (DPMI) is a specialized one-day training event for capital 
mitigation specialists.”); Program Schedule, DePaul Univ. Coll. of Law, Mitigation 
Training Program, http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/cjcc/mitigation_ 
default.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) (describing DePaul Law School’s Mitigation 
Training Program, located within its Center for Justice in Capital Cases).  
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found ineffective assistance based on 
counsel’s “failure to conduct the necessary legal investigation” into a 
viable justification defense to a charge of being a convicted felon in 
possession of a firearm.167 Thus, in addition to guidance on the duty to 
investigate capital mitigation evidence, defense lawyers also have 
guidance in such areas as the duty to investigate affirmative defenses. 
Another example of guidance from the courts about the meaning of 
effective assistance is the Ninth Circuit felony case of Riggs v. 
Fairman.168 There, the court found ineffective assistance where defense 
counsel advised Riggs to reject a plea offer with a five-year prison 
term, telling him that the maximum exposure he faced if convicted at 
trial was only nine years. After Riggs followed counsel’s advice and 
was later convicted at trial, the court sentenced him to twenty-five 
years to life under California’s “three strikes” law.169 In finding that 
defense counsel’s error constituted incompetent performance under 
Strickland’s first prong, the court stated that “[d]efense counsel’s 
advice to Riggs was not only erroneous, but egregious, considering the 
discrepancy between the two punishments.”170 The difference between 
the rejected five-year offer and eventual twenty-five years to life 
sentence also led the court to find that Riggs satisfied Strickland’s 
prejudice prong, because “[s]uch a discrepancy between the two 
sentences would compel any reasonable person to take the deal offered 
by the prosecution.”171 
In theory, the holdings in these felony cases would guide 
misdemeanor representation where there is a right to counsel because, 
as noted above, the constitutional standard is the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Thus, misdemeanor attorneys would have a duty 
to investigate evidence relevant to mitigation of the sentence, a duty to 
investigate the facts and law surrounding potential affirmative 
defenses before counseling the client about a plea offer, and a duty to 
counsel the client about the correct maximum sentence. 
In reality, these felony case holdings, grounded in the facts and 
practices specific to such serious felony cases, do not offer sufficient 
guidance for misdemeanors. This is because misdemeanor attorneys 
 
 167 United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding ineffective 
assistance where counsel failed to inform client that justification is defense to federal 
crime of being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, and where facts supported 
defense). 
 168 399 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 169 Id.  
 170 Id. 
 171 Id.  
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work under the particular, often egregious, conditions of the lower 
criminal courts. Misdemeanor attorneys across the country handle 
caseloads that make almost any investigation difficult.172 These 
attorneys also represent clients in cases where the state or court 
routinely make plea or sentence offers at the first appearance or 
shortly thereafter, when counsel has not yet interviewed her client, let 
alone had time to research the law and facts of any affirmative 
defenses or sentence mitigation.173 These are some of the conditions 
relevant to misdemeanor practice that differ from felony 
representation, and that call for fact-specific analysis from the courts 
in order to establish a jurisprudence of ineffective assistance that can 
realistically apply to misdemeanors. This is not to say that courts 
should excuse inadequate representation on the basis of egregious 
conditions that preclude more rigorous advocacy.174 Indeed, judicial 
analysis of misdemeanor ineffective assistance might well result in a 
strong message to legislatures about the need for reform.175 
There is a small but significant group of cases that address some of 
the workload and other issues that dominate misdemeanor 
representation, even though they are not focused on misdemeanors. 
These cases involve systemic challenges to the delivery of indigent 
defense in a particular jurisdiction. For example, a Connecticut state 
court class action “challenged excessive attorney caseloads, 
substandard rates of compensation for attorneys, and a lack of 
adequate representation for juvenile defendants.”176 However, of the 
limited number of an early group of such cases that met with initial 
success, “the relief . . . has not been sustained.”177 Although several 
 
 172 See supra Part I.A (discussing caseloads in misdemeanor cases). 
 173 See supra Part I.D. 
 174 See infra Part II.A.2 (rejecting idea of resource deprivation driving 
constitutional rules). 
 175 See infra notes 242-46 (describing constitutional road maps for legislatures in 
the area of criminal procedure). 
 176 Cara Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 445 (2009) (describing Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 
950545629S, 1998 WL 96407, at *15-17 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 1998)). Professor 
Drinan has documented what she calls the first two generations of such challenges, 
and suggested approaches for the forthcoming “third generation” of indigent defense 
litigation. These lawsuits take various forms, including challenges to the defender 
system in the context of an individual criminal case, and cases that use a class action 
model. Id. at 433. 
 177 Id. at 439. But see id. at 441-42 (noting, with respect to class action suits 
challenging the county or state defense system, “Despite the unavailability of a federal 
forum for these claims to date, it is worth noting that Luckey did create some good 
law for indigent defense advocates going forward. Importantly, Luckey recognized 
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more recent systemic challenges led to some “substantive, lasting 
reform,”178 the current fiscal crisis has resulted in the recent rolling 
back of these reforms in some jurisdictions.179 To the extent decisions 
in systemic challenge cases address issues present in misdemeanor 
cases, they offer some guidance for misdemeanor advocacy. However, 
they do not focus on the lower criminal courts and are thus of limited 
use in defining specific standards for misdemeanor representation. 
Thus, there is insufficient case law to offer useful misdemeanor 
guidance. The Argersinger line of cases tells judges when they must 
appoint counsel, but not how that counsel must behave once 
appointed. Argersinger, Scott v. Illinois, and Shelton v. Alabama all 
involved challenges to uncounseled misdemeanor convictions; the 
issue of effective assistance was not before the Court.180 Indeed, recent 
litigation involving misdemeanors and the right to counsel continues 
to focus on the fundamental question of whether the right applies, 
albeit in somewhat more nuanced circumstances. For example, the 
Kansas Supreme Court recently found that an uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction that led to jail time — and was thus 
unconstitutional — could not be used for sentence enhancement 
purposes in a later felony proceeding.181 
By contrast, there are relatively few cases that address claims of 
ineffective assistance in misdemeanor cases. A search of all reported 
New York state cases from 2009 until present, with the terms 
“ineffective assistance of counsel” and “misdemeanor,” reveals only 
twenty-two cases that involve only misdemeanor charges and analyze 
 
that a defendant has the right to make a Sixth Amendment challenge outside the 
context of post-conviction review, reasoning that the right to counsel is more than the 
right to a certain result”) (citing Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (11th Cir. 
1988)). 
 178 Id. at 444. 
 179 See, e.g., Dave Collins, Public Defenders Feel Squeeze Conn. Cuts Create 
Caseload Worries, BOSTON.COM (July 21, 2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-07-
21/news/29798875_1_public-defenders-caseload-budget-cuts (noting how public 
defender has stated that “[s]ome public defenders’ caseloads are already at or above 
state guidelines set in 1999 in response to a lawsuit that said the public defender 
system was so overwhelmed that it could no longer fulfill clients’ constitutional rights 
to an adequate legal defense”). 
 180 See supra Part II. A. (discussing this troika of cases).  
 181 State v. Youngblood, 206 P.3d 518, 525 (Kan. 2009). Although an earlier 
United States Supreme Court decision found that “an uncounseled conviction valid 
under Scott may be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even 
though that sentence entails imprisonment,” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 
746-47 (1994), the Youngblood court ruling related to a conviction that was not valid 
under Scott. Youngblood, 206 P.3d at 523. 
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a claim of ineffective assistance;182 the same search in the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals and all New York State federal district courts 
reveals only two such cases.183 These numbers are not surprising, 
because only a small percentage of individuals convicted of a 
misdemeanor file an appeal or seek other post–conviction review of 
counsel’s effectiveness.184 Of the twenty-four cases, seventeen relate to 
one particular issue: the failure to advise a client about the deportation 
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment duty to warn set out in the recent Supreme Court case of 
Padilla v. Kentucky.185 
The concentration of cases in this one specific area of misdemeanor 
practice — which highlights the importance of pre-plea warnings 
about collateral consequences of misdemeanor convictions — is 
significant.186 As discussed in Part I.B, misdemeanor convictions can 
result in many severe collateral consequences, in addition to 
deportation. Although Padilla itself involved a felony drug trafficking 
charge, a number of lower courts have applied Padilla’s duty to warn 
to misdemeanor cases involving deportation as well as other collateral 
consequences.187 It is in lower-level cases — where the penal 
 
 182 Westlaw Search, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (online search for 
[Misdemeanor & “ineffective assistance of counsel” and da(aft2008)], in NY-CS).  
 183 Westlaw Search, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (online search for 
[Misdemeanor & “ineffective assistance of counsel” and da(aft 2008)], in DCTNY and 
CTA2R). 
 184 See infra Part III.B (discussing structural impediments to ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims in misdemeanor cases); see also JOHN SCALIA, Federal Criminal 
Appeals, 1999 with Trends 1985–1999, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS 
SPECIAL REPORT at 2-3 (Ser. No. NCJ 185055, 2001), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf (finding that, with respect to federal 
court cases in 1999, “[d]efendants convicted of property, immigration, and 
misdemeanor offenses were among the least likely to file an appeal,” and that 
defendants filed five appeals for every 100 convictions in misdemeanor cases).  
 185 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (holding that where 
deportation consequences of criminal conviction are “succinct, clear and explicit,” 
defense counsel has Sixth Amendment obligation to correctly inform client of this 
consequence). 
 186 This type of case in not unique to New York. See e.g., Ex parte Tanklevskaya, 
No. 01-10-00627-CR, 2011 WL 2132722, at *11 (Tex. App. May 26, 2011) (finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland and Padilla when counsel failed to 
advise client that pleading guilty to misdemeanor would have immigration 
consequences). 
 187 See, e.g., People v. Harding, 30 Misc. 3d 1237(A), slip op. at 34 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
Mar. 15, 2011) (applying Padilla framework to failure to advise about deportation 
consequences); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010), 
cert. granted, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010) (applying Padilla framework to failure to warn 
about loss of pension); see also State v. Powell, 935 N.E.2d 85, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 
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consequences are not as severe — that defendants are most likely to 
succeed in proving the second prong of the test: that the attorney’s 
failure to warn prejudiced the defendant.188 This means demonstrating 
that, given full knowledge about the collateral consequence, it is 
reasonably likely there would have been a different outcome in the 
case.189 Thus, although Mr. Padilla did not succeed in proving 
prejudice on remand from the Supreme Court,190 some misdemeanor 
defendants will be able to show how they would not have pleaded 
guilty, and would have had other viable options in their case, had their 
attorney properly warned them about the severe collateral 
consequences of their “minor” misdemeanor charges. 
As the nascent post–Padilla misdemeanor jurisprudence develops, it 
will send a message to defenders that warnings about deportation, and 
possibly other severe collateral consequences, are not only mandated 
in all levels of cases, but that the failure to warn is most likely going to 
prejudice the misdemeanor client. This means that training, 
interviewing, counseling, and negotiation and sentencing advocacy in 
this area are critical for misdemeanor attorneys. Indeed, the decision 
in Padilla has already led to numerous trainings about its practical 
application.191 
 
2010) (finding ineffective assistance where counsel improperly advised his client 
about sexual offender registration). 
 188 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
 189 See Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1482; see also Roberts, supra note 137, at 698, 725 
(discussing how prejudice prong’s “different outcome” requirement is broader than 
showing that defendant would have chosen and won trial over guilty plea and should 
instead be interpreted to allow for different outcomes based on negotiation or 
sentencing advocacy that could have led to avoidance of collateral consequence). 
 190 Commonwealth v. Padilla, 01-CR-00517 (Hardin Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2011) (on 
file with author) (holding that Padilla failed to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to 
properly warn him about deportation consequences of his guilty plea prejudiced him). 
 191 See, e.g., The Fifth National Training on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions, DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP, http://defendingimmigrants.org (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2011); Upcoming Trainings: The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky, PAIR 
PROJECT, http://www.pairproject.org/trainings.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). For 
practice advisories on Padilla, see generally IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, A DEFENDING 
IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE ADVISORY: DUTY OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL 
REPRESENTING AN IMMIGRANT DEFENDANT AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY (Apr. 2010), 
available at http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/docs/2010/10-Padilla_Practice_ 
Advisory.pdf; DAN KESSELBRENNER, NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, A DEFENDING 
IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE ADVISORY: RETROACTIVE APPLICABILITY OF PADILLA V. 
KENTUCKY (2010), and WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N’S IMMIGRATION PROJECT, HOW TO ADVISE 
NONCITIZEN DEFENDANTS: WHAT IS “CLEAR AND UNCLEAR” AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 
(2010).  
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These developments in the wake of Padilla demonstrate the promise 
of guidance for misdemeanor attorneys in other areas. Although this 
guidance is badly needed, there are unfortunately a number of 
structural and other reasons for the paucity of misdemeanor 
ineffective assistance jurisprudence. Before exploring these obstacles 
in Part III, the remainder of this section highlights another critical 
missing piece of guidance for misdemeanor attorneys: the lack of 
professional standards that address core misdemeanor issues. 
2. Lack of Misdemeanor Representation Guidance in Professional 
Standards for Defense Representation 
There are a number of non-constitutional sources that provide 
standards for defense representation. These sources range from 
published national standards to unpublished local public defender 
office guidelines. They include general membership organizations, 
such as the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and more specialized 
groups, such as the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers.192 Defense representation standards serve two main purposes: 
First, they offer practical guidance to criminal defense attorneys and 
serve as internal benchmarks for adequate defense representation. 
Second, courts rely on professional standards to determine the 
“prevailing professional norms” against which to judge an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.193 The central role that professional 
standards play in guiding both practice and judicial decisions 
demonstrates the importance of clear standards for misdemeanor 
representation. 
Margaret Colgate Love has called the ABA Criminal Justice Standards 
one of the “most respected sources of criminal defense lawyers’ 
professional duty to the client . . . . Over the years, the Standards have 
earned their place as a measure of ‘prevailing professional norms’ for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment through the thoroughness and 
balance of the process by which they are developed.”194 The Criminal 
 
 192 See generally ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/criminal_justice/policy/standards.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (noting how 
the second edition of most volumes has been completed, and how a third edition is “well 
underway”); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (2006) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES], available at 
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_Guidelines. 
 193 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (citing the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards).  
 194 Margaret Colgate Love, Evolving Standards of Reasonableness: The ABA Standards 
and the Right to Counsel in Plea Negotiations, 39 FORDHAM URB. L. J. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 7), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
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Justice Standards consist of twenty-three separate sets of guidelines on 
diverse topics ranging from the “Urban Police Function,” to 
“Discovery.”195 In determining attorney competency under the first 
Strickland prong, the Supreme Court relies more heavily on the ABA 
Standards than on other professional norms; the Court has referenced 
the Criminal Justice Standards’ “Defense Function” section in its 
ineffective assistance analyses,196 and has also relied on the ABA’s 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases.197 
The Court’s decisions in the well-developed area of ineffective 
assistance in capital mitigation demonstrate an increasing reliance on 
professional standards, and, more specifically, on ABA standards.198 
The Court cited ABA Standards once in Williams v. Taylor, the first 
Supreme Court case to actually find ineffective assistance under the 
Strickland two-prong approach. Three years later, it cited ABA 
standards six times in Wiggins v. Smith, and then eight times in the 
2005 case of Rompilla v. Beard.199 The Court went from describing 
ABA standards in Strickland as “guides to determining what is 
reasonable [attorney behavior], but . . . only guides,” to characterizing 
them in Wiggins as “standards to which we long have referred as 
‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’ ”200 Thus, the Court 
recently added structure to the purposely open-ended, deferential first 
 
1922930. 
 195 See ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 192, at Standard 1 (urban 
review of sentences); id. at Standard 11 (discovery); see also Warren E. Burger, 
Introduction: The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 251, 251 
(1974); Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, 23 CRIM. 
JUST., Winter 2009, at 14 (explaining how ABA Standards arise from consensus 
process involving defenders, prosecutors, and judges). 
 196 See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (“[W]e long have referred 
[to these ABA Standards] as ‘guides to determining what is reasonable.’ ”); Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688 (describing the ABA Standards as “guides to determining what is 
reasonable [attorney behavior], but . . . only guides”).  
 197 See, e.g., Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 (referring to ABA Guidelines and Standards in 
determining what constitutes deficient performance). The Guidelines are not one of the 
Criminal Justice Standards, but rather are separately published. See ABA, Guidelines for 
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 913, 916 (2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 198 See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (describing ineffective assistance 
jurisprudence in capital mitigation context). 
 199 Blume & Neumann, supra note 161, at 151-52; see also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 
381; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
396 (2000). 
 200 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  
  
324 University of California, Davis [Vol. 45:277 
prong inquiry by relying more heavily and explicitly on published 
professional standards for defense practice than it had in the past.201 
One could certainly attribute these developments to at least some 
Justices’ increasing discomfort with and focus on the death penalty in 
the years after the Williams decision. It was during this period that 
Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor gave speeches voicing concerns about 
the troubling state of defense representation in capital cases and the 
possibility of executing innocent defendants.202 It was also during this 
 
 201 See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381 (noting how in judging defense’s investigation, as 
in applying Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to 
“counsel’s perspective at the time” investigative decisions are made and by giving 
“heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments”). There has been some 
commentary that one of the Court’s recent ineffective assistance decisions 
demonstrates a move away from heavy reliance on the ABA Standards in determining 
prevailing professional norms. Reinstating Van Hook’s death sentence in Bobby v. Van 
Hook, the Court critiqued the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on the ABA’s Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which were 
promulgated some 18 years after Van Hook’s sentencing proceeding. Bobby v. Van 
Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2009). In addition to disapproving of such prospective 
application, the opinion criticized the lower court for treating the ABA Guidelines as 
“inexorable commands” rather than “merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent 
attorneys would do.” Id. at 17. The Court quoted liberally from its prior ineffective 
assistance cases, and it is not clear that Van Hook is a step back from that 
jurisprudence in terms of its reliance on the Guidelines, particularly since the opinion 
was per curiam. Van Hook did, however, lead to commentary on the issue. See, e.g., 
Memorandum from the ABA,on Bobby v. Van Hook (Nov. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www2.americanbar.org/DeathPenalty_migrated/RepresentationProject/PublicDo
cuments/van%20hook%20analysis.pdf (“The Court’s opinion in Van Hook does not 
alter its prior jurisprudence regarding the ABA Guidelines.”); Posting of Marcia Coyle, 
THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Nov. 10, 2009 3:15 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/ 
blt/2009/11/a-justices-curious-comment-about-aba-guidelines-for-death-penalty-
lawyers-.html (noting differing viewpoints on the meaning of Van Hook’s language 
about the ABA Guidelines). One term after Van Hook, the Court cited to that 
decision’s language about “inexorable commands,” but went on in the same sentence 
to note how the ABA Criminal Justice Standards “may be valuable measures of the 
prevailing professional norms of effective representation,” and then relied heavily on 
various professional standards in its analysis. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 
1482 (2010). 
 202 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Access to Justice in the 
United States, 7 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y 1, 10 (2001) (noting, in remarks at Access to 
Justice conference, how she has “yet to see a death case, among the dozens coming to 
the Supreme Court on eve of execution petitions, in which the defendant was well 
represented at trial”); Crystal Nix Hines, Lack of Lawyers Hinders Appeals in Capital 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A1 (noting Justice O’Connor’s comment, in speech 
to Minnesota Women Lawyers, that “[p]erhaps it’s time to look at minimum standards 
for appointed counsel in death cases”). It was also during this period that the Court 
held unconstitutional the execution of an individual for a crime committed when 
under the age of 18. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
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period that the ABA updated its Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.203 
However, a narrative that explains the Court’s more robust 
ineffective assistance jurisprudence and heavier reliance on the ABA’s 
Standards and Guidelines as a concern solely with capital cases has two 
limitations. First, although such concerns may well have animated the 
Court, the Court did not limit its recent ineffective assistance 
jurisprudence to the capital context — a move the Court certainly 
could have taken given that the cases all involved capital mitigation 
review. Indeed, as early as Strickland, the Court noted how “[a] capital 
sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case . . . is 
sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of 
standards for decision that counsel’s role in the proceeding is 
comparable to counsel’s role at trial.”204 The applicability of the 
Court’s ineffective assistance norms to non-death cases — and indeed 
to misdemeanors205 — is thus clear. The second limitation to a 
narrative that explains the Court’s interest in ineffective assistance as 
an interest in capital cases is that the Court found ineffective 
assistance for failure to warn about deportation consequences in 
Padilla, which involved a felony marijuana trafficking case where 
Padilla had already served his sentence by the time the Court reviewed 
the case.206 The Court began its exploration of defense counsel’s Sixth 
Amendment duty to warn by noting how the ABA Standards “may be 
valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective 
representation, especially as these standards have been adapted to deal 
with the intersection of modern criminal prosecutions and 
immigration law.”207 The decision then went far beyond the Court’s 
more recent singular focus on the ABA Standards in its exploration of 
professional norms and cited a number of other standards to support 
its statement that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms 
supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the 
 
 203 See ABA, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 913 (2003), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_ 
representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 204 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (internal citations omitted) (explaining how, 
“[f]or purposes of describing counsel’s duties, therefore, Florida’s capital sentencing 
proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial”). 
 205 See supra notes 157-59 (discussing Strickland test’s application to 
misdemeanors). 
 206 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473.  
 207 Id. at 1482. 
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risk of deportation.”208 These other sources included the National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association’s Performance Guidelines for 
Criminal Representation, the Department of Justice’s Compendium of 
Standards for Indigent Defense Systems, various criminal law and 
practice treatises, and law review articles.209 In the 2011-2012 term, 
the Court will decide two more non-capital claims of ineffective 
assistance, Missouri v. Frye, and Lafler v. Cooper. The former involves a 
felony charge of driving with revoked driving privileges, and the latter 
involves assault with intent to murder.210 These recent and upcoming 
cases demonstrate the Court’s interest in professional standards for 
effective representation in non-capital cases,211 and the importance of 
having standards for misdemeanor practice. 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s emphatic reliance on 
professional standards in recent ineffective assistance jurisprudence, 
an institutional defender office or an attorney new to criminal practice 
might reasonably turn to published professional standards for 
guidance on representation in misdemeanor cases.212 That attorney 
will find different defender caseload recommendations for felonies and 
misdemeanors.213 That attorney may also find different levels of 
 
 208 Id.  
 209 Id.  
 210 Lafler v. Cooper, 376 F. App’x 563, 565-66(6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. 
Ct. 856 (2011) (No. 10-209); Missouri v. Frye, 311 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011) (No. 10-444).  
 211 These cases also demonstrate what Professor Stephanos Bibas has described as 
“a watershed in the Court’s approach to regulating plea bargains.” Stephanos Bibas, 
Regulating the Plea Bargain Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2011). Bibas notes how the Padilla decision marked the 
moment when “[t]he Court began to move beyond its fixation upon the handful of 
cases that go to jury trials. It recognized that the other 95 percent of adjudicated cases 
resolved by guilty pleas matter greatly, and began in earnest to regulate plea bargains 
the way it has long regulated jury trials.” Id. at 1118-19. But see Josh Bowers, 
Fundamental Fairness and the Path From Santobello to Padilla: A Response to Professor 
Bibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 53 (2011) (disagreeing with Bibas’s characterization 
of Padilla as “watershed” decision, and describing how “the Court has regulated plea 
bargaining on its own terms for decades,” using fundamental fairness approach rather 
than “accuracy” approach it uses when regulating trials). The Court’s willingness to 
delve so deeply into the messy area of plea bargain regulation--and in particular into 
counseling about collateral consequences of guilty pleas--will surely affect 
misdemeanor practice; indeed, that is already the case with Padilla, which did not 
limit the duty to warn about deportation to felony cases. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 212 See Blume & Neumann, supra note 161, at 147 (“The jurisprudential shift is 
now evident and established. Lower courts must consider the ABA Guidelines and 
other national standards to determine the reasonableness of counsel’s behavior in light 
of prevailing professional norms as part of ineffective counsel analysis.”).  
 213 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting how nationally recognized 
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compensation for felony and misdemeanor representation in her 
jurisdiction,214 which suggests different expectations for felony and 
misdemeanor representation. However, that attorney will not find 
guidance in professional standards on the meaning of any such 
differing expectations. For example, the ABA endorses caseload caps 
of 300 for non-traffic misdemeanors and 150 for felonies, but does not 
explain what misdemeanor lawyers are expected to cut or do 
differently in their representation to handle a caseload that is double 
that recommended for felony attorneys.215 Thus, the widely-cited ABA 
Criminal Justice Standards do not offer any separate guidelines for 
misdemeanors. 
The Criminal Justice Standards do recognize, in various provisions 
and commentary, some of the differences between misdemeanor and 
felony cases. However, these references are largely in relation to the 
baseline issue of whether there is a right to counsel at all under the 
Sixth Amendment.216 One such discussion is located in the “Guilty 
Pleas” Standard relating to “[a]id of counsel; time for deliberation.”217 
This Standard first states that a defendant should have reasonable time 
to consult with an attorney before entering a guilty plea. The second 
part of the Standard states that a defendant who chooses to waive 
counsel should have “a reasonable time for deliberation” about a guilty 
plea before it is accepted by the court, and after certain judicial 
advisement.218 Although there is no misdemeanor-felony distinction in 
the text of this “aid of counsel” Standard, the commentary recognizes 
 
standards are 400 non-traffic misdemeanors per year, with number dropping to 150 
for felonies).  
 214 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (2011) (setting hourly rates and noting that 
payment “shall not exceed $7,000 for each attorney in a case in which one or more 
felonies are charged, and $2,000 for each attorney in a case in which only 
misdemeanors are charged”); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.125 (2001) (setting capital 
and non-capital case hourly rates and capping felony or “gross misdemeanor” 
representation at $2,500 and misdemeanor representation at $750).  
 215 See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC’Y, supra note 77, at 
pt. 4 (stating that ABA endorses National Advisory Commission (“NAC”) caseload 
numbers, although list following endorsement notes misdemeanor cap of 300, rather 
than 400 as NAC recommends). 
 216 See, e.g., ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (3d ed. 
1992) (search reveals 19 mentions of “misdemeanor,” most relating to this baseline 
issue). 
 217 See PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 67, at § 14-1.3.  
 218 Id. This time for deliberation would come after advice by the court, spelled out 
in another guideline, which relates to such things as maximum sentence, the waiver of 
certain constitutional rights, and advisement about certain collateral consequences of 
a criminal conviction. See id. at § 14-1.4. 
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how this provision might work differently if the charge is a 
misdemeanor where the defendant does not have a right to an 
attorney.219 
The Commentary to the Criminal Justice Standards better accounts 
for the reality of the lower courts, by noting how the “time for 
deliberation” standard purposefully did not include a specific time 
period. The Commentary thus explains that set time periods would 
introduce “an undesirable degree of rigidity by requiring two initial 
court appearances even in those cases, such as misdemeanor traffic 
offenses, in which a defendant might wish to enter a plea immediately 
rather than being required to return to the jurisdiction for a second 
appearance.”220 Certainly, this commentary recognizes and advances a 
system where low-level offenses are treated differently from offenses 
carrying a greater potential criminal penalty. 
Other “misdemeanor” mentions in the ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards are passing illustrative examples that just happen to be 
misdemeanor cases, but are not related to the question of effective 
assistance for misdemeanors.221 There are general standards that, if 
applied to misdemeanors as well as felonies, would significantly raise 
the level of practice. For example, one Standard states that “[d]efense 
counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of 
the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits 
of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.”222 To be sure, it 
is an unfortunate reality that this thorough investigation often does 
not take place in felony cases.223 However, investigation is impossible 
in misdemeanor cases that are resolved by guilty plea shortly after a 
 
 219 Id. (“[I]t would impose a significant burden on the courts to require that all 
defendants be represented by counsel in order to plead guilty, even in misdemeanor 
cases involving no prison sentence.”). 
 220 Id. (“[I]n most cases, as a practical matter, the proceedings required to ensure 
that the defendant has properly waived counsel will necessitate a delay between the 
initial court appearance and the entry of a plea.”). 
 221 See, e.g., id. § 14-1.8(a)(ii) (illustrating proper consideration of guilty plea in 
final disposition approval, for court allowing misdemeanor guilty plea in exchange for 
dismissal of felony charges in order “to avoid the stigma-and some or all of the 
collateral consequences-of a felony conviction”).  
 222 See, e.g., ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 4-4.1. (3d ed. 1993). 
 223 See, e.g., Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying 
ineffective assistance claim despite description of defense counsel’s investigation in 
capital case as extremely limited); Jane Fritsch & Matthew Purdy, Defenders by 
Default: A Special Report; Option to Legal Aid for Poor Leaves New Yorkers at Risk, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 1994, at A1 (noting examples where court-appointed attorneys have 
failed to investigate their clients’ cases).  
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defendant meets his counsel at the first appearance, as many cases are 
in some jurisdictions.224 The same is true when a defender has a high 
misdemeanor caseload, or when office investigative resources are not 
available for misdemeanors. 
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards acknowledge that misdemeanors 
are constitutionally different from felonies in terms of the attachment 
of the right to counsel.225 However, the Standards do not address the 
ways in which defense counsel might effectively represent 
misdemeanor clients, given the particular needs and challenges of 
misdemeanor representation, when the right to counsel applies. There 
is a similar lack of guidance in other standards, such as the National 
Legal Aid & Defender Association’s Performance Guidelines for 
Criminal Defense Representation, which do not contain the word 
“misdemeanor.”226 The current lack of guidance from professional 
standards can lead to one of three conclusions: the system must 
change to allow defense counsel in misdemeanors to adhere to existing 
professional standards; there must be new standards designed to 
address a misdemeanor-specific context; or perhaps some combination 
of these two potential responses.227 
III. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES IN RESPONDING TO THE NEED FOR 
MISDEMEANOR STANDARDS 
The academic and practice communities have not paid sufficient 
attention to the significance of a misdemeanor charge or conviction, or 
to the importance of defining and ensuring quality representation in 
these seemingly petty cases. Yet as demonstrated in Part I, 
 
 224 See, e.g., THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 15 (“Almost 70% of defendants 
observed entered a guilty or no contest plea at arraignment.”). In some jurisdictions 
there is no counsel at the initial arraignment or counsel is present only for the 
arraignment and the case is then re-assigned. In these jurisdictions, even if there is no 
guilty plea until the appearance after arraignment, there is simply no real opportunity 
for defense counsel — who is appearing on the case and often meeting her client for 
the first time – to investigate the facts of the case. 
 225 See supra notes 216-19. 
 226 See PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 192 (searching for “misdemeanor” 
shows zero results, and guidelines do not separate “serious” from “less serious” crimes 
or use any similar categorization).  
 227 Some jurisdictions have requirements for capital cases and programs to assign 
“qualified” capital counsel. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of 
“Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 489-90 (1993) (listing 
examples); see also id. at 495, nn.247-50 (noting there are legal standards on capital 
trial issues applying specifically to that context, including death qualification, jury 
instructions, and bifurcation of guilt and punishment); supra note 203 and 
accompanying text (noting that ABA has a separate set of standards for capital cases). 
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misdemeanors matter. Once proper consideration is given to this 
overlooked area of criminal law and procedure, a variety of questions 
flow. They include the core issues of what can be done and who can 
do what. This Part explores potential divisions of labor among the 
various institutions connected to the criminal justice system in 
addressing the specialized needs of misdemeanor defendants. Who can 
act to fill the void for standards of misdemeanor representation, given 
particular institutional competencies? The legislature, judiciary, 
professional organizations, and the defense bar are all well-situated to 
effectuate different, important changes. Although this Article does not 
attempt to fully answer the complex question of what those 
institutions might do, this Part does address some of the ways in 
which each group might react to the crisis in misdemeanor 
representation and the lack of standards. 
Part A considers the legislative role in easing the crisis by moving 
certain truly low-level misdemeanors out of the criminal justice 
system entirely, and notes how this is an opportune moment for 
undertaking such cost-saving reforms. Part B describes the important 
role that courts play in advancing a discussion of and potential 
solutions to inadequate representation in the nation’s lower courts. 
While there are numerous structural obstacles to courts articulating 
constitutional standards for effective assistance of counsel in 
misdemeanor cases, these obstacles are not a total bar to such a 
misdemeanor jurisprudence. Equally important as the articulation of 
constitutional standards is the role of the courts as provocateurs, in 
spurring discussion about reform. Part C is a call to professional 
organizations, including the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards project, 
to consider the particular context of misdemeanor representation. 
While there is no bright line between felony and misdemeanor 
representation,228 there are already separate national caseload 
suggestions and separate levels of compensation in many jurisdictions 
for the two categories of cases. Professional organizations should 
either promulgate misdemeanor-specific standards for representation 
or clarify that general standards apply equally to felonies and 
misdemeanors, with commentary addressing how those standards 
might be met in the different contexts. Finally, Part D describes the 
role the defender community might play in shaping misdemeanor 
standards. While there are unfortunately many fronts on which the 
defender community might begin to address the misdemeanor 
representation crisis, Part D focuses on two areas in particular need of 
 
 228 See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text. 
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attention: training in the identification and use — in client counseling, 
negotiation and sentencing advocacy — of collateral consequences; 
and lowering the high rates of waiver of the right to counsel in the 
lower criminal courts. 
A. The Legislative Role: Moving Minor Misdemeanors Out of the 
Criminal Justice System 
In an open letter to the California State Senate, then-Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger explained why he was signing a bill changing 
the act of possessing less than one ounce of marijuana from a 
misdemeanor to a civil infraction that did not allow for arrest or 
criminal prosecution: 
In this time of drastic budget cuts, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, law enforcement, and the courts cannot afford to 
expend limited resources prosecuting a crime that carries the 
same punishment as a traffic ticket. As noted by the Judicial 
Council in its support of this measure, the appointment of 
counsel and the availability of a jury trial should be reserved 
for defendants who are facing loss of life, liberty, or property 
greater than $100.229 
In 2009, the year before California passed this new law, more than 
60,000 individuals passed through the criminal justice system on 
minor marijuana possession charges.230 In Massachusetts, the move of 
minor marijuana possession from the criminal justice system to the 
civil infraction system came by way of voter ballot initiative.231 A 
similar move is under consideration in Hawaii.232 Driven by the stark 
 
 229 Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., to the Members of the 
Cal. State Senate (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.salem-
news.com/articles/october012010/schwarzenegger-marijuana.php. Under previous 
California law, possession of such small amounts of marijuana was only punishable by 
fine, but processed in criminal court. The new law took such cases out of criminal 
courts, and made possession of less than one ounce a civil offense. CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 2010). Voters later disapproved — by a margin of 54% to 
46%—a ballot measure fully decriminalizing marijuana possession under California 
law, see Miguel Helft, Election Results 2010: California, N.Y. TIMES, available at 
http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/results/california?scp=3&sq=hawaii%20marijuana%
20&st=cse, although the new state law already did much of the work of that ballot 
measure by moving such cases into the civil system.  
 230 See Table 4a: Total Misdemeanor Arrests, CAL. STATE DEP’T JUST., (2009), 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/00/4A.htm. 
 231 See Abel, supra note 108, at B6.  
 232 See Senate Approves Marijuana Decriminalization, HAW. REP. (Mar. 8, 2011), 
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fiscal reality of the high costs of low-level prosecutions in hard 
economic times, other states and localities have also moved certain 
misdemeanors out of the costly criminal justice system. For example, 
keeping the misdemeanor of driving with a suspended license out of 
the criminal justice system offers significant costs savings. A recent 
national report noted how “driving offenses, particularly the offenses 
equivalent to driving with a suspended license, make up an 
extraordinary proportion of the misdemeanor caseloads in many 
jurisdictions.”233 In addition, “Most of these [driving while suspended] 
charges result from the failure to pay fines or fees, such as tickets for a 
broken tail light or not having insurance, parking tickets, or even 
failure to pay child support.”234 In one Washington county, of the 
twenty-nine misdemeanor cases heard on a single day, 41% were 
charges of driving with a suspended license.235 The unnecessarily large 
amount of criminal justice resources that many jurisdictions devote to 
such cases has led to some creative solutions. In King County, 
Washington, the prosecutor, defender office, lower court, county 
executive, and county council worked together to keep such driving 
cases out of the criminal justice system. The program they created 
allowed individuals to work off the underlying fine that led to the 
suspension in exchange for dismissal of the criminal charges. A study 
of the early months of the program showed a reduction of 84% in 
prosecutorial filings in suspension cases, and a reduction of 24% in jail 
costs.236 
The potential savings from such diversion and decriminalization is 
enormous. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics for 2009 show 
that more than 45% of all drug arrests in the United States were for 
marijuana possession.237 In that same year, “there were 8,067 gambling 
arrests, 26,380 vagrancy arrests, 471,727 drunkenness arrests, 518,374 
disorderly conduct arrests, and 89,733 curfew and loitering arrests.”238 
If significant numbers of these low-level misdemeanors are moved out 
 
http://www.hawaiireporter.com/senate-approves-marijuana-decriminalization/123 
 (describing how bill to reduce possession of small amounts of marijuana to civil 
infraction passed Senate and was sent to the House of Representatives).  
 233 MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 28. 
 234 Id. at 26. 
 235 Id. at 25. 
 236 Id. at 28. 
 237 See DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS, supra note 69, at 1-3; see also 
id. at 1 (“In some courts, the combination of [the three misdemeanors of] driving with 
a suspended license, possession of marijuana, and minor in possession of alcohol cases 
can total between 40% and 50% of the caseload.”). 
 238 Id. at 3. 
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of the criminal justice system, there is potential for better levels of 
representation in those misdemeanor cases that remain. However, 
such potential can only be realized if decriminalization does not imply 
cuts to public defense budgets on the theory that less funding is 
needed due to fewer cases in the system. States and localities should 
see this as an opportunity to save money in some parts of the system 
— lower court and jail costs — with a concomitant opportunity to 
focus defense resources on the many individuals still facing 
misdemeanor charges. 
Raising the bar on misdemeanor representation through such 
reforms as workload caps, avoiding guilty pleas at first appearances, 
and more investigative resources undoubtedly requires additional 
resources, or at least the reallocation of existing resources. However, 
there are significant long-term cost savings when higher quality 
representation leads to fewer wrongful convictions, unnecessary 
collateral consequences, and unnecessary incarceration.239 Despite 
some limited inroads to move some low-level offenses to diversion 
programs or the civil justice system, legislators’ perceived need to be 
“tough on crime,” as well as their belief that any concession in the 
criminal justice realm will be seen as “weak,” makes decriminalization 
an unlikely route for true reform of misdemeanor representation.240 
The bottom line is if jurisdictions want to continue to prosecute 
misdemeanor offenses in great number, then they must find a way to 
provide for effective assistance of counsel in these cases. Otherwise 
defenders are put in a position where they are unable to fulfill their 
constitutional, professional, and ethical duties to provide adequate 
assistance to clients charged with misdemeanor crimes. 
The real and perceived obstacles to legislative change highlight the 
need for judicial reform. The next section discusses the important role 
that courts have to play in advancing standards for adequate 
representation in the nation’s lower courts. 
B. The Role of Courts as Provocateurs 
Numerous scholars have described the critical dialogue that occurs 
between different institutions in shaping constitutional norms.241 
 
 239 See generally MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12 (describing high 
costs that deficient representation on misdemeanors may have on indigent defendants 
and their communities). 
 240 See Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719 
(2005) (“Conventional wisdom suggests that appearing tough on crime wins 
elections.”). 
 241 See, e.g., Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
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Professor Erik Luna has examined one facet of that dialogue — that of 
courts providing “constitutional road maps” to legislatures, in the 
context of criminal justice jurisprudence.242 An example of such road 
mapping can be seen in City of Chicago v. Morales, where the Supreme 
Court struck down a city ordinance “prohibit[ing] ‘criminal street 
gang members’ from ‘loitering’ with one another or with other persons 
in any public place.”243 As Luna notes, “Despite agreeing that the gang-
loitering ordinance was unconstitutional, [Justice] O’Connor 
suggested that Chicago had lawful alternatives at its disposal. Her 
concurrence then sketched out potential statutory provisions that 
would survive judicial scrutiny, offering a constitutional road map for 
lawmakers to follow in reenacting the ordinance.”244 
There is a similar road mapping role for courts to play in answering 
the misdemeanor representation crisis and addressing the need for 
misdemeanor standards of representation. Professor William Stuntz 
outlined one such potential road map relating to adequate funding for 
indigent defense, noting how “ensuring an adequate quantity of 
representation . . . is an achievable goal — and raising quantity tends 
to raise quality as well.”245 Recognizing the problem of judges 
essentially setting budget lines to mandate adequate funding, Stuntz 
instead proposed a system of “penalty defaults” under which: 
[I]n all jurisdictions that set up expert commissions to 
recommend appropriate funding for indigent criminal defense 
and then follow those recommendations, ineffective assistance 
doctrine will not apply. Elsewhere, ineffective assistance 
standards will be ratcheted up sharply. If this default rule 
applied, state legislators would have an incentive to establish 
sensible processes for fixing defense budgets, and room to 
experiment with different funding patterns — more money for 
defense lawyers in some jurisdictions, more money for 
investigators or defense crime labs in others.246 
Although this is just one example of a potential road map for 
legislatures, there are a number of areas relating to misdemeanor 
 
1125, 1173-85 (2000) (providing “an overview of the leading theories of interbranch 
dialogue”). 
 242 Id.  
 243 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1999). 
 244 Luna, supra note 241, at 1128. 
 245 William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
780, 837 (2006). 
 246 Id.  
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representation in which courts might provoke legislatures and 
professional organizations to set standards. One such area is caseloads, 
with some defenders recently refusing to take new cases because of 
high caseloads, and states passing or considering caseload caps.247 
Here, courts could rely on national or local caseload recommendations 
in examining individual or systemic claims of ineffective assistance.248 
For example, if an individual claimed ineffective assistance based on 
counsel’s failure to meet him prior to a trial appearance, the court 
might examine the caseload of the defender at the time of the 
individual’s representation and apply a rebuttable presumption of 
ineffectiveness if caseload numbers exceeded recommended standards. 
A few courts have already used such rebuttable presumptions in cases 
challenging the constitutionality of an indigent defender system.249 
These examples illustrate the interconnected nature of any 
discussion about adequate standards for misdemeanor representation. 
There are different institutional competencies, and thus different 
potential responses, that courts, legislatures, defender offices, 
professional organizations, and others might bring to the 
misdemeanor representation crisis and the lack of standards. However, 
there must also be dialogue between those who fund criminal defense, 
examine its adequacy, write aspirational standards, and carry out the 
actual representation. 
This Section focuses on the judiciary’s role in defining the 
constitutional right to misdemeanor effective assistance of counsel. 
Courts face numerous structural obstacles to review of misdemeanor 
ineffective assistance claims, and this section first offers suggestions 
for reform to allow development of such a misdemeanor 
jurisprudence. The Section then considers issues courts will encounter 
in reviewing misdemeanor ineffective assistance claims. In ineffective 
assistance analyses, courts rely on three factors to determine if defense 
counsel offered deficient representation in violation of Strickland’s first 
prong: (1) prevailing professional standards; (2) the norms of practice 
at the time and place of the representation at issue; and (3) court 
decisions applying these first two factors to a particular factual 
 
 247 See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.  
 248 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 249 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that excessive 
caseloads of defenders lead to due process and right-to-counsel violations); State v. 
Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel because 
attorney’s excessive caseloads prevented adequate representation); see also supra notes 
176-79 and accompanying text. 
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context, thus giving content to application of the norms.250 As Part 
II.B.2 reviews, prevailing professional standards such as the ABA 
Criminal Justice Standards offer insufficient guidance for misdemeanor 
representation for the first factor. Part II.B.1 also notes how there are 
few cases to provide content from the third factor. The second factor 
— practice norms at the time and place of the representation — poses 
a troubling issue for courts considering ineffective assistance claims: 
should constitutional attorney competence standards be driven by 
potentially low standards of practice in particular jurisdictions? The 
last part of this Section thus considers the many pitfalls and certain 
benefits of incorporating local practice norms and resource 
deprivation into the constitutional definition of ineffective assistance. 
1. Structural Impediments to Development of Misdemeanor 
Ineffective Assistance Jurisprudence and Suggestions for Reform 
Supreme Court precedent “make[s] clear that one searching for the 
content of the reasonably effective assistance standard must look 
primarily to judicial decisions applying that standard.”251 For example, 
Padilla v. Kentucky addressed the right to effective assistance in the 
area of client counseling about collateral consequences, and Wiggins v. 
Smith informed attorneys that effective assistance includes the duty to 
investigate mitigation evidence in capital cases.252 In areas that the 
Supreme Court has not directly examined, lower court decisions 
might provide this content,253 giving meaning to Strickland’s purposely 
vague and deferential standard of providing reasonably effective 
assistance of counsel.254 
 
 250 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (considering prevailing 
professional standards, local practice, and prior capital mitigation precedent in 
granting claim of ineffective assistance in capital case). 
 251 LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 664 (referring to Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 
(1986), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
 252 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 U.S. 1473, 1485 (2010); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; 
see also supra notes 166, 191 and accompanying text (discussing trainings in wake of 
Padilla and Wiggins).  
 253 See, e.g., Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding ineffective 
assistance of counsel where lawyer failed to counsel defendant “that, although he 
never even suggested such a thought to the petitioner, it was [defense counsel’s] own 
view that his client’s decision to reject the plea bargain was suicidal”). 
 254 See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing need for deference in 
determining attorney competence); supra Part II.B.2. 
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a. Structural Impediments 
In order for courts to provide the factual context that gives content 
to the vague ineffective assistance test, misdemeanor cases must work 
their way up the appellate ladder. However, not many misdemeanor 
cases make their way up this ladder, so that there is little opportunity 
for courts to apply general ineffective assistance norms to 
misdemeanor-specific facts.255 There are a number of reasons for the 
lack of appellate review in misdemeanor cases. 
Perhaps the main reason courts fail to review misdemeanor cases is 
that the vast majority of misdemeanor convictions come after a guilty 
plea. For example, in New York City in 2003, less than one-third of 
1% of misdemeanor convictions resulted from a trial verdict.256 In 
addition, individuals who plead guilty in the fast-paced, high-volume 
lower criminal courts may not even be aware of the right to appeal, or 
of the need to file a notice of appeal within a short time period after 
conviction.257 Even if a defendant is aware of the right to appeal, 
prosecutors sometimes insist on a waiver of the right as part of any 
plea bargain.258 Individuals who get past these obstacles will have long 
 
 255 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 184, at 2-3 (noting that in 1999, there were only five 
appeals for every 100 misdemeanor convictions in federal courts).  
 256 See Zeidman, supra note 26, at 321, n.35; see also OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., 
ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY 48 (2009) (finding that only 1% of county 
court cases, which are predominantly misdemeanors, proceed to trial). This trend is 
not exclusive to misdemeanors. Percentages of felony prosecutions that end in a trial 
verdict have gone down from already low levels over the past few decades. See Ronald 
Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 
1415-16 (2003) (noting that while by 2003 some states’ federal plea rates had 
increased over the past decade to 99.0%, national federal trial rate was only 3.4% and 
decreasing). 
 257 See OR. REV. STAT. § 138.071 (2011) (defendant must file notice of appeal 
within thirty days after judgment entered). A recent report on the state of indigent 
defense in Florida’s lower courts noted how “[a]fter sentencing at arraignment, only 
23.7% of defendants were advised of their right to an appeal, and only 23.2% the right 
to an attorney for that appeal. In-custody defendants were less likely to be advised of 
their right to appeal than released defendants.” See THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 
1, at 19. These troublingly low percentages were observed despite a Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure requiring trial judges to inform defendants of their right to 
appeal. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.670. 
 258 See, e.g., United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An 
appellate waiver will be enforced if: (1) its terms are clear and unambiguous; and (2) 
the record demonstrates that it was entered into ‘knowingly and voluntarily.’ ”). Such 
a waiver does not automatically foreclose a later claim of ineffective assistance. See, 
e.g., Costin v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284 (D. Conn. 2008) (“[A] waiver is 
unenforceable if petitioner can prove that, because her counsel’s advice was 
ineffective, her waiver was not knowing and voluntary.”). However, courts allowing 
  
338 University of California, Davis [Vol. 45:277 
finished any sentence by the time any appeal would be heard, thus 
undercutting the immediate incentive to revisit the underlying 
conviction. 
In addition, any direct appeal of a misdemeanor conviction will 
rarely include consideration of an ineffective assistance claim. Direct 
appeal is limited to review of the trial court record, which often does 
not contain evidence of the alleged incompetence of defense counsel, 
particularly if the conviction came after a guilty plea.259 Thus, “almost 
all jurisdictions prefer that ineffective assistance claims be presented 
on collateral attack,”260 where the petitioner can develop a factual 
record through the petition and any evidentiary hearings. In short, a 
defendant has to get past direct appeal — where few misdemeanors go 
to begin with — and then develop a record on collateral review.261 
The first opportunity for most individuals convicted of a 
misdemeanor to raise an ineffective assistance claim is through a 
petition for post–conviction relief. Statutory and judicially created 
 
such a claim to go forward may narrowly circumscribe the scope of review. See Parisi 
v. United States, 529 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that in analyzing ineffective 
assistance claim where defendant waived right to appeal, court may only consider 
process by which defendant agreed to plead guilty and thus may not consider any pre-
plea events). In addition, once a defendant waives the right to appeal, and there is no 
attorney assigned to handle the appeal, it is highly unlikely that anyone will review 
the case to determine if there is a viable ineffectiveness claim. It is also unlikely that 
the defendant will file the requisite notice of intention to appeal. See, e.g., OR. REV. 
STAT. § 138.071 (2003) (defendant must file notice of appeal within 30 days after 
judgment entered). 
 259 In many jurisdictions the same lawyer or organization that handled the trial will 
handle the appeal, and that person or group is “unlikely to look to their own 
ineptitude in developing grounds for appeal.” KAMISAR ET AL., ADVANCED CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 143 (12th ed. 2008). An even more basic obstacle is that “a large number 
of misdemeanor convictions take place in police or justice courts which are not courts 
of record. Without a drastic change in the procedures of these courts, there would be 
no way” for the defendant to demonstrate error in the original proceeding or 
reconstruct evidence lost in the intervening period. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 
738, 748 (1994).  
 260 See KAMISAR, supra note 259, at 142; see also United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 
1149, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e will not remand a case from direct appeal for 
fact-finding related to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but allow a defendant 
to pursue the issue in district court collateral proceedings.”) (citing United States v. 
Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000)).  
 261 See LAFAVE, supra note 143, at 1333 (“Every jurisdiction has one or more 
procedures through which defendants can present post-appeal challenges to their 
convictions and sentences on at least limited grounds. In addition, through the federal 
writ of habeas corpus, a state defendant may challenge his state conviction on federal 
constitutional grounds in the federal courts. These procedures for presenting post-
appeals challenges are commonly described as ‘collateral remedies.’ ”). 
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impediments to post–conviction relief are extensive. The list is too 
long to document here, but a few examples suffice to understand why 
one commentator recently noted that “[a]t enormous expense, the 
system grants relief to almost nobody.”262 First, there is no federal 
constitutional right to counsel on post–conviction review, so many 
petitioners proceed pro se.263 Second, both federal and state habeas 
courts have numerous opportunities to find procedural default, such 
as for a petitioner’s failure to raise an issue in an earlier proceeding.264 
Third, the federal habeas corpus statute as well as twenty-four state 
habeas statutes or rules have a jurisdictional prerequisite that an 
individual filing a petition be “in custody.”265 Courts have found 
custody where the individual seeking federal habeas review is 
imprisoned for the conviction, on parole or probation, serving a 
suspended sentence, or under court-ordered treatment in the 
community.266 A person seeking post–conviction relief from a 
 
 262 Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2010) (referring to federal habeas corpus review); see also id. at 9-12 (providing an 
excellent explanation of myriad bars to federal habeas corpus relief). 
 263 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that 
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks 
upon their convictions and we decline to so hold today.”). Some states grant post-
conviction counsel through statute, court rule, or at the court’s discretion, although in 
other jurisdictions the right is limited to death-sentenced defendants. See Thomas M. 
Place, Deferring Ineffectiveness Claims to Collateral Review: Ensuring Equal Access and a 
Right to Appoint Counsel, 98 KY. L.J. 301, 326 (2010) (noting that “majority of states 
appoint counsel in collateral proceedings in non-capital cases and thirty-three states 
provide counsel in capital cases.”); see also Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A 
Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 app. A (2002) (providing chart breaking down how, as of 2002, 34 
states discretionarily provided post-conviction counsel, 13 states guaranteed it, and 3 
states did not provide for post-conviction counsel).  
 264 See, e.g., Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding 
procedural default on federal habeas corpus because defendant failed to raise 
ineffective assistance claim in earlier state post-conviction proceeding, even while 
acknowledging that post-conviction counsel may have been ineffective for so failing to 
raise that claim). While there is no such state exhaustion requirement for individuals 
convicted in federal court, the overwhelming majority of convictions come out of the 
state courts. See Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, Felony Sentences in State 
Courts, 2004, in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. 1 (Ser. No. 
NCJ 215646, 2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf 
(noting how in 2004, “94% of felony convictions occurred in State courts, remaining 
6% in Federal courts”).  
 265 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2010) (federal habeas statute); Place, supra note 263, 
at 327 n.203 (listing state statutes and court rules).  
 266 See Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
147, 153 (2000) (citing cases). 
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misdemeanor conviction will be long free of such restraints. Although 
the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the question of 
whether severe collateral consequences (such as deportation) 
sufficiently restrain liberty to constitute custody, language in related 
decisions “strongly suggests that such collateral effects would be 
insufficient.”267 Given these obstacles, it is not surprising that a recent 
study of federal habeas corpus litigation in the United States District 
Courts found, in a sample of 1,512 non-capital cases, only “[f]ive . . . 
had a misdemeanor as the most serious offense of conviction.”268 
In the end, the prospects are stark even for those few petitioners 
able to pick through the minefield of impediments to review of an 
ineffective assistance claim; in non-capital federal habeas petitions, 
judges grant relief in less than 1% of cases.269 These obstacles are a 
central reason that one of the three sources for ineffective assistance 
norms270 — guidance from judicial decisions — is underdeveloped and 
adds to the problem of a virtually non-existent jurisprudence of 
misdemeanor ineffective assistance. 
b. Suggestions for Avoidance of Structural Impediments, and Reform 
There are several ways for courts and litigants to avoid obstacles to 
the development of a body of law on misdemeanor ineffective 
assistance. One possibility is for state and federal courts to include 
 
 267 Yale L. Rosenberg, The Federal Habeas Corpus Custody Decisions: Liberal Oasis or 
Conservative Prop, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 99, 115 n.111 (1995) (discussing Carafas v. 
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)); see also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 
(1989) (“[O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the 
collateral consequences of that conviction are not in themselves sufficient to render an 
individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.”). But see infra text 
accompanying notes 271-74, arguing that courts deciding whether severe collateral 
consequences satisfy the “in custody” requirement should interpret the requirement 
liberally, and in light of the Supreme Court’s recent Padilla decision.  
 268 NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL 
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 20 (2007), available at http:// 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf.  
 269 See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State 
Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 809 (2009); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 
U.S. 1, 23-24 (1989) (“Federal habeas courts granted relief in only 0.25% to 7% of 
noncapital cases in recent years.”). In addition, as explored above there are fewer trials 
in misdemeanor cases, and “[p]leas account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions. 
But they account for only approximately 30% of the habeas petitions filed.” Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 U.S. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing VICTOR E. FLANGO, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 36-38 (1994)). 
 270 The other two sources being prevailing professional norms and local practice. 
See supra text accompanying note 250 (describing three factors that inform analysis of 
alleged attorney deficiencies). 
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severe collateral consequences in their interpretation of the state or 
federal habeas statutes’ ”in custody” requirement. This would be 
timely given the current era of growing and high stakes collateral 
consequences,271 and the Supreme Court’s decision establishing a 
defendant’s right to information about deportation before any guilty 
plea in the wake of Padilla v. Kentucky.272 Padilla is notable for Justice 
Stevens’s discussion of the severe effect that deportation can have on 
an individual’s life, and the Court’s “view that, as a matter of federal 
law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most 
important part-of the penalty that may be imposed on non-citizen 
defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”273 As a number of 
courts and commentators have noted in the wake of Padilla, surely 
other consequences are equally severe for some defendants and thus 
similarly integral to the criminal penalty.274 A broader interpretation of 
the “in custody” requirement would open up this avenue to 
consideration of claims of ineffective assistance where defense counsel 
failed to warn about deportation or other severe collateral 
consequences. 
Alternatively, courts might follow the Third Circuit’s example in its 
recent approval of the federal writ of coram nobis as an avenue of relief 
for individuals no longer “in custody” and thus unable to access 
federal habeas corpus relief.275 In United States v. Orocio, Gerald 
Orocio pled guilty in federal court to simple possession of a controlled 
substance in exchange for a sentence of time served plus two years of 
supervised probation after turning down an earlier offer to plead guilty 
to drug trafficking with a ten-year sentence. After completing his 
probation, Orocio received notice that the government had initiated 
removal proceedings to send him back to his birth country of the 
Philippines.276 The Third Circuit granted Orocio’s petition for relief 
based on counsel’s failure to warn him about the deportation 
consequence of his plea, noting how the federal writ of error coram 
nobis “is used to attack allegedly invalid convictions which have 
continuing consequences, when the petitioner has served his sentence 
 
 271 See supra Part I.B. 
 272 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).  
 273 Id. at 1480. 
 274 See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 884 (Ct. App. 2010) (applying 
Padilla’s duty to warn to consequence of sex offender registration); see also Love, 
supra note 90, at 24-25. 
 275 United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 635 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United 
States v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 276 Id. at 634.  
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and is no longer ‘in custody’ for purposes of [the federal habeas corpus 
statute].”277 
Some jurisdictions allow state coram nobis review for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims that cannot otherwise be litigated,278 while 
others have effectively closed it as an avenue for such review.279 At 
least one state court has allowed use of the writ in the context of a 
misdemeanor conviction.280 Just as courts should ease the “in custody” 
requirement to allow for state and federal habeas claims, courts should 
allow more liberal use of the writ of coram nobis to generate critical 
jurisprudential development of misdemeanor effective assistance. 
More ambitious solutions can be found in the recent scholarly 
literature condemning the current highly restrictive and wasteful state 
of federal and state habeas corpus. Proposing a practical solution to 
two related criminal procedure problems, Professor Eve Brensike 
Primus has called for the “relocation” of ineffective assistance claims 
from post–conviction review to direct appeal.281 The first problems she 
identifies are the structural impediments discussed above. Second, 
Primus describes the waste of resources during direct review of 
criminal convictions, where the defendant has a constitutional right to 
counsel and, therefore, where public funds for a largely indigent 
 
 277 Id. at 647 n.4; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2011) (empowering federal court, 
under All Writs Act, to issue writ of error coram nobis); Hirabayashi v. United States, 
828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that coram nobis “petitioner must show the 
following to qualify for coram nobis relief: (1) a more usual remedy is not available; 
(2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse 
consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy 
requirement of Article III; and (4) the error is of the most fundamental character”); 
United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2005) (same). 
 278 See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 525 So. 2d 820, 830 (Ala. 1985) (“Coram nobis, 
therefore, can now be used to raise claims of inadequate assistance of counsel”). 
 279 See, e.g., People v. Gallardo, 77 Cal. App. 4th 971, 987 (Ct. App. 2000) (“A 
claim that the defendant was deprived of effective representation of counsel is not an 
appropriate basis for relief by writ of coram nobis.”); Commonwealth v. Morris, 
092346, 2011 WL 111692, at *5 (Va. 2011) (“[A] claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel does not constitute an error of fact for which coram nobis will lie . . . because 
such a claim would not ‘have prevented rendition of the judgment.’ ”). 
 280 See Dequesada v. State, 444 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
Unfortunately, Desquesada’s review of the merits of the underlying ineffective 
assistance claim was limited to one sentence, thus failing to advance that jurisdiction’s 
norms for such representation. See id. at 576-77 (“[R]eview of Desquesada’s 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as a perusal of the attached 
affidavits and portions of the trial transcript which he submitted . . . shows that the 
allegations are substantively insufficient”).  
 281 Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 731 (2007). 
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population are directed. The waste comes from the inability of 
appellate attorneys to raise issues on direct review that the trial 
attorney failed to preserve, so that “public defenders routinely spend 
their time arguing frivolous appeals.”282 Her solution to these dual, 
related problems is to allow attorneys handling direct appeals to raise 
ineffective assistance claims and to ease up on rules barring such 
attorneys from looking outside the trial record to support such 
claims.283 Primus’s relocation proposal is particularly intriguing for 
misdemeanor representation,284 and such relocation would surely 
benefit the anemic jurisprudence of ineffective assistance in 
misdemeanor cases. 
In another recent structural proposal, Professors Nancy King and 
Joseph Hoffman call for “a solution that would allow the states to shift 
dollars that they now waste at the back end forward to trial and appeal 
at the front end, where those resources can make the kind of 
meaningful difference for the accused that Strickland and post-
conviction review never could.”285 This re-allocation of resources 
might, like Primus’s relocation proposal, advance ineffective assistance 
jurisprudence in misdemeanor cases. King and Hoffman propose a 
quid pro quo under which a state that “takes specified steps to 
effectively reform its system of defense representation at the trial and 
appellate level” would get the benefit of “scaled back” federal habeas 
review as well as federal funds for providing adequate front-end 
representation. In addition to this carrot, King and Hoffman propose 
the stick of expanded federal habeas review in jurisdictions that fail to 
undertake such “front-end reforms.”286 Although it is not clear that 
King and Hoffman would include non-felonies in their proposal due to 
financial constraints,287 such incentives for front-end reforms, and 
 
 282 Id. at 682; see also id. at 679 n.d1 (noting that Primus was public appellate 
defender in Maryland). 
 283 Id. at 682. 
 284 Id. at 694-95 (noting “the grim reality is that the performance of trial counsel in 
almost all misdemeanor and many felony cases is largely unchecked,” and that 
ineffectiveness caused by the failure to provide adequate defender resources “appears 
to be at its zenith for precisely those defendants who are least likely to pursue 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims”). 
 285 Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffman, Envisioning Post-Conviction Review for 
the Twenty-First Century, 78 Miss. L.J. 433, 441 (2008). For a more comprehensive 
exploration of this proposal, see Hoffman & King, supra note 269. 
 286 Id. at 442. 
 287 See id. at 447 (stating that “[a] third revenue source may be needed because the 
cost of providing adequate counsel to all of those facing felony charges probably 
dwarfs, in most states, the present cost of post-conviction review for those locked up 
long enough to seek it” (emphasis added)). 
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penalties for lack of reforms, would be particularly significant in the 
arena of misdemeanor representation. 
A critical component of front-end reform to indigent defense is the 
willingness of those involved in ineffective assistance, including 
defenders, prosecutors, and judges, to act. Defenders in a number of 
jurisdictions, including Miami-Dade County, Kentucky, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Maryland, Arizona, and Tennessee, have cited their 
professional and constitutional duty to provide effective assistance in 
turning down assignments to handle more cases or suing to reduce 
excessive caseloads.288 These defender offices acted despite the 
difficulties for defense lawyers in turning away clients in need, and in 
challenging the very system within which they work. However, 
“[w]ith public defender workloads growing while funding is being 
reduced, more offices may soon follow their lead.”289 Judges have an 
important role to play in these situations, both in dealing with the 
defenders in their courtrooms who refuse to accept further cases, and 
in analyzing the issues in jurisdictions where the crisis has led to 
individual or class action lawsuits challenging the validity of the 
indigent defender system.290 In addition, prosecutors often witness off-
the-record ineffective assistance in dealing with defense counsel 
during negotiations or many of the other points of contact outside the 
courtroom where the parties might discuss a client’s case (such as 
during the discovery process).291 Although the potential for adversarial 
 
 288 See, e.g., State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479 (Fla. App. 2010) (certifying public 
defender office’s claim of conflict-of-interest arising from excessive caseloads to Florida 
Supreme Court); Jeff Adachi, Budget Cuts Threaten Promise of Equal Justice, THE 
RECORDER, Feb. 13, 2009 (listing other jurisdictions), available at 
http://sfpublicdefender.org/media/2009/04/budget-cuts-threaten-promise-of-equal-
justice/; see also ABA, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1 (2002) 
(Principle One on need for independent public defense function), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/ 
indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf; Zeidman, supra note 71, at 6 
(describing recent caseload cap initiative in New York State). 
 289 Adachi, supra note 288. 
 290 See Drinan, supra note 176, at 439-43 (discussing such systemic challenges); 
see also AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 2-3 (2009) (“The 
system involves too many players to hold one accountable for the routine injustice 
happening in courtrooms across America.”) 
 291 See, e.g., Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual 
Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 222 n.124 (1988) (stating that “prosecutors are 
uniquely positioned to observe incompetent and lazy representation of defendants”); 
Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of the Sixth 
Amendment” If You’re Trying to Put That Lawyer’s Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
997, 1005-17 (2000) (describing prosecutor’s real-life experience when she witnessed 
ineffective representation of defendant). 
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advantage may be tempting, rules of professional responsibility and 
constitutional constraints bind prosecutors where they have 
knowledge of inadequate assistance of counsel.292 Prosecutorial 
identification of ineffective assistance at the trial level, which would 
help enable judges to act immediately, offers another avenue for front-
end reform and thus helps avoid the significant obstacles to post–
conviction litigation of ineffective assistance in misdemeanor cases. 
Finally, in what would perhaps be the most simple, effective, and 
cheapest way to move review of inadequate counsel to the front end of 
the criminal justice process, judges should follow the example of the 
trial court judge who stated: “If a defendant appearing in my 
courtroom is not being provided with the effective assistance of 
counsel, then I am obligated to intervene and protect that defendant’s 
rights.”293 Unfortunately, many judges witness ineffective assistance at 
the misdemeanor trial level on a regular basis. Judges might confront 
the same issues of lack of independence that plague many defender 
offices. However, trial courts could have great impact on the front end 
of delivery of defense services by being proactive when ineffective 
assistance unfolds in front of them and fulfilling their responsibility to 
identify and ameliorate constitutional violations.294 The deference to 
strategic decision-making that the Supreme Court requires in its 
ineffective assistance jurisprudence does not extend to the trial judge, 
who has the right and responsibility to ask about quality of 
representation.295 This may take a few extra minutes for each case, but 
 
 292 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2002) (“[L]awyer who 
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness 
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional 
authority.”). 
 293 COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE CHIEF 
JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK add. (2006) (Additional Commentary of Hon. 
Patricia D. Marks), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-
commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf. 
 294 See generally Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and DC: The Impact on 
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531 (1988) 
(discussing various techniques that trial judges might use to evaluate defense 
counsel’s degree of pretrial preparation, including pretrial conferences and use of a 
pretrial worksheet for core defense tasks, in part to create a record for any post-plea 
ineffective assistance claims).  
 295 See Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the Adversary 
System: The Trial Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
945, 951 (“This article argues that trial court judges must step into the breach and 
restore the integrity and fairness of the adversary system and, ultimately, the 
legitimacy of criminal convictions. The trial judge’s role in safeguarding the rights of 
the accused and the interests of the public is not simply a professional duty, but an 
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performing such inquiries on the record could encourage better 
representation, help define acceptable levels of practice, and save 
resources by uncovering ineffectiveness at the front end. 
2. The Problem of Resource Deprivation Driving Constitutional 
Rules 
In ineffective assistance cases that explore the attorney competence 
prong of Strickland, the dominant principle is that lack of diligence is 
a violation whereas simple bad judgment by defense counsel is 
deemed “strategic decision-making.”296 This creates real cause for 
concern in misdemeanor cases, where there is often no diligence at all. 
Can it ever be reasonable strategy for defense counsel to meet a client 
for the first time in court, spend a few minutes discussing a plea 
bargain with him while everyone waits impatiently, and then stand 
next to him as he enters a “negotiated” guilty plea?297 The stark 
situation begs the question: can triage that is necessary under the 
current criminal justice system be part of the ineffective assistance 
inquiry, thus dragging standards down to the unacceptable levels that 
under-resourcing creates?298 
 
ethical obligation. Trial judges are uniquely situated to identify substandard defense 
representation.”); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial 
Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L. J. 73, 121-22 (2009).  
 296 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“[A] court must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be 
considered sound trial strategy.’ ”). 
 297 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 137, 144 (1986) (contending that “hurried conference” with 
the defendant and a near universal loss of pretrial discovery in misdemeanor cases 
make it impossible to view a plea bargain as a “plausible compromise by fully-
informed decision makers”); see also GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 16 
(describing “meet them and plead them” method of representation in various states); 
RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 15-22 (describing Michigan situation); Zeidman, 
supra note 26, at 336-43 (describing New York City criminal courts). 
 298 See Brown, supra note 27, at 821 n.78 (2004) (discussing how allocation of 
public defender resources is analogous to triage); Mitchell, supra note 26, at 1239-48 
(discussing how realities of lower court system require public defenders to engage in 
“the practice of triage”); see also GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 7-8, 17-18 
(discussing realities of overburdened defense counsel straddled with excessive 
caseloads); Jane Fritsch & Matthew Purdy, Defenders by Default: A Special Report: 
Option to Legal Aid for Poor Leaves New Yorkers at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1994, at 
A1 (detailing problems with New York’s “assigned counsel” system for some indigent 
defendants). 
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Dissenting in Strickland, Justice Marshall raised critical questions 
about implementing the two-prong test announced in that case. Justice 
Marshall observed that the majority failed to clarify whether the 
reasonableness of attorney performance should be judged in relation 
to norms of “adequately paid retained lawyer[s]” or overburdened 
appointed counsel.299 This point is particularly potent in the context of 
misdemeanor cases. Courts assessing the effectiveness of a 
misdemeanor attorney must decide whether to judge that performance 
as reasonable under the particular circumstances present in that 
jurisdiction, which might include high workloads and few resources, 
or instead as reasonable where defense counsel is adequately 
resourced. 
Although not in the misdemeanor context, a number of courts have 
touched on this resource issue in the wake of Strickland and have 
taken counsel’s time limitations as well as office resources into 
account in deciding what qualifies as effective assistance. For example, 
the Fourth Circuit noted how “the reasonableness of an 
investigation . . . must be considered in light of the scarcity of 
counsel’s time and resources in preparing for a sentencing 
hearing. . . .”300 In another decision, granting an ineffective assistance 
claim for failure to pursue a viable affirmative defense, the Fourth 
Circuit emphasized that “in this case, counsel’s deficient performance 
did not . . . involve a difficult choice on how to allocate precious legal 
resources.”301 This implies that resource allocation could be part of an 
ineffective assistance analysis, and the court’s choice of words suggests 
that such an analysis might excuse or give more leeway to decisions 
made in the face of limited resources. 
In Harrington v. Richter, the Supreme Court stated that “[c]ounsel 
was entitled to formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and 
to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and 
strategies.”302 However, both Harrington and the Circuit Court of 
Appeals decisions based their holdings of failure to show ineffective 
 
 299 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 300 McWee v. Weldon, 283 F.3d 179, 188 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 893 
(2002); see also Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 387 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
whether decision not to conduct particular investigation was reasonable “reflects the 
reality that lawyers do not enjoy the benefit of endless time, energy or financial 
resources”). 
 301 United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Mahaffey 
v. Page, 151 F.3d 671, 685 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted) (articulating need to 
“consider the limited time and resources that defense lawyers have in preparing for a 
sentencing hearing”), vacated in part on other grounds, 162 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 302 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011).  
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assistance largely on findings that defense counsel had sound strategic 
reasons to avoid the particular line of investigation.303 Thus, courts 
have generally avoided grappling directly with issues of resource 
deprivation. 
Taking caseloads and resources into account would be particularly 
problematic with misdemeanors, where clients often get the short end 
of the limited-resources stick. The reality of the lower courts calls into 
question the firmly entrenched deference to attorneys’ strategic 
decision-making in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, at least insofar as 
strategy is analyzed as going beyond the one case under review. The 
circuit court decisions noted above clearly contemplated strategy to 
include the need to make hard resource decisions based on caseloads 
and funds; strategy was not specific to the case but rather to the 
attorney, the defender office, or the jurisdiction. Such an approach 
makes it constitutionally permissible to shortchange one client if such 
action is intended to benefit another client. For misdemeanor 
defendants, low on any resource-deprived attorney’s or office’s list, 
everyone else comes first. While one might argue that the Supreme 
Court’s ineffective assistance jurisprudence is concerned with strategy 
within the particular case, the Court has never explicitly endorsed 
such an approach and, thus, has never dealt with Justice Marshall’s 
legitimate concerns about resource limits. 
To bring the resource issue to its most troubling conclusion, if 
strategy is not case specific, then a state or county legislature may 
purposely underfund lower-level cases, or even statutorily mandate 
that fewer resources go to such cases. Is it principled to allow 
inadequate representation where the legislature has so underfunded 
criminal defense that high caseloads and low resources are inevitable? 
Surely, having this built into the jurisprudence of effective assistance 
is a perverse incentive in an already besieged area. 
3. The “Localism” Problem in Ineffective Assistance Jurisprudence 
Courts consider three sources in analyzing an ineffective assistance 
claim: prevailing professional standards, norms of local practice, and 
precedent.304 With the second factor, norms of practice in the 
 
 303 In McWee, for example, counsel did not fully explore their client’s family mental 
health history, but counsel had also decided on a sentencing case theory that 
“primarily focused on McWee’s positive attributes and the basically good life that he 
led before he met George Wade Scott, his accomplice.” McWee, 283 F.3d at 189. The 
Court noted that a focus on the myriad mental health problems in Harrington’s family 
could well have undermined the chosen sentencing theory. Id.  
 304 See supra text accompanying note 250. 
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particular jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has directed courts to 
consider both “where” the case on review occurred and “when” the 
case was litigated in determining if a particular lawyer rose to the 
expected level of competence.305 Thus, in Wiggins v. Smith, the 
Supreme Court looked at Maryland practice at the time of the 
mitigation phase of Wiggins’ death penalty trial as part of the equation 
for determining whether Wiggins’s attorneys provided ineffective 
assistance.306 Although the result in Wiggins was that counsel had to 
rise to the level of local practice to meet the constitutional floor for 
effective assistance, this will not always be the case. Rather, poor 
representation might be excused as the local norm. For example, a 
defendant in Maryland would enjoy better representation than a 
defendant in Alabama if there were more resources — and thus a 
higher standard — in Maryland. Even within one state, under this 
approach someone charged with a crime in a city could be 
constitutionally entitled to a higher level of representation than 
someone charged with that same crime in a rural county. 
The Court has not explained why it relies in part on local norms in 
assessing counsel’s competency. Certainly there are a number of 
potential benefits to incorporating local practice norms into the 
constitutional definition of effective assistance (referred to here as 
“localism”). This section briefly considers those benefits, but explains 
why they are either misguided or can be achieved in a better way. 
One major argument for localism is that it allows for greater 
flexibility in recognizing that different jurisdictions have different 
formal rules of procedure. Local culture — both of the jurisdiction 
generally and of the local courthouse — also affects how lawyers 
interact with other lawyers, judges, clients, and juries. Navigation of 
the local culture requires local knowledge. This local knowledge is 
encapsulated in local practices and is developed through experience, 
making it intuitive and thus hard to clearly articulate. The complexity 
in clearly articulating necessary local knowledge makes it a difficult 
topic for critique and comparison, highlighting the need for flexibility. 
Localism’s flexibility recognizes the reality that criminal cases can 
progress quite differently depending on the jurisdiction. These 
differences may call for varying levels and types of defense counsel 
 
 305 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (“Standard practice in Maryland 
capital cases at that time included the preparation of a social history report.”); Blume 
& Neumann, supra note 161, at 151 (“In effect, when considering the adequacy of 
trial counsel’s investigation, courts must now look to ABA standards, as well as local 
practice, in order to determine whether the Sixth Amendment has been satisfied.”). 
 306 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524.  
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involvement in a case. An example based on my own experience 
defending individuals charged with misdemeanors in three very 
different jurisdictions illustrates this point.307 Consider a Mr. Jones, an 
indigent man charged with misdemeanor heroin possession. Mr. Jones 
lives with his children in public housing; he has one prior conviction 
from five years earlier for misdemeanor drug possession. Imagine that 
the street stop of Mr. Jones, who was in front of the grocery store near 
his house with a group of men when searched, raises legitimate Fourth 
Amendment issues. 
If Mr. Jones were arrested in Manhattan, he would meet his attorney 
for the first time at his arraignment, when he would likely receive a 
plea bargain offer from the prosecutor or an offer to plead guilty in 
exchange for an agreed-upon sentence from the judge.308 Because of 
the high volume of misdemeanors in Manhattan’s arraignment 
courtrooms, Mr. Jones — assuming that he had only a minimal 
criminal record — might be told that he could have a sentence of time 
served should he plead guilty to the possession misdemeanor. 
However, his defense counsel would also know that many 
misdemeanors are dismissed in New York City under the state’s 
speedy trial statute but normally only after a defendant has appeared 
numerous times on the case.309 Thus, while Mr. Jones might have a 
strong claim for suppression of the heroin (and thus dismissal of the 
case), he would not get a hearing for many months, during which time 
the offer to plead guilty for no additional jail time would likely be re-
offered many times. If he could continue to appear in court, he might 
win suppression or a speedy trial dismissal. 
Four and a half hours away in Syracuse, New York, Mr. Jones would 
be in quite a different situation. He might have been offered the option 
of appearing in drug treatment court, where his case would be 
dismissed if he completed a drug treatment program. Mr. Jones’s 
lawyer would be invited, but not required (and perhaps not 
encouraged), to attend Mr. Jones’s drug treatment court appearances, 
 
 307 My practice experience was as a public defender from 1996–2001 in New York 
City, and then teaching a criminal defense clinic from 2005–2009 in Syracuse, New 
York, and 2009 to the present in Montgomery County, Maryland. Thus, these 
examples reflect local practice and culture during those time periods.  
 308 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 29, 32 n.10, 82 (2002) (“In a charge bargain, the prosecutor agrees to dismiss 
some charges in return for a plea of guilty to the remaining charges,” whereas 
sentence bargains entail “conversation [that] relates directly to the sentence rather 
than to the crime of conviction.”).  
 309 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 2011) (noting statutory speedy 
trial periods).  
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where the judge would get updates about Mr. Jones’s progress or 
problems in treatment. After a first problem, such as a positive drug 
test, Mr. Jones could remain in the program only if he pled guilty to 
the possession charge. The court would not impose a sentence at this 
point, however, and would agree to vacate his guilty plea upon 
completion of the program. After the guilty plea, any suppression 
advocacy would be off the table. At a later court appearance, defense 
counsel might learn that Mr. Jones had failed another drug test and 
that the judge was going to incarcerate him until there was a bed for 
him at an in-patient program. Should Mr. Jones later fail to complete 
that program, he could expect to be sentenced (remember, he pled 
guilty earlier) to the maximum sentence for misdemeanor possession 
in New York State — one year in jail. 
Finally, Mr. Jones would have yet another experience in district 
court in Montgomery County, Maryland. He would have no lawyer at 
all at his initial appearance, where the “judicial officer” would either 
release him or set bail.310 He would first meet his lawyer at or just 
before his trial date, some thirty days later. 311 Counsel would tell Mr. 
Jones that he would not qualify for the intensive drug education 
program that leads to an effective dismissal of the charges because he 
already had a drug conviction. He would have two choices that day. 
First, he could plead guilty to the charge and hope for one of a variety 
of potential sentences that would not involve jail time. Because district 
court judges will not promise any sentences before the plea, counsel 
would have to tell Mr. Jones that the judge could give him any 
sentence up to the statutory maximum of four years for misdemeanor 
possession. Of course counsel would also tell Mr. Jones what sentence 
he thought was likely. Second, he could try to win suppression in the 
lower criminal court. His lawyer would tell him that the suppression 
hearing would take place that day, in the middle of a bench trial, when 
the prosecution attempted to admit the heroin into evidence. Mr. 
Jones would also learn that, if he did not get suppression during the 
trial and was then convicted of possession, under Maryland’s de novo 
system for misdemeanors he could appeal his case to the Circuit Court 
 
 310 MD. RULES § 4-213 (West 2004). But See Richmond v. Maryland, No. 24-C-06-
009911, 2007 WL 5446238 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2010), cert granted sub nom. 
DeWolfe v. Richmond, 429 Md. 81 (Md. 2011). 
 311 This fast-track trial scheduling is based on my personal experience supervising 
clinic students in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County. There is no 
Maryland statute that requires this particular process.  
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to get another suppression hearing and a jury trial.312 He might also 
receive a plea bargain in that court. 
The descriptions of these three different courts show how taking 
local practice into account in setting constitutional norms allows for 
flexibility. But they also illustrate how the chaos of the particular 
system may dictate a local culture of passivity instead of zealousness. 
There are thus two ways to view these three different descriptions of 
Mr. Jones’s case. The first view argues that these three descriptions 
illustrate that local rules, practice, and culture lead to three quite 
different situations, all of which require different approaches to 
advocacy and some different skill sets. The need to quickly interview a 
client and witnesses, and then litigate a suppression hearing, trial, and 
possible sentencing in a few short hours is quite different from the 
need to intensively counsel a client about the pros and cons of drug 
treatment court, including the likelihood of winning the suppression 
issue that the client would have to forgo to enter drug court. These 
needs, in turn, are both different from the task of counseling a client 
under time pressure at an arraignment about a plea offer, and to 
explain the workings of a non-intuitive justice system where cases are 
on the court calendar for a year or longer, only to end in dismissal for 
a speedy trial violation. This first view thus embraces localism in 
setting effective assistance standards. 
This Article advances a second view: when resource deprivation 
determines culture, ineffective assistance jurisprudence should not 
excuse inadequate representation in the name of localism. For 
example, lawyers struggling to adequately counsel clients facing plea 
decisions at a first appearance should not be excused as a necessary 
facet of practice in a locality that relies heavily on plea bargaining and 
guilty pleas at the first appearance. Similarly, the specter of lawyers 
attempting to meet the client for the first time, and to prepare for and 
possibly go to trial in several cases on the same day cannot be 
acceptable under a theory of localism that would be consistent with 
the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. 
This second view is not entirely at odds with the first view. 
Legitimate differences in local practice that arise from valid decisions 
about how to administer a lower court should be taken into account in 
ineffective assistance jurisprudence. For example, a number of states 
have made the valid choice to use a de novo system in the lower 
courts,313 as described above in the Maryland example of Mr. Jones’s 
 
 312 MD. RULES §§ 7-101, 7-102(a) (West 2004) (noting how appeals from lower 
courts to circuit court “shall be tried de novo in all . . . criminal actions”). 
 313 See David Harris, Justice Rationed in the Pursuit of Efficiency: De Novo Trials in 
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case. Other states use one system for both misdemeanors and felonies, 
so that the right to appeal a conviction takes the traditional route of 
direct review rather than a new hearing and trial in the court of higher 
jurisdiction.314 Evaluation of the reasonableness of defense counsel’s 
actions in a case litigated in a de novo system might differ from actions 
taken in a traditional appellate system. 
While a particular case might unfold in very different ways in 
different places, there is clearly much that defense advocacy has in 
common wherever it is undertaken. Thus, a clear articulation of the 
common tasks expected of misdemeanor lawyers — at least at a 
general level — would set a baseline consistent with reasonably 
adequate lawyering expected in all cases. All of the hypothetical 
lawyers representing Mr. Jones should interview him, and then 
investigate the case, which might include a visit to the scene of the 
search and seizure, review of applicable Fourth Amendment law, and 
inspection of the evidence. Any of the three lawyers would also 
counsel Mr. Jones about the viability of the suppression motion as well 
as any serious collateral consequences of a drug conviction, which 
would include the likelihood of both his children and him losing their 
public housing. These are just a few of the many basic, common tasks 
essential to the misdemeanor representation of Mr. Jones, regardless of 
the place of arrest. 
Justice Marshall’s insightful Strickland dissent raised a further 
critical issue: “It is also a fact that the quality of representation 
available to ordinary defendants in different parts of the country varies 
significantly. Should the standard of performance mandated by the 
Sixth Amendment vary by locale?”315 Again, this discrepancy is 
particularly troubling when asked in the context of misdemeanor 
representation. Can the norms of practice control when they range 
from outright violation of the right to counsel (pleas taken or even 
trial conducted with no lawyer appointed), to “a live body next to 
you” representation, to excellent work in particular jurisdictions on 
minor cases? Certainly quick pleas with little consultation and little-
to-no review of the evidence are common practice.316 
 
the Criminal Courts, 24 CONN. L. REV. 381, 385 (1992) (finding that “[t]wenty-four 
state utilize de novo systems”). 
 314 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.10 (McKinney 2005) (governing appeals). 
 315 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(citing Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970)) (noting required 
performance level is “customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the 
time and place”).  
 316 See sources cited supra notes 133-34 (noting such problems in variety of 
jurisdictions). 
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To put the locality issue into stark light, imagine a county defender 
office strapped for resources that decides to institute a practice of no 
investigation in misdemeanor cases so that the office can devote its 
entire investigatory budget to felonies. Because one of the three 
sources for determining levels of ineffective assistance is local norms, 
one must ask how a court reviewing a claim in this jurisdiction would 
factor in this unfortunate practice. This norm of practice arises not out 
of a principled determination about what level of service is necessary 
to ensure just outcomes, but rather comes from the inevitable 
abdication of defense responsibility in the face of insurmountable 
resource deprivation combined with overwhelming caseloads.317 Such 
a practice would certainly violate professional standards, including the 
ABA Standard that calls for thorough investigation.318 How will a court 
reconcile this conflict between local practice and national professional 
standards?319 Clearly, there will always be unequal levels of indigent 
representation because some defender systems offer more than the 
constitutional minimum in terms of the services they provide. The 
issue here is whether the constitutional minimum — the floor of 
competent performance below which defense counsel cannot perform 
— should differ based on where a particular person is charged. 
A recent report entitled Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible 
Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts called for caseloads that 
are judged by the “unique nature of the jurisdiction and its 
misdemeanor practice and, under no circumstances, exceed national 
standards.”320 Under this approach, local calibration would come at 
 
 317 A broader critique would be that courts rely on any norms of practice in setting 
effective assistance standards in any type of case. In the world of indigent defense, 
which comprises the vast majority of criminal cases, most defenders’ practice is often 
not — and never exclusively — driven by careful determination of what is sufficient 
and what may be unnecessary. While some defender offices offer high-quality services, 
other jurisdictions lack any defender office and use assigned counsel plan or “lowest 
bidder” contracts to deliver indigent defense services. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, 
supra note 18, at 2 (describing three different types of defender systems: public 
defender, assigned counsel, and contract). In all locations, fiscal and personnel 
constraints drive the norms to some extent.  
 318 ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 192. 
 319 This example of forgoing all investigation is a stark one. It may be 
unconstitutional, as Williams and Wiggins highlight the Sixth Amendment right to an 
attorney who investigates the case. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 514 (2003); 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). However, both of those cases involved 
capital sentencing mitigation investigations, a far cry from forgoing investigation in a 
misdemeanor. In addition, since the right to an attorney who undertakes effective 
investigation is based in part upon local practice, it circles back to the original 
question.  
 320 MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 24 (Recommendation One, on 
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the front end in determining what goes into the equation. Thus, the 
determination of the number of cases an attorney in one jurisdiction 
can handle might differ from the number in another jurisdiction with 
a different practice. The local calibration should not come at the back 
end, in determining if there was indeed adequate assistance in 
appellate review of a post–conviction ineffective assistance claim. 
Assistance of counsel should always come out effective, and what one 
jurisdiction needs to accomplish such an outcome may vary from 
another. 
The current incorporation of localism into ineffective assistance 
jurisprudence advances a race to the bottom, with the troubling 
phenomenon of courts excusing low practice levels simply because 
there are low practice levels in that locale. For misdemeanor 
representation, already beset with issues of resource deprivation and 
other systemic pressures, courts considering post–conviction 
ineffective assistance claims should reject these invalid aspects of 
localism and instead should judge attorney competency against 
uniform standards. There comes a point where efficiency and 
inadequate funding push too hard against individual rights. 
Individuals facing misdemeanor charges and potential jail time have a 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, and 
there is no “resource deprivation” or “triage” exception to this 
important constitutional guarantee. 
There are a number of structural impediments to the development 
of a jurisprudence of ineffective assistance of counsel in misdemeanor 
cases.321 However, courts should strive to overcome barriers wherever 
possible in order to add their institutional voice to the conversation 
about misdemeanor representation, and to prompt often-reluctant 
legislatures to live up the realities of the misdemeanor-driven criminal 
justice system that they have created. By rejecting localism in 
ineffective assistance of counsel analyses, courts can urge professional 
organizations to either adopt uniform misdemeanor-specific standards, 
or to clarify whether current standards apply to misdemeanors and 
explain how they might apply to misdemeanor advocacy. In this way, 
courts can act as provocateurs: pushing the other relevant institutions 
— including legislative bodies, prosecutors, and defender offices — to 
fashion workable solutions to the difficult task of defining and 
supporting effective misdemeanor representation. 
Due to the cost of indigent defense, a strong judicial message about 
the need for reforming an unconstitutional system of defense delivery 
 
excessive caseload). 
 321 See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
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might prompt further efforts to move unnecessary cases out of the 
lower criminal courts. Indeed, a number of factors make this a critical 
time for the judiciary to add its voice to the crisis in misdemeanor 
representation, including: legislatures’ current willingness to engage in 
decriminalization; the nationwide financial crisis that is putting 
significant pressure on state, county, and local budgets;322 a growing 
awareness of the difficulties that individuals with criminal records, 
however minor, have in joining or rejoining the workforce; and the 
implications of these barriers for public safety.323 
C. The Role of Professional Organizations: Promulgating Standards for 
Misdemeanor Representation 
Professional organizations’ written standards for criminal justice 
actors play a powerful role in reform efforts. For example, the ABA 
Criminal Justice Standards are developed and promulgated by broadly 
representative task forces of criminal justice practitioners that include 
prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, academics, the public, and other 
groups that may have a special interest in the subject.324 The resulting 
standards build on the diversity of experience of these groups and 
reflect many salutary practices. One commentator noted how 
“[p]rosecutors and defense attorneys have found the Standards 
useful . . . in guiding their own conduct, and in training and 
mentoring colleagues.”325 In addition, as explored in Part II.B.2 above, 
the Supreme Court has cited ABA Standards in numerous cases 
analyzing prevailing professional norms under Strickland’s first prong, 
and recently cited a variety of other standards as well.326 
 
 322 See Adam Skaggs & Maria da Silva, America’s Judiciary: Courting Disaster, L.A. 
TIMES (July 8, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/08/opinion/la-oe-
skaggs-dasilva-courts-20110708; see also DIVERTING AND RECLASSIFYING MISDEMEANORS, 
supra note 69. 
 323 See supra notes 40, 51, 101 and accompanying text.  
 324 See Marcus, supra note 195, at 3.  
 325 Id. at 3; see also Drinan, supra note 176, at 457 (“These [ABA Criminal Justice] 
standards are beneficial to litigants because they allow plaintiffs’ counsel to measure 
the system’s shortcomings against an objective predetermined index of factors, and 
because they assist courts and legislative bodies in crafting appropriate remedies.”); 
Love, supra note 194, at 7 (“The two most respected sources of criminal defense 
lawyers’ professional duty to the client are the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice . . . . Over the years, the 
Standards have earned their place as a measure of ‘prevailing professional norms’ for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment through the thoroughness and balance of the 
process by which they are developed.”). 
 326 See supra note 208 and accompanying text (describing citation to broad group 
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There are currently no misdemeanor-specific professional standards 
from a national organization such as the ABA.327 However, there are a 
number of public defender offices that have developed high-level 
practices in the lower courts,328 providing field development of 
salutary, specialized misdemeanor representation that awaits 
incorporation into existing sets of professional standards. At a time 
when misdemeanor representation matters more than ever,329 yet the 
low quality of such representation is well documented,330 it is critical 
that professional organizations act. Organizations that promulgate 
national standards should either set out separate misdemeanor 
standards or should clarify that existing standards apply to both 
misdemeanors and felonies. However, if these organizations choose 
the latter route, they must provide commentary explaining what is 
different about misdemeanor representation that would allow 
misdemeanor defenders to handle — if national caseload 
recommendations are adhered to — between double and triple the 
number of cases as felony defenders.331 
In 1996, the Department of Justice-funded National Advisory 
Committee on Indigent Defense Services issued a report noting: 
[T]he ever changing landscape in the criminal justice field, 
including increasingly complex statutory schemes and 
litigation, have outpaced the standards. Thus, all such national 
standards, whether by the ABA, NLADA, or other national 
criminal justice entities, need to be revised and updated to 
meet the modern needs of institutional defenders, contract 
defenders and assigned counsel in the nineties and into the 
twenty-first century.332 
 
of sources in Padilla). 
 327 See supra Part II.B.2. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 338-343 (describing 
Washington State standards).  
 328 See infra text accompanying notes 346-348 (describing offices that follow a 
holistic defense model); see also Legal Services, COMMUNITY LAW OFFICE, 
http://www.pdknox.org/writeup/2 (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (explaining that 
Knoxville Public Defenders’s office handles cases in Tennessee’s misdemeanor courts). 
 329 See supra Part I. 
 330 See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12 (finding that 
misdemeanor courts are depriving defendants of their right to counsel and are, at 
same time, wasting tax payer money); THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1 
(concluding that Florida courts, in an attempt to cope with large volumes of cases, 
have failed to provide due process to individuals charged with misdemeanors). 
 331 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (describing these national caseload 
recommendations).  
 332 NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, BLUE RIBBON ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
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By suggesting that a Justice Department research branch fund and 
develop defense practice standards, the Committee noted how national 
standards that “promote both high quality defense services and 
efficiency are crucial to the effective functioning of the criminal justice 
system as a whole, and to the adjudicatory function performed by the 
courts, prosecution, and defense.” The Committee pointed out how 
“[s]uch standards are also a critical tool for defenders nationwide in 
their ongoing battles to secure an adequate share of fiscal 
resources.”333 
At the time of its report, the Committee described a criminal justice 
crisis fueled by the “war on drugs,” as well as harsh penalties such as 
“three strikes” and mandatory sentencing laws.334 It recognized the 
need to revisit existing standards in order to adjust to current realities 
of the criminal justice system. Some fifteen years later, the crisis — as 
well as the underlying causes that the Committee identified — still 
exist. However, the exponential growth in misdemeanor prosecutions, 
combined with the explosion in potential collateral consequences of 
even minor criminal convictions and the wide availability of electronic 
criminal records, has created another crisis, this one located in the 
nation’s lower criminal courts. 
By allowing for higher caseloads and different levels of experience 
for misdemeanor defense counsel,335 many national and local 
organizations at least implicitly recognize that the type of assistance 
that individuals charged with misdemeanors require differs from the 
type of assistance for more serious felony or capital cases. While the 
ABA sets forth separate guidelines for capital cases, the Criminal Justice 
Standards draw no such lines; all non-capital cases are lumped 
together.336 The same is true in the standards of other professional 
organizations, such as the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association’s Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense 
Representation.337 
The ABA and other professional organizations that promulgate 
standards could simply clarify that their general standards apply to 
representation in all types of cases, from misdemeanors carrying the 
 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 7 (1997), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/ 
Defender_Standards/Blue_Ribbon#two. 
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. 
 335 See supra Part I.A. 
 336 See supra Part II.B.2. (discussing professional standards). 
 337 See supra note 226 and accompanying text (noting how NLADA Guidelines do 
not mention the word “misdemeanor”). 
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potential for little jail time to felonies carrying the potential for life in 
prison. However, another option would be to differentiate, and to 
specify more particularly what is expected of misdemeanor 
representation. Such misdemeanor standards could come, for example, 
in the form of requirements of more familiarity with and training 
about the myriad collateral consequences of criminal convictions. 
The full content of misdemeanor-specific standards is beyond the 
scope of this Article, which instead focuses on the need for such 
standards and the particular competencies of the different institutions 
in articulating them. However, the Washington State Bar Association’s 
Standards for Indigent Defense Services (“Washington Standards”) offer 
one example of standards that differentiate misdemeanor 
representation. The eighteen standards cover topics including 
“Guidelines for Awarding Defense Contracts,” “Limitations on Private 
Practice of Contract Attorneys,” “Caseload Limits and Types of 
Cases,” and “Support Services.”338 By far the longest and most detailed 
is Standard Fourteen, entitled “Qualification of Attorneys.” It seeks to 
define the minimum professional qualifications necessary for an 
attorney to fulfill the mandate of delivering effective assistance of 
counsel. 
The first part of “Qualification of Attorneys” covers minimum 
qualifications for all defense counsel, while the second part sets out 
“[t]rial attorneys’ qualifications according to severity or type of 
case.”339 Misdemeanors are one category under this “severity or type of 
case” breakdown. The qualification standard for misdemeanors simply 
refers back to the first part of the standard, covering minimum 
qualifications. In other words, the Washington Standards are clear that 
misdemeanors require less experience than other types of 
representation. However, the minimum qualifications that apply to 
misdemeanor representation cover some important ground. The most 
basic qualifications reference the need to meet state Supreme Court 
requirements for practicing law, to be familiar with statutes, case law 
and other sources “relevant to their practice area,” and to complete 
seven hours of continuing legal education relating to public defense 
practice each year.340 The Washington Standards also call for 
familiarity “with mental health issues and [the ability] to identify the 
 
 338 See WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES at 
Standards 3, 7, 13, and 18 (adopted Sept. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.defensenet.org/about-wda/WSBA%20Indigent%20Defense%20Standards.pdf. 
 339 The third and fourth parts deal with appellate representation and interns, 
respectively. Id. Standard 14. 
 340 Id. Standard 14.1(A), (B), (E). 
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need to obtain expert services.”341 For anyone with practice experience 
in the lower criminal courts, the importance of familiarity with such 
issues — which arise with great frequency as individuals with mental 
health issues cycle in and out of the criminal justice system — is clear. 
Finally, the “Qualification of Attorneys” standards for misdemeanor 
representation require familiarity “with the collateral consequences of 
a conviction, including possible immigration consequences and the 
possibility of civil commitment proceedings based on a criminal 
conviction.”342 As noted in this Article, misdemeanor representation 
requires much more than familiarity with immigration consequences 
for non-citizen clients. Although the Washington misdemeanor 
qualification standards need more development, including in the area 
of collateral consequences, they are an important model for specific 
standards of misdemeanor representation. The misdemeanor standards 
make clear the expectations for attorneys representing clients in the 
lower courts. In this regard, they stand in stark contrast to other 
standards that make no attempt to separate out misdemeanor 
representation and rely on general standards, such as one that simply 
states: “Prior to handling a criminal matter, counsel should have 
sufficient experience or training to provide quality representation.”343 
The existence of such particularized standards demonstrates 
recognition of the need for separate rules, as well as the motivation to 
add them to the existing set. Standards relating to a particular area of 
criminal practice, such as misdemeanors, offer an important 
comparative data point for review of ineffective assistance claims, as 
well as a benchmark for appropriate defense representation. 
Professional standards specific to misdemeanor representation also 
give courts something other than local practice — which is often so 
poor as to drag norms to unconscionable levels344 — against which to 
judge a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
D. The Role of the Defender Community 
When committed and innovative defender offices set high 
expectations for their attorneys, the resulting salutary practices can 
influence other offices, national practice standards, and ineffective 
assistance jurisprudence. Defender standards grow out of best 
 
 341 Id. Standard 14.1(D). 
 342 Id. Standard 14.1(C). 
 343 PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES, supra note 192, at GUIDELINE 1.2b. 
 344 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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defender practices,345 and thus the defender community plays an early 
and unique role in the development of a body of sources that might 
guide misdemeanor representation. Examples of such defender 
community leadership include the Neighborhood Defender Service of 
Harlem and the Bronx Defenders. Both are community-based offices 
that follow a holistic model of criminal defense.346 This approach, 
which has been influential on a number of levels, treats clients as 
individuals with a variety of potential issues in need of services rather 
than simply as one narrow criminal case. One goal of the holistic 
approach is to address underlying causes of involvement in the 
criminal justice system in order to avoid further involvement, 
including consideration of the collateral consequences of any criminal 
conviction as an integral part of defender practice.347 Integrating 
collateral consequences into defender practice has become a model for 
other offices,348 and it is also making its way into national standards.349 
A more holistic approach truly entered the national discussion about 
the role of defenders in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Padilla, which held that defense counsel has a duty to warn 
 
 345 See NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, A PILOT ASSESSMENT OF THE OFFICE OF 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA (SAN JOSE), at xi app.A 
(2003) (“[T]here are many innovative policies and programs that have been 
established in indigent defense systems across the country that are nationally regarded 
as necessary ‘best practices’ to ensure high quality services to those of insufficient 
means.”). 
 346 See THE BRONX DEFENDERS, CTR. FOR HOLISTIC DEF., THE 2011 HOLISTIC DEFENSE 
FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT 2-4 (2011) [hereinafter 
2011 HOLISTIC DEFENSE], available at http://www.bronxdefenders.org/sites/default/ 
files/2011%20Technical%20Assistance%20RFP.pdf (explaining Bronx Defenders’ 
theory of holistic representation); NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDER SERVICE OF HARLEM, 
http://www.ndsny.org/index.html (last visited July 15, 2011) (noting how through a 
holistic approach NDS of Harlem seeks to address underlying issues, minimize future 
incidents, and provide referral services to problems arising out of collateral 
consequences); see also Holistic Representation, KNOX COUNTY PUB. DEFENDERS 
COMMUNITY L. OFF., http://www.pdknox.org/writeup/80 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011) 
(explaining Knox County Public Defenders’s holistic representation model). 
 347 See 2011 HOLISTIC DEFENSE, supra note 346, at 2. 
 348 See, e.g., MD OFF. OF THE PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.opd.state.md.us/ 
services.html (last visited July 15, 2011) (describing office and services provided); see 
also SYSTEM OVERLOAD, supra note 38, at 29-32 (section entitled “Doing it Better: 
Holistic and Community-Based Approaches”). 
 349 UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT, supra note 68, at 12-14; 
PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 67, § 14-3.2(f) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel 
should determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any 
plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the 
contemplated plea.”). 
  
362 University of California, Davis [Vol. 45:277 
clients about the deportation consequences of a conviction.350 The 
influence of this approach is also apparent in the numerous lower 
court decisions following Padilla, many of which have extended the 
duty to warn to collateral consequences other than deportation.351 
Although some offices have written practice standards,352 many lack 
clear guidelines.353 Memorializing these practices in written local 
defender office standards has the benefit of providing clear guidance 
and benchmarks against which to evaluate attorney competency. In 
addition, these standards would come from service providers with the 
expertise to understand and articulate best practices. 
Although voluntary adoption of best practices by defender offices 
benefits clients and advances defense practice norms, the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism for such standards can weaken their effect. 
One recent report on the state of indigent defense noted how, 
although almost all national and local practice standards are 
voluntary, 
[A]n indigent defense program could choose to require that its 
attorneys adhere to them. For example, certain of the 
recommendations contained in NLADA’s Performance 
Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation could be 
made mandatory for an agency’s attorneys, and sanctions 
could be imposed in instances of non-compliance. However, 
we are aware of no defense program that has actually 
developed a vigorous process to monitor and strictly enforce 
compliance with performance standards.354 
The report describes how “at least one state has adopted standards that 
purport to be mandatory as a condition for receiving funding from the 
state,” referring to the Indiana Public Defender Commission’s 
 
 350 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); see also Conference Report, 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Padilla and the Future of the Defense Function 
(June 20-21, 2011), http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx?ccmd= 
ContentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10396&contentid=20736&folderid=360 
(describing event to “bring together people with a variety of experiences in the 
criminal justice system to discuss the future of the role of the defense lawyer”).  
 351 See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 304 Ga. App. 878, 884 (Ct. App. 2010) (extending 
Padilla to sex offender registration); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2010), cert. granted, 9 A.3d 1133 (Pa. 2010) (holding that counsel must 
warn of possible loss of pension as a consequence to entering plea).  
 352 See COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERVS., PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND COMPLAINT 
PROCEDURES (2010), available at http://www.publiccounsel.net/private_counsel_ 
manual/chapter_four.html. 
 353 MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 41. 
 354 JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 72, at 35. 
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Standards for Indigent Defense Services in Non-Capital Cases.355 Of 
course, as described in Part II.B.2 above, such standards do not 
specifically address misdemeanor practice.356 
While a full exploration of the myriad ways in which the defender 
community might set and enforce standards for misdemeanor practice 
is beyond the scope of this Article, the remainder of this section briefly 
describes two areas in need of immediate attention for training, policy, 
and standards: first, the understanding and use of collateral 
consequences for interviewing and counseling clients, and negotiating 
plea bargains with the State; and second, the alarming rate of waiver of 
the right to counsel in many lower courts around the nation. 
1. Collateral Consequences as a Focus of Misdemeanor Attorney 
Training and Practice 
In 2002, the ABA published the Ten Principles of a Public Defense 
Delivery System in recognition of “the need for clear and concise 
guidance on how to design an effective system for providing public 
defense services.”357 Principle Number Six calls for a system where 
“[d]efense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the 
complexity of the case.”358 The ABA intended this Principle to capture 
the idea that there are certain classes of cases that require a certain 
level of experience and expertise. For example, the commentary for 
this Principle cites the “Attorney Eligibility” guideline from the ABA’s 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases.359 Few would argue with the notion that defense 
counsel needs experience before handling cases that carry significant 
potential prison — or death — sentences, or with the idea that 
attorneys need particularized training to handle these cases, such as in 
the area of forensic evidence or capital mitigation advocacy. 
Misdemeanor lawyering also calls for particularized training and 
ability. In a system of generally low-stakes criminal sanctions for 
misdemeanor convictions,360 defense counsel must have training and 
 
 355 Id. at 34 & n.76 (citing IND. PUB. DEFENDER COMM’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT 
DEFENSE SERVICES IN NON-CAPITAL CASES (1995), available at http://www.in.gov/ 
judiciary/pdc/docs/standards/non-cap.pdf.).  
 356 The Indiana Standards set minimum qualifications for attorneys handling 
felonies, but only mention minimum qualifications for misdemeanor cases in the 
juvenile delinquency context. Id. at 9. 
 357 See TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM, supra note 288, at iv. 
 358 Id. at 1. 
 359 Id. at 5 & n.21.  
 360 But see supra notes 55-61 (describing jurisdictions such as Maryland, with 10-
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expertise in the non-criminal sanctions that often overwhelm any 
sentence that the trial judge imposes.361 As the Director of Bronx 
Defenders noted, “[W]hen a plea to disorderly conduct makes a client 
presumptively ineligible for New York City public housing, as it does 
here, or where two convictions for turnstile jumping makes a lawful, 
permanent resident non-citizen deportable, then something has got to 
change and indigent defense needs to look different.”362 This 
observation captures the concept of focusing defender resources on 
issues that matter most to the client. In the case of misdemeanors with 
low-level sanctions, severe collateral consequences of any conviction 
will surely play a large role in a defendant’s cost-benefit analysis of 
entering a guilty plea or going to trial.363 
Training for attorneys just entering defense work (and thus most 
likely to handle misdemeanor cases), or for attorneys who practice 
exclusively in the lower criminal courts, should focus on the most 
pervasive and common collateral consequences of criminal 
convictions.364 To be sure, there is some positive movement in this 
direction. However, it is still quite limited. For example, Wisconsin’s 
Office of the State Public Defender offers a variety of continuing legal 
education trainings, one of which is entitled Handling a Misdemeanor 
Case from A to Z.365 In 2009, the A to Z agenda did not list any topic 
relating to collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction.366 
The 2010 training agenda had one hour on “Immigration 
Consequences of Conviction,”367 presumably included as a result of 
the Supreme Court’s Padilla decision.368 Although it is certainly an 
improvement that at least one collateral consequence has found its 
 
year maximum sentences for some misdemeanors and California, where certain crimes 
“wobble” between misdemeanor and felony).  
 361 See supra Part I.B (discussing the collateral consequences of misdemeanor 
convictions). 
 362 Spangenberg Study, supra note 129, at 145. 
 363 See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing such analyses by 
defendants).  
 364 Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word, supra note 90, at 498. 
 365 See Year 2010, CLE Approved Programs, WIS. ST. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFFICE (Jan. 13, 
2011), http://training.wisspd.org/file.php/1/CLE/Complete_CLE_List_1998-2010_.pdf.  
 366 See Handling a Misdemeanor Case from A to Z, WIS. ST. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFFICE, 
http://wisspd.org/htm/ATPracGuides/Training/ProgMaterials/AZ09/MilwAgenda.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011).  
 367 Handling a Misdemeanor Case from A to Z, WIS. ST. PUB. DEFENDER’S OFFICE, 
http://wisspd.org/htm/ATPracGuides/Training/ProgMaterials/AZ10/MadAgenda.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2011). 
 368 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010). 
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way into these new attorney trainings,369 a one- or two-day training 
cannot cover everything; misdemeanor attorneys should be aware of 
more than immigration consequences for non-citizen clients. In 
addition to immigration, misdemeanor attorneys should learn about 
the jurisdiction’s statutory bars to employment for individuals with a 
criminal record, as well as any other serious collateral consequence 
that would apply if the client were convicted.370 
Once armed with important information about collateral 
consequences that matter to the client, misdemeanor attorneys have 
the greatest potential for creative use of such information in plea-
bargaining with prosecutors to avoid unintended consequences in 
particular cases.371 There are a number of reasons for this potential, 
including the fact that in low-level cases, prosecutors may be more 
flexible in working out bargains that avoid serious collateral 
consequences, and that defenders often have a number of alternative 
misdemeanors, noncriminal offenses, or diversion programs to choose 
from in proposing solutions. As Justice Stevens noted in Padilla: 
Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of 
the deportation consequences of a particular criminal offense 
may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in 
order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the 
likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an 
offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence. 
At the same time, the threat of deportation may provide the 
defendant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an 
offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a 
dismissal of a charge that does.372 
 
 369 Immigration consequences are also now on the general CLE training list in 
Wisconsin. See Immigration and Criminal Defense in the Post-Padilla Era, WIS. ST. PUB. 
DEFENDER’S OFFICE (Feb. 25, 2011), http://wispdtraining.blogspot.com/2011/02/on-
demand-immigration-and-criminal.html (describing course focusing on defense 
counsel’s Sixth Amendment duty to counsel non-citizen clients about immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction).  
 370 See supra Part I.B (discussing serious collateral consequences of misdemeanor 
convictions). 
 371 For a more fully developed exploration of defenders’ use of collateral 
consequences in negotiations, see Roberts, supra note 137, at 719-25.  
 372 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (“By bringing deportation consequences into th[e 
plea bargaining] process, the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach 
agreements that better satisfy the interests of both parties.”); see also Smyth, Holistic Is 
Not a Bad Word, supra note 90, at 493; Robert M.A. Johnson, Message from the 
President, PROSECUTOR, May–June 2001, at 5 (former President of the National District 
Attorneys Association writing that prosecutors “must consider [collateral 
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The Padilla decision thus highlighted the importance of incorporating 
collateral consequences into plea negotiations. However, standards for 
and training about negotiation are not common in defender offices; 
the skill of negotiation is perhaps one of the most neglected skills, 
beginning in law school and continuing into practice.373 
Misdemeanor attorneys should also be trained to pursue any sealing 
or expungement mechanisms available for the client’s criminal 
records.374 In some jurisdictions, there may be a certificate of relief 
from civil disabilities or other document to ameliorate such things as 
employer hesitancy in hiring individuals with criminal records.375 Such 
relief mechanisms are particularly important in an era where 
landlords, employers, and the general public have easy electronic 
access to an individual’s criminal records, and in jurisdictions where 
dismissals remain on the record until expunged.376 Although felony 
convictions can rarely be sealed, many jurisdictions allow for sealing 
of misdemeanor records, and misdemeanor defenders should integrate 
this critical step — as well as helping the client apply for certificates of 
relief — into client representation. 
The defender community has an important role to play in training 
new attorneys and attorneys focused on lower court practice. 
Trainings aimed at collateral consequences, expungement, sealing, or 
other relief mechanisms, are a critical facet of misdemeanor 
representation, and deserve more attention than they currently 
receive. 
 
consequences] if we are to see that justice is done”). 
 373 This observation is based on my own practice experience, as well as my 
experience researching law school curricular offerings as I developed a course on plea 
bargaining that includes readings about and a simulation involving negotiation. Many 
schools offer a general Lawyer Bargaining or Negotiation type of class, but these are 
generally limited-enrollment seminars taken by small numbers of students. See, e.g., 
Course Information Spring 2012, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR C. L., 
http://apps.law.asu.edu/Apps/Registrar/CourseInfo/AllCourses.aspx?semester=20121 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (showing that there is one Negotiation course offered). 
 374 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 938.355 (2011) (juvenile expungement statute); WIS. STAT. 
§ 973.015 (2011) (expungement of record in limited instances for adults).  
 375 See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 701-03 (2011); cf. Joy Radice, Administering 
Justice: Removing Barriers to Reentry, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 28-30, 41), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1864917 (describing how under New York law, employers must use 
presumption of rehabilitation when considering hiring individual presenting 
certificate of rehabilitation, but how “[m]any unanswered questions exist about how 
employers actually use certificates in their decision-making. If the court decisions 
described above are any indication, the consideration may be minimal at best.”).  
 376 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing Maryland’s expungement 
statute and electronic access to records).  
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2. Lowering High Rates of Waiver of the Right to Counsel in the 
Lower Courts 
Misdemeanor-focused trainings will only benefit clients who 
actually receive the assistance of counsel. Yet in lower courts across 
the country, there are high rates of waiver of the right to counsel, 
often under troubling circumstances. For example, under Colorado 
state law, indigent defendants facing misdemeanor charges must 
consult with a prosecutor before applying for appointed counsel. It is 
only after the prosecutor informs the court of any plea agreement 
between the state and the uncounseled defendant that the court must 
advise the defendant of his right to court-appointed counsel (if 
qualified).377 This troubling incentive structure is clearly constructed 
to encourage waiver of the right to counsel, as the first mention of 
counsel comes when an agreed-upon bargain is already on the table. A 
defendant who has already accepted such a bargain and stands before 
the judge ready to enter the plea is unlikely to suddenly assert his 
newfound right to counsel.378 
Waiver of the right to counsel is permissible only if the judge 
ensures that the defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
relinquishing this constitutional right.379 Yet there are high waiver 
rates and waiver practices in lower courts across the country that are, 
like Colorado’s, questionable.380 For example, a recent study of 
 
 377 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-301(4) (2006).  
 378 See RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 15 (describing a similar incentive 
structure in Michigan’s lower courts); see also Ronald E. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, 
The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2045, 2087 (2006) (“Statewide court data from Minnesota and North Carolina 
fail to reveal any impact on waiver rates when those states enacted application fee 
statutes. This statewide pattern might show that defendants place a higher value on 
defense counsel than the amount of the application fee, or it could reflect the efforts of 
trial judges and defense lawyers to spare the defendants from such choices. We are 
more inclined to believe the latter, because it fits with the often-observed power of 
trial actors to dampen the effects of criminal justice policy changes imposed from the 
top, especially in the short-run.”). 
 379 See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 81 (2004) (“The constitutional requirement is 
satisfied when the trial court informs the accused of the nature of the charges against 
him, of his right to be counseled regarding his plea, and of the range of allowable 
punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.”). 
 380 See Wright & Logan, supra note 378, at 2080 (comparing felony and 
misdemeanor waiver rates in North Carolina and Minnesota). There is a pending 
constitutional challenge to the Colorado statute. See Complaint at 1, Colo. Crim. Def. 
Bar v. Ritter, No. 10-cv-2930-JLK, (D. Colo. Dec. 2, 2010) (“Plaintiffs bring this action 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) to obtain a declaration that Colorado violates the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by deferring the appointment of 
counsel for certain indigent criminal defendants until after such defendants engage in 
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Florida’s lower courts revealed that 66% of defendants came to their 
arraignment without counsel. Of those defendants, half waived the 
right to counsel.381 Defendants who waived their right to counsel were 
most likely to enter a guilty plea at arraignment, with more than 80% 
pleading either guilty or no contest, which has the same legal effect as 
a guilty plea,382 at that early appearance.383 
A number of studies have highlighted the doubtful validity of the 
waiver process in a variety of jurisdictions.384 In one study: 
In a number of jurisdictions, site teams observed judges 
ignoring the rules regarding waiver. Time after time, courts 
made clear to defendants that they must waive counsel to 
proceed. There were no inquiries into the education or 
sophistication of the defendants and very few efforts to warn 
defendants regarding the dangers of self-representation or the 
kind of assistance counsel could provide. Often the waiver was 
incorporated into the first part of the proceeding and was 
presented as a rhetorical, compound question directed at 
whether the defendant wanted to dispose of the case quickly. 
The judge asked the defendant something like, “You are 
waiving counsel and wish to proceed now, right?” and the 
defendant responded, “Yes.”385 
Even when valid, waiver of the constitutional right to counsel is 
troubling because it means that a defendant is representing himself in 
a proceeding that may result in a criminal record, a jail sentence, or 
some other significant outcome. Despite a defendant’s satisfaction with 
the outcome of his case — for example a plea bargain to a seemingly 
minor misdemeanor that allows him to avoid incarceration — that 
defendant will likely be unaware of the myriad collateral consequences 
of that conviction.386 This may include ignorance of the fact that the 
misdemeanor can be used to enhance punishment in a later 
conviction. As the former Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court 
 
discussions with prosecuting attorneys regarding potential plea offers.”). 
 381 THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 15. 
 382 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining “no contest” pleas).  
 383 THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 23 tbl.9; see also Wright & Logan, supra 
note 378, at 2080-82 (stating that, although “precious little data exist on waivers of 
counsel in misdemeanor cases,” approximately 40% of misdemeanor defendants in 
North Carolina waived counsel). 
 384 See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 39; MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE 
WASTE, supra note 12, at 15-16. 
 385 MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 15. 
 386 See supra Part I (setting out various collateral consequences). 
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noted in one example, “[S]pur-of-the-moment decisions to plead 
guilty to driving on a suspended license or under the influence can be 
used to charge a subsequent suspended license or DUI offense as a 
felony in Florida.”387 
In addition to ignorance about potential enhanced punishment 
based on a misdemeanor conviction, waiver means that there is no 
counsel to warn a defendant about serious collateral consequences of 
his guilty plea and conviction. This raises interesting legal issues in the 
wake of Padilla v. Kentucky.388 There is now a constitutional duty for 
defense counsel to warn clients about the deportation consequences of 
a criminal conviction, a duty that some lower courts have extended 
beyond deportation to include other serious consequences such as sex 
offender registration.389 The combination of high waiver rates in 
misdemeanor cases, high rates of guilty pleas after waiver in some 
jurisdictions, and the many serious collateral consequences that flow 
from misdemeanor convictions raises the question of whether a court 
must ensure that a defendant realizes he is giving up his right to 
counsel about such collateral consequences through his waiver. It also 
raises the question of whether a court’s inquiry about the matter is 
sufficient, given the inability of the court to question a defendant 
about things such as citizenship to determine what collateral 
consequences might apply. Finally, lowering high rates of waiver in 
the lower courts could lead to significant long-term savings, as 
effective defense advocacy can result in fewer unnecessary convictions 
and, therefore, fewer individuals saddled with a criminal record that 
serves as a bar to most employment.390 These issues illustrate the need 
for guidance and an updated view about standards surrounding waiver 
in misdemeanor cases. 
The defender community’s voice on the issue of high rates of waiver 
in the lower courts is critical. In most jurisdictions, high workloads 
mean that public defenders struggle to handle existing clients’ cases.391 
A recommendation that defender offices ameliorate high waiver rates 
by providing counsel at the first appearance and representing more 
 
 387 THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 7; see also Nichols v. United States, 511 
U.S. 738, 738-39 (1994) (valid uncounseled misdemeanor can be used to enhance 
punishment in subsequent case). But see State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029, 1052 (Fla. 
2008) (“[T]he State may not use an uncounseled conviction to increase a defendant’s 
loss of liberty in the absence of a valid waiver of counsel.”). 
 388 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 389 See sources supra note 187.  
 390 See supra note 94- 96 (discussing employment bars based on criminal history).  
 391 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (describing high caseloads in 
many jurisdictions). 
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clients in lower court cases sounds unrealistic. However, defenders are 
uniquely situated to witness inappropriate waivers and to advocate on 
behalf of the individuals subject to such conditions. Defender offices 
are also situated to take positions on standards for waiver in 
misdemeanor cases. Although articulating salutary practice standards 
may not lead to immediate change, there is certainly precedent for the 
defender community advancing norms of effective assistance. The 
decision in Padilla came after the development of a holistic defender 
movement that took collateral consequences into account in defense 
advocacy392 and the articulation of professional standards 
encompassing a duty to counsel clients about deportation.393 The 
Court cited these developments in setting forth the constitutional 
standard.394 
The defender community is the front line in defining standards for 
effective misdemeanor assistance. By training lawyers to incorporate 
collateral consequences into interviewing, counseling, negotiation, 
and sentencing advocacy, defender offices do more than provide a 
critical piece of assistance to clients facing misdemeanor charges. 
These offices also influence others in the defender community, as well 
as professional organizations that write defense practice standards and 
courts that decide ineffective assistance claims. This same influence 
could be felt in the area of waiver of the right to counsel if defender 
offices received resources needed to cover more of those cases. 
CONCLUSION 
“Most people who go to court in the United States go to 
misdemeanor courts. The volume of misdemeanor cases is 
staggering.”395 Yet the view expressed in one recent report is 
unfortunately representative of the quality of representation in many 
of the nation’s lower courts: “the emphasis on celerity of case 
processing has led many of the criminal justice stake holders . . . 
interviewed in one jurisdiction . . . to colloquially refer to the district 
[misdemeanor] court arraignment dockets as ‘McJustice Day.’ ”396 
Misdemeanor defenders struggle with high workloads and few 
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resources. Indeed, some defenders — and even entire offices — have 
found it necessary to litigate these resources issues.397 
Despite some recent recognition of the troubling quality of 
representation and coercive circumstances in the lower criminal 
courts, the meaning of effective misdemeanor representation remains 
largely undefined. There is no developed Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence of misdemeanor ineffective assistance of counsel to 
regulate attorney behavior; nor are there any professional standards 
for criminal defense practice that address the particular challenges of 
misdemeanor practice. The lack of standards and inadequate 
representation is a serious problem because misdemeanors matter. 
Even minor criminal convictions can lead to major collateral 
consequences, including deportation, loss of public housing and 
benefits, sex offender registration and community notification, and de 
facto bars to employment. Quality representation in misdemeanor 
cases can help individuals avoid unnecessary collateral consequences, 
as well as unnecessarily long jail sentences and wrongful convictions. 
There are also social costs to inadequate misdemeanor counsel, 
including the effects that unnecessary misdemeanor convictions can 
have on employment, housing, and other issues of daily living that are 
critical to the quality of life for individuals, families, and entire 
communities. Legislatures that underfund indigent defense should 
consider the overall costs that inadequate presentation has on society. 
Currently, there is an opportune climate for legislatures to take a 
broad view in advancing reform in the lower criminal courts and 
misdemeanor defense. The fiscal crisis, as well as a growing public 
recognition that minor convictions can hinder productive 
participation in society, has led to several important decriminalization 
actions in various jurisdictions. By moving low-level misdemeanors 
out of the criminal justice system, while refraining from funding cuts 
for defenders, legislatures could fulfill the constitutional mandate for 
effective assistance of counsel through smarter spending. 
There should be no dispute that there is a crisis of representation in 
the nation’s lower courts, driven by high volume and low resource 
 
 397 See, e.g., Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 950545629S, 1996 WL 636475 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1996) (declining to grant motion to dismiss in class action suit on 
behalf of indigent defendants alleging inadequate representation due to excessive 
caseloads and insufficient resources); State v. Bowens, 39 So. 3d 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2010) (certifying public defender office’s claim of conflict-of-interest arising 
from excessive caseloads to the Florida Supreme Court); Louisiana v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 
780 (La. 1993) (finding that indigent defendants were not provided with effective 
assistance of counsel due to large caseloads and lack of resources). 
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levels.398 This crisis must be taken seriously, as it leads to real harm in 
individual cases and threatens the very legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system. Development of misdemeanor representation standards 
alone will not reform a deeply troubled criminal justice system. Yet 
there is little hope of cultural or constitutional change in the lower 
courts, where most individuals charged with crimes experience the 
system, without first defining rights and responsibilities in the 
misdemeanor context. Standards for misdemeanor practice, articulated 
by defenders, professional organizations, and ineffective assistance 
jurisprudence, would provide a crucial baseline against which to judge 
the current crisis in the lower courts. The existence of standards 
would serve to highlight current inadequacies, pushing legislatures 
already concerned with fiscal realities to give serious consideration to 
decriminalization, better defense funding as a long-term savings 
strategy, and other potential solutions to the indigent defense crisis. 
Courts, professional organizations that write standards for criminal 
defense practice, and the defender community are best situated to 
define effective misdemeanor advocacy. Each of these institutions has 
particular competencies and specific roles to play in shaping 
misdemeanor standards. 
 
 398 See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE, supra note 12, at 14 (“the operation of 
misdemeanor courts in this country is grossly inadequate and frequently unjust”); 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 18, at 29 (noting how there are “deep-rooted 
problems in the delivery of indigent defense services, establishing a clear and pressing 
need for reform.”). 
